當前位置

首頁 > 英語閱讀 > 雙語新聞 > 中國老齡化問題的解決之道

中國老齡化問題的解決之道

推薦人: 來源: 閱讀: 3.15W 次

China is becoming an ageing society. But, unlike other ageing societies such as Japan and Germany, it is getting old when its income is still relatively low. In terms of the share of old people in the population, China today looks like Japan at the end of 1980s, but in terms of per-capita gross domestic product, it has just reached the level of Japan in the early 1970s. Japan started more than 20 years of stagnation in the early 1990s, and many people fear that China will follow its footsteps in the next 10 to 20 years.

中國正步入老齡化社會。但和日本和德國等其他老齡化社會不同,中國在收入還相對較低的時候就開始老齡化了。就老年人佔總人口比例而言,當下的中國就像是上世紀80年代末的日本,但就人均國內生產總值(GDP)而言,中國纔剛剛達到日本在上世紀70年代初的水平。日本在上世紀90年代初開始了持續20多年的停滯,許多人擔憂中國將在接下來的10到20年裏重蹈日本的覆轍。

中國老齡化問題的解決之道

China’s demographic structure was almost the same as India’s until late 1970s when China started to enforce a stringent family planning policy. Since then its demographic transition has been very abrupt. The proportion of people over 60 years old is now more than 12 per cent of the population and those of working-age, between 16 and 65 years old, has begun to decline by 2.5m a year. Furthermore, labour movement from the countryside to the city, which used to be a major source of growth in China, is drying up. According to the official numbers, agriculture still employs 30 per cent of China’s total labour force. But most economists, such as Cai Fang, one of the most prominent economists on labour issues, believe that the real number is much smaller. The average farm is tiny — only about one hectare — so most farmers have to take additional jobs outside the farming sector to sustain a decent living.

過去中國的人口結構幾乎和印度相同——直到中國在上世紀70年代後期開始推行嚴格的計劃生育政策。其後中國的人口結構轉變非常劇烈。現在60歲以上人口已經超過了總人口的12%,而勞動年齡人口,也就是16到65歲之間的人口每年下降250萬人。此外,曾經推動中國經濟增長的從農村到城市的勞動力流動,正在逐漸枯竭。根據官方數據,農業依然僱傭了中國30%的勞動力。但大多數經濟學家(包括勞動力問題研究方面最知名的經濟學家之一蔡昉)相信真正的比例要小得多。一般的農地很小,大概一公頃左右,因此大多數農民不得不在務農以外從事額外的工作,才能維持像樣的生活。

The official data on urbanisation are also problematic. These figures only count people living in government-designated cities as urban dwellers. So, while many villages in coastal provinces have become industrial towns, their inhabitants are still counted as rural dwellers. In recent years, employment growth in coastal provinces has been stagnant. The number of migrant workers has even declined in 2015. Although rural-to-urban labour movement will continue in inland provinces, thanks to the government’s policy aim to move 100m people into the city, it is unlikely to be a major driver for China’s overall growth.

官方的城鎮化數據也問題重重。這些數據只將在政府指定城市居住的人算作城市居民。因此,儘管許多沿海省份的村子已變成工業城鎮,但那裏的居民依然被算作農村居民。近年來,沿海省份的就業增長陷入停滯。農民工的數量在2015年甚至還下降了。儘管受政府促進約1億農業轉移人口落戶城鎮的政策目標推動,內陸省份從農村到城市的勞動力流動將會持續,但這種流動不太可能成爲中國總體增長的主要驅動力。

The first is to postpone retirement. The current retirement ages were set in the early 1950s. They allow blue-collar female workers to retire at 50, and blue-collar male workers at 55. This means that most women can enjoy a pension for 30 years, probably longer than they have worked for. The sixth National Census (these happen every ten years) conducted in 2010 shows that women’s labour-force participation rate dropped by 20 percentage points at 50. A sensible policy is gradually to raise the retirement ages until they uniformly reach 60.

中國能夠採取的第一項措施是延遲退休。目前的退休年齡是在上世紀50年代初設定的,允許藍領女性勞動者在50歲時退休,藍領男性勞動者在55歲時退休。這意味着大多數女性可以領取30年的養老金,很可能比她們的工作時間還長。2010年的第六次全國人口普查(每十年一次)表明,到50歲時,女性的勞動力參與率會下降20個百分點。明智的政策是逐步提高退休年齡,直到將男女退休年齡統一爲60歲。

The second thing China can do is continue to raise the educational level of its young people. Currently, less than 40 per cent of young people go to college. While an average young adult in the city can almost always finish high school (having had 12 years of education), his rural counterpart — including migrant workers in the city — barely finishes middle school (nine years of education). The return on education is quite high; one more year of formal education can raise a person’s wage by 10 per cent. On average, people in their 20s have had 4.3 more years of education than people in their 50s.

第二項措施是繼續提高年輕人的教育水平。目前只有不到40%的年輕人上大學。儘管城市的一般年輕人幾乎都能完成高中學業(12年教育),但農村年輕人(包括進城務工的農民工)能完成初中學業(9年教育)就算不錯了。教育的回報很高:一個人每多接受一年的正規教育,薪資就能提高10%。平均而言,20多歲的人比50多歲的人多接受4.3年的教育。

The third thing is to strengthen research and development. Both Japan and South Korea became world technology leaders after they reached China’s per-capita income of today. This, of course, does not guarantee that China can do the same, but the signs are that it is on the right track. Thanks to its miraculous growth, China has accumulated a huge amount of wealth. As a result, it can afford to increase its R&D spending -and fast. Last year, R&D spending reached 2.1 per cent of GDP; by 2020, it will certainly reach 2.5 per cent, higher than in many advanced countries.

第三項措施是加強研究和開發。日本和韓國在人均收入達到當今中國的水平後成爲了世界技術領袖。當然,這並不能保證中國也能做到同樣的事情,但有跡象表明,中國已經走上了正確的軌道。得益於奇蹟般的增長,中國積累了大量財富。因此,中國能夠快速提高研發支出。去年,中國的研發支出達到了GDP的2.1%;到2020年,中國的研發支出肯定能達到GDP的2.5%,高於許多發達國家。

The reforms initiated by Premier Li Keqiang have created a vibrant financial sector that channels money to support innovation; private equity and venture capital companies are flourishing. As a result, private R&D spending is now higher than that by the government.

中國總理李克強發起的改革,已建立了一個富有活力的金融業,引導資金支持創新;私人股本和風險投資公司正在蓬勃發展。其結果是,私人部門的研發支出如今高於政府投入。

So, while ageing is taking a toll on China’s growth, it will be balanced in the next 10-15 years by improvements in education and technological capacity as well as policy adjustment on retirement ages. China’s real demographic challenge will only come between 2025 and 2030, when there will be little room left for improvement in education, R&D spending will be likely to plateau, and the baby boomers of the 1960s will have all left the labour force — even if retirement ages are pushed back.

因此,儘管老齡化正在損害中國的增長,但在接下來的10到15年,教育程度和技術能力的提高,以及退休年齡的政策調整,將平衡老齡化帶來的影響。中國真正的人口結構挑戰將在2025到2030年間來臨,到那個時候,教育已沒有多少改善空間,研發支出已進入平臺期,上世紀60年代嬰兒潮時期出生的人已全部離開勞動力隊伍——即使退休年齡推後也是如此。

To better prepare for that period, it is probably time for China to give up its family planning policy. The one-child policy was introduced in 1979: the birth rate in the country was 25m in 1987, 20m in 1997 – and 16m last year.

要更好地爲那個時期做準備,現在很可能是時候放棄計劃生育政策了。一胎化政策1979年出臺:1987年中國的出生人口爲2500萬,1997年爲2000萬,而去年已降至1600萬。