當前位置

首頁 > 英語閱讀 > 雙語新聞 > 只有中國才能牽制中國

只有中國才能牽制中國

推薦人: 來源: 時間: 2013-12-25 閱讀: 3.16W 次

When Xi Jinping visits the U.S. this autumn, one of the items on his agenda is bound to be what he has called a "new type of major power relations." The term remains ambiguous and some Americans fear that it is a device for disrupting American alliances. Chinese scholars reply that it is a genuine effort to avoid the dangerous dynamics between a rising and an established power that helped precipitate the Peloponnesian War and World War I.

當習近平今年秋天訪問美國時,他的議程上的項目之一必然是他所謂的"大國關係的新類型"。這個詞仍然含糊不清,一些美國人擔心它會分裂美國聯盟。中國學者回答說,它是真誠的努力,旨在避免一個崛起的大國和一個根基穩固的大國之間的危險的動態關係,而這種關係可以推進伯羅奔尼薩戰爭和第一次世界大戰發生。

只有中國才能牽制中國

Looking ahead, pessimists predict an impending clash as China grows stronger and seeks to expel the U.S. from the Western Pacific. Some argue that this can be forestalled by the acceptance of spheres of influence in which the U.S. restricts its activities primarily to the Eastern Pacific. But such a response to China's rise would destroy American credibility and lead regional states into bandwagoning rather than balancing China. Instead, a continued U.S. presence in the Western Pacific can reinforce the natural balancing reactions of regional states and help to shape the environment in a way that encourages responsible Chinese behavior.

展望未來,悲觀者預測:隨着中國變得更加強大,試圖從西太平洋驅逐美國,衝突即將發生。一些人認爲通過美國限制自身活動(主要是東太平洋)的影響範圍,可以預先阻止衝突。但對中國崛起的如此大的反響會摧毀美國的信譽,導致區域各國也會對中國亦步亦趨,而不是平衡中國。相反,美國在西太平洋的繼續存在能加強區域各國的自然平衡反應,有助於塑造環境,在某種程度上鼓勵中國採取負責任的行爲。

An appropriate policy response to the rise of China must balance realism and integration. When the Clint on Administration first considered how to respond to the rise of China in the 1990s, some critics urged a policy of containment before China became too strong. We rejected such advice for two reasons. First, it would have been impossible to forge an anti-China alliance since most countries in the region wanted (an d still want) good relations with both the U.S. and China. Even more important, such a policy would have unnecessarily guaranteed future enmity with China. As I used to say in my speeches when I was responsible for East Asia in the Pentagon, if you treat China as an enemy, you are certain to have an enemy.

適當的應對中國崛起的政策必須平衡現實和整體。在上世紀90年代,當克林頓政府首先考慮如何應對中國崛起時,有評論員呼籲在中國變得過於強大之前對其剪政策。我們有兩個理由拒絕這祥的建議。首先,我們不可結成反華聯盟,因爲該地區大多數國家希望(現在仍然希望)與美國和中國都保持良好關係。更重要的是,這祥的政策不必要地保證了未來與中國爲敵。正如我曾經在演講中說當我在五角大樓負責東亞事務時,如果你把中國當作敵人,你就一定會擁有一個敵人。

Instead the U.S. chose a policy that could be called "integrate and insure." China was welcomed into the World Trade Organization, but the U.S.-Japan security treaty was revived to insure against China becoming a bully. If a rising China throws its weight around, it drives neighbors to seek to balance its power. In that sense, only China can contain China.

相反,美國選擇了一個可以被稱爲"整體和保險"的政策。中國被欣然接納,進了世界貿易組織,但《美日安全條約》被重啓,旨在避免中國強大後以強凌弱。如果一個崛起的中國盛氣凌人,它會驅使鄰居尋求平衡它的力量。在這個意義上,只有中國才能遏制中國。

This is a key point in assessing the relative power of the U.S. and China. As Yan Xuetong wrote about how China could defeat America, "to shape a friendly international environment for its rise, Beijing needs to develop more high-quality diplomatic and military relationships than Washington. No leading power is able to have friendly relations with every country in the world, thus the core of competition between China and the United States will be to see who has more high-quality friends." At this point, the United States is better placed to benefit from such networks and alliances. Washington has about 60 treaty allies; China has few. In political alignments, The Economist estimates that of the 150 largest countries in the world, nearly 100 lean toward the United States; 21 lean against.

這是評估美國和中國的相對實力的一個關鍵點。正如閻學通所寫的關於中國如何此能打敗美國所言,"爲中國的崛起塑造一個友好的國際環境,北京需要發展比華盛頓更優質的外交和軍事關係。沒有一個大國能夠擁有世界上每個國家的友好關係,因而中國和美國之間的競爭核心將是看看誰擁有更多高品質的朋友。"在這一點上,美國能夠更好地受益於這樣的網絡和聯盟。美國有約60個盟友;而中國的盟友只有幾個。在政治路線上,《經濟學人》雜誌估計世界上最大的150個國家中,有將近100個傾向美國;有21個傾向中國。

In 2011, the United States announced a strategy of rebalancing toward Asia, the fastest growing part of the world economy. Some Chinese see the Obama Administration policy of "rebalancing" towards Asia as a form of containment, but unlike the Cold War doctrine when the U.S. had virtually no trade or social contact with the Soviet Union, it has massive trade with China and more than 250,000 students in American universities. Shaping the environment for Chinese decisions is a more accurate description than containment for American strategy.

2011年,美國宣佈對亞洲——世界經濟增長最快的部分,實施再平衡戰略。一些中國人認爲奧巴馬政府對亞洲的"再平衡"政策是一種遏制形式。但不像美國與蘇聯幾乎沒有任何貿易或社會交往時的冷戰聲明,美國和中國之間有大量貿易,有超過25萬中國學生就讀於美國大學。相對於美國戰略遏制,一個更準確的描述是塑造中國的決策環境。

Some analysts see China as a revisionist state eager to overthrow the established international order as its strength increases. But China is not a full-fledged revisionist state like Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union in the last century. While it has joined in the creation of a BRICS development bank, and promotes regional organizations that suit its needs, China has benefited greatly from, and is not eager to destroy, existing international institutions such as the UN, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization -- as well as many others. American allies help shape the environment that encourages responsible behavior, and China cares about its reputation.

一些分析師認爲中國是一個修正主義國家,隨着其國力增強,急於推翻既定的國際秩序。但中國並不像納粹德國或上個世紀的蘇聯,它並不是一個成熟的修正主義國家。雖然它已經參與創建了金磚國家發展銀行,推進適合其需求的區域組織,而不是急於破壞現有的國際機構,如聯合國,國際貨幣基金組織,以及世界貿易組織——以及許多其他組織,中國已經從中受益匪淺。美國的盟友幫助塑造鼓勵中國負責任行爲的環境,而中國也關心自己的聲譽。

In addition, technological and social changes are adding a number of important transnational issues to the global agenda such as climate change, pandemics, terrorism, organized crime, and cyber crime. These issues represent not a transition of power among states, but a diffusion of power away from governments. Coping with these global threats will require increased inter-governmental cooperation that includes China, Europe and the United States and others.

此外,科技和社會的變化給全球議程增添了一些重要的跨國問題,如氣候變化、流行病、恐怖主義、有組織犯罪和網絡犯罪。這些問題不代表着權力在各國之間的過渡,而是代表着權力從政府的擴散。應對這些全球性威脅,需要增強包括中國、歐洲、美國和其他國家在內的政府間合作。

China aspires to play a larger role in East Asia, and the U.S. has Asian allies to whose defense it is committed. Miscalculations are always possible, but conflict is far from inevitable. The legitimacy of the Chinese government depends on a high rate of economic growth; the top leaders realize that China will need many decades before it approaches the sophistication of the American economy. Where Germany was pressing hard on Britain's heels (and passed it in industrial strength), the U.S. remains decades ahead of China in overall military, economic, and soft power resources at the global level. Moreover, China cannot afford a policy like that of the Kaiser's Germany. Too adventuresome a policy risks its gains and stability at home and abroad.

中國渴望在東亞發揮更大的作用,美國擁有亞洲盟國,美國承諾守護盟國國防安全。誤判是可能的,但衝突並非不可避免。中國政府的合理性依賴於高經濟增長率;最高領導人意識到中國將需要幾十年才能像美國經濟一樣成熟。曾經德國對英國窮追不捨(並在工業實力上超過了它),而全球範圍內,未來數十年美國仍然會在軍事、經濟和軟實力資源方面整體領先中國。此外,中國不能承擔像Kaiser(譯者注:德國皇帝)的德國的政策。過於冒險的政策無疑給其在國內外的獲益和穩定性增加了太多風險。

In other words, the United States has more time to manage it relations with a rising power than Britain did a century ago, and China has more incentives for restraint than Germany had. This provides an opportu nity to work out a new type of major power relationship if the U.S. continues to avoid containment as a s trategy, and if China accepts the legitimacy of the American presence in the Western Pacific. Whether the United States and China will manage to develop such a relationship is another question. Human error and miscalculation are always possible. But with the right choices, conflict is not inevitable.

換句話說,不像一個世紀前的英國,美國有更多的時間來處理它與一個正在崛起的大國之間的關係,而與德國相比,中國有更多動機來約束自己。如果美國繼續避免遏制成爲戰略,如果中國接受美國在西太平洋存在的合理性,這就爲制定一 個新型的大國關係提供了一個機會。美國和中國是否能建立這樣的關係是另外一個問題。人爲錯誤和誤判是可能的。但有了正確的選擇,衝突並非不可避免。