查韋斯身後的委內瑞拉:現在是算總賬的時候

IN THE flesh he seemed indestructible. Hugo Chávez was not especially tall, but he was built like one of the tanks he once commanded. He was possessed of seemingly inexhaustible energy. He travelled incessantly, both around his vast country and abroad. Each Sunday he would host a live television show lasting up to 12 hours. He would ring up ministers in the early hours of the morning to harangue them. For 14 years, everything that happened in Venezuela passed through his hands, or so he liked to think.

烏戈·查韋斯似乎有着一個堅不可摧的肉體。他個子不高，但體格就像他曾經指揮過的坦克一樣；他似乎有着使不完的精力；他不定地在國內外四處訪問；每逢週日，他都要主持一檔長達12個小時的電視真人秀節目；他會在凌晨時分叫醒手下的部長，然後對他們發表長編大論。不管他是否願意承認，他經手處理了14年中發生在委內瑞拉的每一件事。

Yet Mr Chávez turned out to have been as reckless with his health as with his country's economy and its democracy. Those late nights were fuelled by dozens of cups of sweet Venezuelan coffee. When in mid-2011 he revealed that he had been operated on for cancer, the lack of detail (“a baseball-sized tumour in the pelvic region”) suggested that the diagnosis had come late. He turned down an offer of care from a Brazilian hospital that had recently cured three Latin American presidents of cancer, preferring treatment in Cuba, where his precise condition could be kept secret. After a further two operations and chemotherapy, he declared himself cured.

然而，如同他對國家的經濟和民主不在意一樣，查韋斯對他的身體也毫不在意。他靠着幾十杯委內瑞拉甜咖啡撐過了那些個漫長的夜晚。2011年年中，他對外界宣佈自己剛剛進行了一次癌症手術，但是並沒有透露細節（只說是“骨盆處有一個像棒球那樣大小的腫瘤”），這讓人懷疑診斷已經太晚。在拒絕了一家近來曾治癒三位拉美國家總統癌症的巴西醫院提供的治療請求後，他選擇在古巴接受治療，因爲在那裏接受治療可以讓外界不瞭解他的真實病情。在接受了兩次手術和一次化療後，查韋斯宣佈自己已經痊癒。

Addicted to the drugs of power and popular acclaim, he campaigned for and won yet another six-year term in an election last October. During the campaign it was clear to those not blinded by loyalty that Mr Chávez was still a sick man. After the election he dropped out of sight, before making the sombre announcement on December 8th that he was going back to Cuba for yet another operation. If the worst happened, he said, Venezuelans should vote for Nicolás Maduro, his foreign minister and appointed vice-president, as his successor. The six-hour operation did not go well: after weeks in which his family kept a bedside vigil, joined by senior officials, Mr Chávez returned home last month, to die on March 5th at the age of 58.

出於對權力和民衆崇拜的沉迷，他投身競選並在去年10月的選舉中獲勝，贏得了又一個6年的執政期。在競選期間，在那些沒有被忠誠迷住眼睛的人看來，查韋斯仍是一個病人。選舉結束之後，他淡出人們的視線。直到去年12月8日，他才心情沉重地宣佈，他準備去古巴接受新的手術。他說，爲預防最壞的情況發生，委內瑞拉人應當選舉外交部長兼副總統尼古拉斯·馬杜羅爲他的接班人。然而6個小時的手術並不順利：在手術後的幾周內，他的家人和政府高官日夜守護在他的病牀傍邊。不過，他還是於上個月回到了祖國。3月5日，查韋斯去世，終年58歲。

To the end, Mr Chávez's rule was narcissistic, with country and constitution subordinated to his whim. In the tradition of the Latin American caudillo, he wanted to die with his boots on. When he was too ill to be sworn in for his new term on January 10th, his officials resolved to disregard the constitution that he himself had pushed through in 1999 and declared that the inauguration could happen at a later date.

查韋斯的統治直到最後都是一種自我陶醉型的，他要求他的國家和憲法屈從於他的各種古怪念頭，他按照拉丁美洲國家元首的傳統，希望死在自己的國家。在他因病重而無法於1月10日宣誓就職開始新任期的時候，政府官員決定置他於1999年親手通過的憲法與不顧，宣佈就職儀式可在今後任何一個日期舉行。

Hours before announcing his leader's death, Mr Maduro made an aggressive speech, flanked by army commanders, in which he accused the opposition of conspiring to reverse the “revolution” and “historical enemies” (ie, the United States) of poisoning Mr Chávez. He expelled two American military attachés. That looked like an effort to rally the faithful for the election that will now be called.

在宣佈查韋斯去世的消息之前，馬杜羅在一羣軍官的簇擁下發表了一次具有挑釁性的演講。在演講中，馬杜羅指責國內反對派陰謀推翻“革命”，同時還指責“宿敵（即美國）”毒死了查韋斯。隨後，他宣佈將兩名美國武官驅逐出境。這種努力看上去是爲了在馬上就要舉行的選舉中激發選民對他的信心。

Mr Chávez is mourned by millions of Venezuelans, for whom he was a kind of Robin Hood, shouting defiance at “the empire” (the United States once again) and the “oligarchy” (ie, the rich) while handing out windfall oil revenues. His opponents, many of whom saw him as a corrupt dictator, will sense deliverance. That may be premature.

查韋斯受到了數百萬委內瑞拉人的哀悼。在他們看來，查韋斯是一個羅賓漢式的人物，他一邊對那個“帝國”（還是指美國）和“寡頭”（即富人）發出大聲的抗議，一邊將大筆的石油收入分發給窮人。在他的對手看來，他是一個腐敗墮落的獨裁者，他們覺得將會得到解脫，但是還爲時過早。

A swift election may favour Mr Maduro, a former bus drivers’ leader who has been the de facto president since December. He will benefit from a sympathy vote. The sooner he has his own mandate, the less the risk that he will face rebellion, or at least passive resistance, from within the chavista camp. The opposition candidate will probably be Henrique Capriles. A moderate centrist and dogged campaigner, in last October's vote he cut Mr Chávez's margin of victory, from 26 percentage points in 2006 to 11 points. But demoralised by defeat, the opposition fared poorly in regional elections in December, though Mr Capriles was re-elected as governor of the state of Miranda, covering much of the capital, Caracas.

馬杜羅有可能在即將舉行的大選中獲勝。這位曾經當過公交車司機的領導人自去年12月以來一直就是實際意義上的總統。他將受益於人們的同情票。只要他早一天獲得授權，就能早一天減少面對起義的風險，至少也能早一天減少面對來自查韋斯陣營的消極抵抗的風險。反對派的候選人可能是恩裏克·卡普里萊斯，他是一個溫和的中間派和不肯輕易認輸的競選對手。在於年10月的大選中，他把查韋斯的領先優勢從2006年時的26的百分點縮小到現在的11個百分點。但是，由於在大選中的失敗讓反對派灰心喪氣，他們在去年12月舉行的地區選舉中也大敗而歸。不過，卡普里萊斯卻再次當選管轄首都加拉加斯大部分地區的米蘭達州州長。

The bigger question in the months ahead will be how much will survive of Mr Chávez's “Bolivarian revolution”, named for Simón Bolívar, South America's Venezuelan-born independence hero. His reluctance to surrender power despite his illness underlined just how personal his regime was. Through a mixture of unusual political talent and extraordinary good fortune, Mr Chávez managed to make himself into a world figure, perhaps the best-known Latin American after his friend and idol, Fidel Castro. His death means he will not be around to face the reckoning after 14 years of a corrupt, oil-fuelled autocracy.

在今後幾個月中，擺在委內瑞拉麪前的一個更重要的問題是：查韋斯以委內瑞拉出生的南美獨立英雄西蒙·玻利瓦爾的名字命名的“玻利瓦爾革命”還能堅持多久？他在病重的情況下仍然不願交出權力突顯出他的政權具有強大的個人性。通過將非凡的政治才能和出奇的好運結合在一起，查韋斯把自己塑造成了一個世界性的人物，他有可能是僅次於他的朋友和偶像的菲德爾·卡斯特羅之後最著名的拉丁美洲之人。因此，他在去世之後大概不會因14年的腐敗獨裁統治而面臨清算。

Swapping baseball for revolution

爲了革命而放棄棒球

Had things turned out differently, Hugo Chávez might have been a professional baseball player. That was his childhood dream. A typical Venezuelan mestizo, of African, indigenous and European descent, he was born in poverty (though not in the “mud hut” of the title of a hagiography) in Barinas, a remote state in the llanos, the tropical lowlands of the Orinoco basin. His father was a teacher, and his mother a teaching assistant. One of six brothers, he was largely brought up by his grandmother. He topped up the family income by selling home-made sweets in the street.

如果不是命運的陰差陽錯，查韋斯本可以成爲一名職業棒球選手。那是他童年時期的夢想。他是一名典型的委內瑞拉混血兒，身體裏流淌着非洲人，當地土著人和歐洲後裔的血。他出身貧寒（不過並不像聖徒傳記中所寫的那樣，出生在一個“土屋”中），家鄉巴里納斯州是一個偏遠的地區，這裏的大草原屬於典型的奧裏諾科河盆地的低地。他的父親是一名教師，母親在學校裏做些輔助性的工作。在兄弟6人當中，他主要是由祖母帶大。他在街上叫賣自家制作的甜點，給家庭增加收入。

By Mr Chávez's own account, he entered Venezuela's military academy because it had a good baseball team. As a young officer, he had a role in mopping up Cuban-supported guerrilla groups in the 1970s—a task that left him sympathetic to their aims. At the age of 23, he was already conspiring against the government.

按照查韋斯自己的講述，他考入委內瑞拉軍事學院是因爲那裏有一隻出色的棒球隊。作爲一名年輕的軍官，他曾在上世紀70年代參與了清剿由古巴支持的游擊隊的任務——不過，這次的任務讓他對游擊隊的目標產生了同情。在23歲的時候，查韋斯已經開始策劃推翻委內瑞拉政府。

In the 1980s Venezuela, previously seen as a model democracy, struggled as the price of oil, its main export, plunged and foreign debt mounted. Discontent at rising poverty, austerity and corruption exploded in three days of rioting in Caracas in 1989, and repression by the army left 400 dead. “It was the moment we were waiting for to act,” Mr Chávez said later. In February 1992, a lieutenant-colonel in command of a paratroop battalion, he made his move: he led a bloody but unsuccessful coup against the elected government of Carlos Andrés Pérez. Cashiered and jailed, he was released after just two years. He claimed that Bolívar was his inspiration.

在上世紀80年代，因其主要出口商品的石油的價格出現暴跌，同時外債累計達到了一定的程度，一度被視爲民主典範的委內瑞拉局勢動盪不安。人們出於對日益增長的貧困、財政緊縮和政府腐敗的不滿，1989年時，首都加拉加斯爆發了持續三天的暴亂。在留下400具屍體後，這場暴亂被軍隊鎮壓下去。查韋斯後來曾說：“這是我們準備行動的時刻。”1992年2月，身爲空降營指揮官的陸軍中校查韋斯開始了他的行動：爲了推翻卡洛斯·安德烈斯·佩雷斯的當選政府，他領導了一場流血的軍事政變，但沒有獲得成功。政變失敗後，查韋斯被解除職務並被關進監獄。但是，僅僅過了兩年，他就獲釋出獄。出獄後，查韋斯宣稱他從玻利瓦爾那裏獲得了靈感。

Bolívar had long been the object of an official, quasi-religious cult in Venezuela—but a conservative one. Mr Chávez would appropriate the cult for his own ends: he was said to leave an empty chair at meetings, claiming it was occupied by the ghost of the great Liberator. His second source of inspiration was Fidel Castro. In 1994 he visited Cuba where he began a close friendship with Mr Castro, whom he saw “as a father” and who became his most important counsellor. The Cuban leader, who had long viewed Venezuela’s oil wealth as the key to sustaining his own regime in his energy-short island, would find in Mr Chávez what he had been seeking for decades: a powerful, unconditional ally in a large Latin American country.

在委內瑞拉，玻利瓦爾長期以來就是一位獲得官方認可的、得到近似於宗教狂熱般崇拜的人物——但是，他是一位保守派人士。查韋斯把這種狂熱爲其所用：據說，他在開會時要讓一把椅子空着，他還宣稱說，這樣做是因爲椅子早已被那位偉大的解放者的鬼魂佔據了。他靈感的第二個來源是菲德爾·卡斯特羅。他在1994年出訪古巴，開啓了與卡斯特羅之間親密的朋友關係，使得“父親般”的卡斯特羅成爲他最重要的一位顧問。這位古巴領導人長期以來把委內瑞拉的石油財富看作是維持其政權在那個缺少能源的島嶼上生存下去的關鍵，他在查韋斯身上發現了他爲之尋找了幾十年的東西：同一個拉美大國結成一種強有力的並且是無條件的盟友關係。

Mr Chávez's world view had a third strand, too. He was an army man through and through: his early heroes had been nationalist military dictators of the 1970s, such as Peru’s Juan Velasco Alvarado and Panama’s Omar Torrijos. As Enrique Krauze, a Mexican writer, has pointed out, from eclectic reading Mr Chávez acquired the conviction that history is made by great men. He was influenced, too, by Norberto Ceresole, an obscure Argentine fascist who advised him when he was first in government. His regime had an anti-semitic undertone. The notion, peddled by some of his foreign supporters, that Mr Chávez was a moderate radicalised only by implacable opposition both at home and in Washington, does not square with the evidence.

查韋斯對世界的看法還有第三個來源。作爲一名純粹的軍人，查韋斯的早期崇拜者是上世紀70年代那些具有民族主義思想的軍事獨裁者，如祕魯的胡安·貝拉斯科·阿爾瓦拉多和巴拿馬的奧馬爾·托裏霍斯。正如墨西哥作家恩裏克·克勞澤所指出的那樣，查韋斯通過大量的閱讀認識到，歷史是由大人物創造的。對查韋斯產生影響的另一位人物是諾伯託·賽裏索爾，這位少爲人知的阿根廷法西斯主義者，在查韋斯第一次被關進監獄時曾給他提出過一些建議。他的政權還帶有一種反猶太主義的潛在傾向。據查韋斯的部分國外支持者說，那種認爲查韋斯是一位溫和的激進主義主義者的觀念同事實不符。

Mr Chávez was reluctantly persuaded—probably by Mr Castro—that elections were better than force as a route to power. His promises of a clean sweep of the old order and an end to poverty and corruption won him the presidency in December 1998 with 56% of the vote. His first act was to call a Constituent Assembly, which wrote a new constitution, approved by referendum. It enshrined respect for private property, human rights and an independent judiciary. But it also expanded the powers of the presidency and the armed forces. It gave Mr Chávez a chance to appoint loyalists to the supreme court and other nominally independent institutions.

可能是在卡斯特羅的說服下，查韋斯勉強地接受了這樣一種思想，那就是：同武力奪取政權相比，選舉是一條更好的道路。在1998年的大選中，他向選民承諾廢除舊秩序、終結貧困和腐敗，最終以56%的支持率當選總統。當選後，他的第一個行動是召集立憲大會制定新憲法，並在隨後舉行的全民公決中獲得通過。雖然新憲法對私有財產、人權和獨立司法表示出極大的尊重，但是這部憲法也擴大了總統和軍隊的權力，使查韋斯有機會任命忠實於他的人進入最高法院和其他一些有名無實的獨立機構。

Unlike Mr Castro, Mr Chávez derived his legitimacy from the ballot box. He would win three further presidential elections. But he ruled by confrontation and decree, rather than consensus. That triggered severe political unrest. The tensions came to a head on April 11th 2002, when hundreds of thousands marched on the presidential palace to demand Mr Chávez’s resignation: 19 people died, many killed by snipers who were never identified. When the army refused his order to use force to suppress the protests, the president surrendered his office; his most senior general told the nation he had resigned. But after a conservative business leader proclaimed himself president on April 12th and declared the constitution abolished, the army switched sides again and restored Mr Chávez to power.

與卡斯特羅不同的是，查韋斯的政權因出自選舉而具有合法性。雖然他在此後的總統選舉中又三次獲勝，但是他的統治依靠的是對抗和強制命令，而不是共識。這引發了嚴重的政治動盪。2002年4月11日，緊張氣氛達到高潮。當時，成百上千的遊行人羣來到總統府要求查韋斯辭職。但是，有19人在遊行中死亡，其中大部分人是被永遠也無法的到確認的狙擊手殺害的。當軍方拒絕了查韋斯提出的使用武力鎮壓遊行示威活動的命令時，這位委內瑞拉的總統只得在他的辦公室中舉手投降；隨後，他手下的高級軍官宣佈，總統已經辭職。但是，當一位保守派的商界領袖在4月12日宣佈自己接任總統並聲明廢除憲法後，軍方又迅速地轉變了立場，把權力重新還給查韋斯。

The elected autocracy

選出來的獨裁政權

That was a turning point. An opposition strike later that year paralysed PDVSA, the state oil monopoly, but it failed. Through the medium of these conflicts, Mr Chávez neutralised all potential rival sources of power. He turned PDVSA and the Central Bank into vehicles for opaque, off-budget spending. He staffed the government, the bureaucracy and the armed forces according to loyalty rather than merit. He packed the courts, and gained full control of the legislature, thanks to an ill-advised opposition boycott in 2005. When a revived opposition later did well in regional and legislative elections, he stripped local government and the National Assembly of much of their powers.

這是查韋斯政治生涯的一個轉折點。當年晚些時候，反對派發起了一場運動，原本想令國有的石油壟斷企業委內瑞拉國家石油公司（PDVSA）陷入癱瘓，但是最終還是失敗了。通過這一系列的衝突，查韋斯成功地瓦解了所有潛在對手的權力根基。他把PDVSA和委內瑞拉央行變成不透明的預算外開支機器。他任命政府和軍方官員的標準不是根據他們的功績，而是根據他們對他的忠誠度。得益於反對派在2005年發起的一場不明智的抵制運動，查韋斯得以將他的人安插到法院，並且獲得了對立法系統的絕對控制。當反對派在晚些時候舉行的地方選舉和立法會選舉中捲土重來之時，查韋斯又剝奪了地方政府和國民議會的大部分權力。

Three other things had come to Mr Chávez's rescue. The first was the spectacular rise in the world price of oil, which provided nearly all Venezuela's export earnings. In real terms, between 2000 and 2012 Venezuela's total oil revenues were more than two and a half times as great as those of the preceding 13 years—even though output declined after 2000 (see chart 1). The second was the advice of Mr Castro. Cuban officials drew up new social programmes, known as “missions”, starting with primary health care and adult education. In return for virtually free oil, Cuba provided Venezuela with thousands of doctors and sports trainers. Cuban intelligence and security agents surrounded Mr Chávez: he would never again be caught off-guard by street protests.

除此之外，還有三個事件拯救了查韋斯。第一件事情是世界油價的驚人上漲。由於石油收入佔了委內瑞拉幾乎全部的出口所得，即便其產量在2000年以後開始下降，但是在2000年到2012年間，石油收入仍是此前13年的2.5倍（如圖表1）。第二件事情是來自卡斯特羅的建議。當時，古巴的官員爲委內瑞拉制定了一些名爲“佈道”的新型的社會項目，首當其衝的是基本醫療保健和成人教育。由於委內瑞拉提供給古巴的石油近乎免費，作爲報答，古巴向委內瑞拉派出了數千名醫生和體育教練，古巴情報和安全部門的特工也爲查韋斯提供了全方位的保護，使他從此再也沒有陷入街頭抗議活動的騷擾。

The missions and the flood of oil money helped the president defeat a referendum in 2004 that would have removed him from office. He cowed the opposition. He harassed its media outlets: today, most free-to-air television channels spout government propaganda. The names of the 3.6m who signed the petition calling for the recall referendum were published; some were sacked from state jobs or denied passports or other official services.

這些佈道活動和大量的石油收入幫助查韋斯挺過了2004年那場本應該令其下臺的全民公決。獲勝後的查韋斯對反對派又是威脅又是恐嚇，並且還對國家宣傳機器進行嚴格的管制：如今，大部分免費播出的電視頻道都在爲政府搖旗吶喊。同時，查韋斯還將在那些在全民公決的請願書上簽名的360萬人的名字公諸於衆；這之後，有人因此而失掉了政府的工作，有人因此而無法拿到護照，還有人因此而不得參與國家事務。

The third godsend for Mr Chávez was George W. Bush. Thanks to the worldwide unpopularity of the American president, he could use his address to the UN to mock Mr Bush as “the devil”. He deployed his talents as a propagandist to weave a fiction to the effect that the coup attempt against him in April 2002 had been backed by the United States.

小布什是查韋斯的第三個天賜之物。多虧這位美國總統在世界範圍內不受歡迎，查韋斯利用他在聯合國的演講嘲笑布什，把他說成是“魔鬼”。他施展其鼓動家的才能虛構出一個故事，從而到達了將發生在2002年4月的軍事政說成是變得到了美國支持的效果。

In 2006 Mr Chávez won a landslide victory. At the height of his power, he declared that he was implanting “21st-century socialism”, though he never defined exactly what this was. He nationalised swathes of the economy, including telecommunications, electricity, cement and parts of the oil industry still in private hands.

在2006年的大選中，查韋斯以壓倒性的優勢贏得了勝利。在他的權力巔峯時期，查韋斯稱他正在爲委內瑞拉灌輸“21世紀的社會主義”。不過，他從未對這個概念給出過一個明確的定義。他還將大量的企業收歸國有，這其中即包括電信、電力、水泥，也包括部分仍由私人控制的石油企業。

Mr Chávez’s domination of Venezuela was never absolute. The two-Party democracy of 1958-98 bequeathed a popular belief in democratic values. In 2007 he lost a referendum on constitutional changes aimed at making his revolution irreversible (though many of these measures were later brought into law by decree).

不過，查韋斯對委內瑞拉的控制從未達到絕對的程度。1958年-1998年期間形成的兩黨民主制度給這個國家遺留下一個廣受信賴的民主價值觀。爲了讓給他的革命成爲不可逆轉的進程，查韋斯相對憲法進行修改。爲此，委內瑞拉在2007年舉行全民公決，查韋斯在這次全民公決中大敗而歸。（但是沒過多久，他的許多措施就在行政命令的要求下被強行寫入憲法）。

Everything Mr Chávez did was calculated to shore up his support among a majority of Venezuelans, while ignoring or harassing the rest. His original base was those people who laboured in the informal economy, which had blossomed in the 1980s after the end of the previous oil boom. To this he added a growing army of public-sector workers: under him, the public payroll more than doubled, to 2.4m.

查韋斯的所作所爲一方面是爲了提高他在大多數委內瑞拉人之中的支持率，一方面是爲了打擊和騷擾另一部分人。他的統治基礎是那些在非正規經濟中謀生的人，他們大多出生在前一次石油繁榮之後的上世紀80年代。爲了達到他的這個目標，查韋斯讓他們成爲在政府公共部門工作的工人：在他的支持下，在公共部門的工資翻了一番，人數也達到240萬人。

Sent by God

上帝派來的

Most of the motley collection of parties that backed the Bolivarian revolution were merged into the Venezuelan United Socialist Party (PSUV). Mr Chávez also created two other instruments of control: a militia of around 125,000, answerable directly to him rather than the army command; and a network of community councils which took over many of the functions (and revenues) of local government. Foreign leftist academics claimed that all this added up to an empowering “direct democracy”, superior to the incipient welfare state set up by Latin America’s social-democratic governments. But to others, it looked like a top-down charade of participation, in which all power lay with the president.

支持“玻利瓦爾革命”的政黨五花八門，在查韋斯的整合下，其中的大部分政黨合併組成了“委內瑞拉社會主義統一黨”（PSUV）。除此之外，查韋斯還組建了兩個特殊的統治工具：一個是由大約125000人組成的民兵組織，它不歸軍方指揮，直接聽命於查韋斯本人；另一個是被稱爲社區委員會的體系，這些委員會接管了地方政府的大部分功能（以及稅收收入）。在國外的極端左翼分子看來，把所有這些措施加起來形成了一種“直接民主”的授權。同拉美的社會黨政府建立的福利制度相比，這種“直接民主”授權具有優越性。。但是，在其他人看來，這種民主看起來就像是一種自上而下的虛僞的參與體系，在這種體系中，所有的權力都掌握在總統手裏。

Behind the propaganda, the Bolivarian revolution was a corrupt, mismanaged affair. The economy became ever more dependent on oil and imports. State takeovers of farms cut agricultural output. Controls of prices and foreign exchange could not prevent persistent inflation and engendered shortages of staple goods. Infrastructure crumbled: most of the country has suffered frequent power cuts for years. Hospitals rotted: even many of the “missions” languished. Crime soared: Caracas is one of the world’s most violent capitals. Venezuela has become a conduit for the drug trade, with the involvement of segments of the security forces.

拋開這些宣傳，“玻利瓦爾革命”就是一個腐敗墮落而且管理混亂的事件。在這場革命的影響下，國家經濟對石油和出口的依賴越來越嚴重；將農場收歸國有造成農產品產量下降；對價格和外匯實行管制無法阻止通貨膨脹一再發生，並且還造成了日常用品的短缺。國家基礎設施供不應求：數年來，這個國家的大部分地區一直都在遭受經常斷電的困擾。醫院陳舊老化：就連許多“佈道”工程都已經停止運轉。犯罪直線上升：首都加拉加斯已成爲世界上暴力犯罪最嚴重的首都之一，委內瑞拉已經成爲毒品交易的一條通道，甚至國家安全部隊的一些人員也參與其中。

Mr Chávez’s supreme political achievement was that many ordinary Venezuelans credited him with the handouts and did not blame him for the bungling. They saw him as one of them, as being on their side. His supporters, especially women, would say: “This man was sent by God to help the poor.” He had llanero wit and charm, and an instinctive sense of political opportunity. He deployed these talents each Sunday on “Aló, Presidente”, his interminable talk show. He had the skills of a televangelist, as Cristina Marcano and Alberto Barrera, two Venezuelan writers, put it in a revealing biography.

查韋斯最大的政治成就在於贏得了大部分普通委內瑞拉人的信任，並且他們不不會因爲管理不善而對他表示不滿。他們把查韋斯看作是他們中的一員，因此他們認爲查韋斯會站在他們的一邊。他的支持者，尤其是婦女支持者會說：“這個人是上帝派來幫助窮人的。”他有着大草原人特有的智慧和魅力，他對政治時機有着本能的感覺，他把這些才華都用在了每個星期日的“你好，總統”這檔談話秀節目中，節目中的查韋斯口若懸河，滔滔不絕。正如委內瑞拉的兩位作家——Cristina Marcano and Alberto Barrera在那本揭祕性的傳記中所說的那樣，查韋斯具有一種電視佈道者的才能。

Abroad, Mr Chávez deployed Venezuela's oil wealth to build an anti-American block he called the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (Alba). As well as Cuba, this included Bolivia and Ecuador, where far-left leaders were elected in the mid-2000s and several small client states in Central America and the Caribbean. For years he maintained a barely veiled alliance with Colombia’s FARC guerrillas, allowing them to use Venezuela as a base.

在國外，查韋斯利用委內瑞拉的石油財富打造了一塊反美的地區，他把這塊地區稱之爲“美洲玻利瓦爾聯盟”（Alba）。該聯盟的成員除古巴之外，還包括在21世紀頭十年中期開始由左翼執政的玻利維亞和厄瓜多爾，以及中美洲和加勒比海的數個附屬小國。數年來，查韋斯一直同“哥倫比亞革命武裝力量”游擊隊保持着幾乎不加掩飾的盟友關係，並且允許他們把委內瑞拉當做基地。

Argentina’s Cristina Fernández and her husband and predecessor, Néstor Kirchner, were semi-detached friends and clients. Venezuela bought Argentine bonds. In 2007 an alert customs official in Buenos Aires opened a suitcase stuffed with $800,000 in cash that was, its Venezuelan owner later confessed, a donation to Ms Fernández’s election campaign.

查韋斯同阿根廷的克里斯蒂娜·費爾南德斯和他的丈夫、已故前總統內斯托·基什內爾保持着半朋友半生意的關係。委內瑞拉購買阿根廷債券。在2007年的時候，布宜諾斯艾利斯的一位海關官員在打開一部手提箱時大吃已經，發現裏面裝滿了800000美元的現金。據這個手提箱的委內瑞拉主人事後承認，這是送給費爾南德斯夫人進行競選的捐款。

Alba was inimical to Brazil’s ambitions to lead South America. But Brazil’s left-wing presidents, while governing as moderate social-democrats, found it useful to indulge Mr Chávez. They appeared to see him as a means to blunt American influence in the region, while his economic mismanagement gave Brazilian business the chance to supply the goods and services that Venezuela ceased to produce.

對於巴西來說，“美洲玻利瓦爾聯盟”不利於她實現領導南美洲的野心。但是，巴西的的左翼領導人卻發現，縱容查韋斯有利於巴西。他們似乎是把他當做是消弱美國在該地區影響力的手段，同時查韋斯在經濟上的管理不善也讓巴西的企業抓住機會向委內瑞拉推銷這個國家已經不再生產的商品和服務。

Further afield, Mr Chávez delighted in embracing the world’s autocrats and dictators. He forged an alliance with Iran, which offered opaque “technical co-operation”. He agreed to buy arms worth some $15 billion, mainly from Vladimir Putin’s Russia. He made friends with Saddam Hussein, Robert Mugabe, Muammar Qaddafi and Bashar Assad.

在拉美之外的地區，查韋斯樂於同世界上的獨裁政權和專制政府打交道。他同伊朗結成聯盟，目的是提供“不透明的技術合作”；他同意從弗拉基米爾·普京的俄羅斯購進價值150億美元的武器；他還同薩達姆·侯賽因、羅伯特·穆加貝、邁阿穆爾·卡扎菲以及巴沙爾·阿薩德是朋友。

In Latin America Mr Chávez’s influence declined after 2006. Economic growth made the region’s voters less angry; and many Latin American left-wingers came to realise that chavismo was a blind alley. Though poverty fell fast in Venezuela, so it did elsewhere, as the commodity boom lifted the region (see chart 2). Some on the left had always been critical. Carlos Fuentes, a Mexican writer, dubbed Mr Chávez a “tropical Mussolini”. The 2008-09 world economic slowdown exposed the weaknesses of chavismo. While much of the rest of Latin America recovered quickly, Venezuela remained in recession for two years.

自2006年以來，查韋斯在拉美的影響力開始下降。雖然經濟增長使這個地區的選民變得不像以前那樣憤憤不平，但是拉美左翼的大部分人開始認識到，查韋斯主義是一條沒有希望的道路。隨着大宗商品泡沫提升了該地區的實力，儘管委內瑞拉的貧困快速減少，但是貧困依然無處不在（見圖表2）。一部分左翼人士對查韋斯一直持批評的態度。例如。墨西哥作家卡洛斯·富恩特斯就把他成爲“熱帶的墨索里尼”。2008年-2009年的世界經濟放緩將查韋斯主義的短處暴露無遺。就在其他拉美國家快速復甦之際，委內瑞拉的經濟卻連續兩年處於衰退之中。

Subordinates without a chief

羣龍無首

The Bolivarian revolution now faces its greatest test. Without doubt, chavismo will outlive its founder. Many ordinary Venezuelans will look back on his rule with fondness. But his heirs will have to grapple with some intractable problems.

“玻利瓦爾革命”目前正面臨着起開始以來的最大考驗。查韋斯主義的壽命毫無疑問會超過其締造者的壽命。大多數委內瑞拉的普通民衆會用一種讚賞的心情來回顧這段時期，但是擺在查韋斯後人面前的是一些不得不處理棘手難題。

After a pre-election spending binge last year, the economy is slowing again. Faced with shortages of many goods, including hard currency, Mr Maduro devalued the bolívar by 32% in February. Venezuela comes towards the bottom of just about every league table for good governance or economic competitiveness. For 14 years Venezuelans have been told that their problems were caused by somebody else—the United States or “the oligarchy”. Getting ahead has depended on political loyalty rather than merit. The mass enrolment of millions in “universities” that mainly impart propaganda have raised expectations that are almost bound to be dashed.

在經歷了去年選前的那段開支熱潮之後，委內瑞拉的經濟再次進入衰退。面對包括美元在內的多數商品出現短缺的現狀，馬杜羅在今年2月份宣佈將委內瑞拉貨幣玻利瓦爾貶值32%。無論是在有效管理還是經濟競爭力方面，玻利維亞幾乎在每一個排行榜上都排在最後幾位。在過去的14年間，委內瑞拉人一直都在被告知：他們的問題都是由其他人造成的——除了美國就是“寡頭”，出人頭地要靠政治上的忠誠而不是你的長處，主要由宣傳機器製造出來的數百萬“大學”生的希望幾乎肯定會破滅。

Assuming the PSUV wins the election, it will be ill-equipped to grapple with these problems. None of its leaders has the authority of Mr Chávez, nor his skill at communicating with the masses. While affable, Mr Maduro is a yes-man lacking political weight, according to a former Latin American foreign minister who dealt with him. Diosdado Cabello, the Speaker of the National Assembly and an army colleague of Mr Chávez, has declared his support for Mr Maduro, but has ambitions of his own. Perhaps only the Cuban leadership can preserve unity among the chavistas. The stakes are high. Cuba’s president, Raúl Castro, knows that the loss of Venezuelan oil would plunge his country’s economy deeper into penury.

如果委內瑞拉社會主義統一黨在大選中獲勝，它幾乎無力處理這些問題。該黨的任何一位領導人不僅不具有查韋斯的權威性，也不具備他那種同大衆交流的能力。據一位曾同馬杜羅打過交道的拉美國家前外交官說，雖說這個人和藹可親，但是作爲老好人的他在政治舞臺上缺乏分量。國民大會主席迪奧斯達多??卡維略是查韋斯在軍隊中的同事，他雖然宣佈支持馬杜羅，但是他有自己的野心。除此之外，唯一有可能讓查韋斯主義者保持團結的人選就是古巴領導人。不過，風險是相當大的。古巴總統勞爾·卡斯特羅深知，失去委內瑞拉的石油將使他的國家經濟陷入更加困難的境地。

A majority of Venezuelans may eventually come to see that Mr Chávez squandered an extraordinary opportunity for his country, to use an unprecedented oil boom to equip it with world-class infrastructure and to provide the best education and health services money can buy. But this lesson will come the hard way, and there is no guarantee that it will be learned.

大多數委內瑞拉人最後都會認識到：查韋斯讓這個國家浪費了一次千載難逢的機會：利用史無前例的石油熱潮，用世界一流的基礎設施來裝配這個國家，並且利用金錢能買到的最好的教育和醫療保健提供給他的民衆。雖然這個教訓的代價很大，但是沒有人能保證委內瑞拉一定能吸取這個教訓。