風投業界所面對的傳承難題

The San Francisco trial pitting Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers, one of Silicon Valley’s oldest and most venerable venture capital firms, against Ellen Pao, a former junior partner who claims that she faced sexual harassment and discrimination, has forced an institution that prefers to remain private into the public gaze. Among other things, it has raised questions about how well John Doerr, its de facto leader, knows his own firm.

凱鵬華盈(Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers)是硅谷成立時間最長且最受尊敬的風險資本公司之一。該公司與其前初級合夥人鮑康如(Ellen Pao)在舊金山對薄公堂一案，讓這家寧願保持低調的機構受到公衆的關注。鮑康如指控稱，自己在凱鵬華盈曾遭到性騷擾和歧視（鮑康如案已於美國時間3月27日宣判，法庭裁定鮑控告凱鵬華盈性別歧視的說法不成立——編者注）。它引發的疑問是，凱鵬華盈事實上的領導人約翰•多爾(John Doerr)在多大程度上了解他自己的公司。

“It’s a partnership. Nobody really runs a partnership. We make decisions together,” Mr Doerr told the court last week. This is not how some of Kleiner Perkins’ women executives perceive it. It was “becoming more of a cult of personality, and each personality had its own brand”, one told Stephen Hirschfield, a lawyer that the firm hired in 2011 to investigate Ms Pao’s allegations.

多爾最近在法庭上表示：“這是一種合夥關係。沒人真正按合夥關係辦事。我們一起做決定。”凱鵬華盈的某些女性高管不這麼認爲。有人告訴律師史蒂芬•赫希菲爾德(Stephen Hirschfield)，它“越來越像是一種個人崇拜，每個人都有自己的品牌。”凱鵬華盈在2011年聘請赫希菲爾德調查鮑康如的指控。

If Kleiner Perkins crumbles because it cannot make a smooth transition to the next generation of partner-leaders, male and female, it will be a terrible waste. Ms Pao entered the witness box this week and the case has shown what the top venture firms clustered around Sand Hill Road in Silicon Valley need to worry about most.

如果凱鵬華盈因爲不能順利地轉交給下一代合夥領導人（無論男女）而衰落，那將是一種可怕的浪費。不久前鮑康如進入了證人席，該案表明，集中在硅谷Sand Hill Road周圍的頂級風投公司最需要擔心什麼。

An enduring partnership — what Kleiner Perkins called in a brief to the court “a family, with occasional disputes” — is of enormous value in venture capital. That is not just a useful marketing myth while rivalry flourishes behind closed doors. It has real, sometimes extraordinary, financial benefits.

一份持久的合作關係——凱鵬華盈在提交給法庭的辯護狀中將這種關係稱爲“一個偶爾會爭吵的家庭”——在風險資本中具有巨大的價值。它不僅僅是在營銷時拿來用一用，結果卻在私下裏激烈爭鬥。它也會帶來實實在在、有時異乎尋常的金融益處。

Venture capital as a whole, despite the urge among private equity firms, hedge funds and mutual funds to invest in technology, is a mediocre asset class. The money is locked up for a long time and returns have not been high enough to compensate. “Most venture firms are not very successful. The returns for the venture industry don’t even match passbook savings,” Mr Doerr said.

整體而言，風險資本是一個普通的資產類別，儘管私人股本公司、對衝基金和共同基金也有投資於技術的衝動。資金長期鎖定，回報率也不足以讓投資者獲得補償。多爾表示：“大多數風險資本公司不是非常成功。風險資本行業的回報率甚至比不上存摺儲蓄。”

But a few do very well, and carry on doing well across funds and generations. Newcomers such as Andreessen Horowitz sometimes break into the top tier, while others fade away — the fate that Kleiner Perkins has to avoid. But Sequoia Capital, Accel Partners, Benchmark and others keep on going.

但有些風投企業做得非常好，在不同基金和代際間仍然表現出色。Andreessen Horowitz等新入行者有時會擠入第一陣營，同時其他企業則會消失——凱鵬華盈必須避免這種命運。但紅杉資本(Sequoia Capital)、阿塞爾夥伴公司(Accel Partners)、Benchmark以及其他風投企業則會繼續存在。

The gilded elite achieve returns that are “not just average but spectacular. The kind that are impossible to get elsewhere unless you strike oil or have a natural monopoly,” as Saul Klein, an Index Ventures partner, describes it. Outside investors vie to put their money into the most exclusive funds.[what is the source for this quote pls? I can’t find it - ib].

正如Index Ventures合夥人薩爾•克萊因(Saul Klein)描述的那樣，其中的佼佼者實現了“不只是普通、而是驚人的回報率。那種回報率你不可能在其他領域獲得的，除非你發現了油礦或者壟斷某種自然資源”。外部投資者競相將他們的資金投入表現最出色的基金。

Their success is due in part to the investing instincts of figures such as Mr Doerr, whose reputation was dented by an unprofitable bet on green energy in the mid-2000s. (“A tech visionary, he is constantly hunting for ‘the next big thing’,” was how the firm billed him to investors in 2013.) Partly it is due to insight — the operating expertise their partners bring to boards of the portfolio companies in which they invest.

它們的成功部分歸因於多爾等人的投資本能——多爾因2005年押注於綠色能源沒有盈利而聲名受損（公司在2013年向投資者推薦時宣稱，他始終在追求“下一個重大事件”，在技術領域頗具遠見）。部分歸因於洞察力——他們的合夥人帶給所投公司董事會的運營專長。

Much, however, is due to network effects that accumulate over time. Especially in Silicon Valley, source of many “unicorns” — tech start-ups valued at $1bn or more — these firms offer their imprimatur to in-demand start-ups that could easily raise money elsewhere. When Mr Doerr testified that Kleiner Perkins was “lucky” to “win 80 per cent of the time” when it competes to invest, he was being modest.

然而，它們成功的最主要原因是隨着時間積累起來的網絡效應。尤其是在誕生了許多“獨角獸”（指價值10億美元或者以上的技術初創企業）的硅谷，接受了這些風投公司投資的初創企業可以在其他地方輕易地籌集到資金。當多爾證實，凱鵬華盈“是幸運的”，“在競爭投資的時候80%會勝出”，他這是謙虛的說法。

Venture returns have risen in the past couple of years, helped by initial public offerings by Facebook and Twitter, and exits including the $3.2bn acquisition by Google of Nest, the smart thermostat company backed by Kleiner Perkins. The annualised 10-year return for US venture capital reached 10 per cent in the first quarter of last year, according to a Cambridge Associates index.

在過去兩年裏風投回報率有所上升，這得益於Facebook和Twitter的首次公開發行(IPO)，以及包括谷歌(Google)以32億美元收購智能溫控器公司Nest在內的退出——凱鵬華盈對Nest有投資。美國康橋諮詢公司(Cambridge Associates)編制的指數顯示，去年第一季度美國風投資本的十年年化回報率達到10%。

This still means investors received only a modest premium above the S&P 500’s 7.4 per cent annualised return over 10 years. That is not enough to compensate for illiquidity, according to Diane Mulcahy, director of private equity at the Kauffman Foundation.[was this in her 2012 report? if so think we should link to it] But plenty want to invest in Uber, or one of the other late-stage companies now raising hundreds of millions in capital.

然而這只不過意味着，投資者收到的回報率只比標普500指數十年間7.4%的年化回報率稍高一些。考夫曼基金會(Kauffman Foundation)私人股本主管黛安娜•馬爾卡希(Diane Mulcahy)表示，這不足以補償資金的流動性不足。但是許多人希望投資於Uber，或者其他現在籌集了數億資本的晚期公司中的某一家。

The rush into what Bill Gurley, a partner of Benchmark, has called “the most crowded party that’s ever been thrown” further raises the value of partnerships that specialise in early stage investment — what venture capital is, or should be, about. There is no point in enlarging such funds, small investments are enough, and the leading firms have scaled recent funds back.

倉促進入Benchmark合夥人比爾•格利(Bill Gurley)所稱的“有史以來人數最多的聚會”，進一步提升了致力於早期投資的合夥關係的價值——這種合夥關係與或者說應該與風投資本有關。擴大此類基金規模沒有意義，小規模投資就足夠了，主要公司已經削減了近期發行基金的規模。

This is a young industry. Kleiner Perkins and Sequoia were both founded in 1972 and are among the oldest of the leading firms. Combine that with the length it takes for early stage investments to reach maturity, often 10 to 15 years, and venture capital is barely into its third generation.

這是一個年輕的行業。凱鵬華盈和紅杉資本(Sequoia)全都成立於1972年，就已經進入創立時間最長的風投公司之列。再加上早期投資的到期日通常爲10到15年，風投資本很難傳遞至第三代。

So the capacity to bequeath a firm’s knowledge and brand value is highly valuable. Kleiner Perkins managed to pass its leadership from the original partners to Vinod Khosla and Mr Doerr (Mr Khosla later left in 2004). Soon enough, Mr Doerr will need to deliver his own succession.

因此傳遞一家公司的知識和品牌價值的能力非常重要。凱鵬華盈成功地將其領導權從最初的合夥人傳遞至維諾德•科斯拉(Vinod Khosla)和多爾（科斯拉後來在2004年離職）。多爾很快也需要宣佈他自己的接班人。

The Pao case indicates what he is up against. Venture firms have to cultivate forceful individuals among their top partners — those who follow the crowd will be poor investors — yet remain a collective with a single, enduring name. The financial incentive to co-operate is very strong but it contends with rivalry, ruthlessness, and other misbehaviour.

鮑康如案表明他正面臨困境。風投公司不得不在它們的高級合夥人當中培養具有獨立主見的個人——那些隨大流的人將是糟糕的投資者——然而風投依然是一個有着長期單一名稱的集體。採取合夥制有着很強的財務動機，但合夥企業必須應對爭鬥、無情以及其他不當行爲。