中國如何突破西方的期望 對於世界秩序意味着什麼

The West sees China’s rise as a challenge to its hegemony. For the Chinese this is merely the restoration of the natural order of things—of China as the world’s largest economy and the center of the world.

對於中國的崛起，西方視之爲對自身霸權的挑戰，而對中國人而言，這只是自然秩序的恢復--中國是世界上最大的經濟體也是世界的中心

What makes the West particularly nervous is that China has shattered two important misconceptions: first the expectation that as China modernised it would become increasingly Western; second the idea that single-Party rule by the Communist Party of China would inevitably give way to demands for Western-style democracy. Many in the West thought that China would be integrated into the Western economic and political order as Japan was after World War II.

是什麼讓西方人特別緊張，因爲中國粉碎了兩個重要的錯誤理念：第一，西方人認爲隨着中國的現代化進程，中國會越來越西化。第二，中國共產黨的一黨專政必然被西式民主取代。很多西方國家都認爲，日本在二戰之後接受了西方的政治經濟制度，中國也會步日本後塵。然而故事卻不是這麼發展的。

But that’s not how the story has unfolded. Moving forward we should expect continued assertion and pursuit of its interests by China—both in its neighborhood and on the world stage.

往後，中國將繼續在周邊範圍和世界舞臺上主張和追求自身利益

CHINA RISING

中國的崛起

Rather than become more Western China’s polity and society remain stubbornly Chinese. If anything the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) grip on power in China is stronger than ever. And China has made it clear that while it is a major beneficiary of the U.S.-led era of open markets free trade and investment flows it is also determined to have an independent say in the economic political and security order in its region and in the world.

中國沒有更西化，而是堅定的保持了中國本色。party的權力空前穩固。而中國業已表明，在美國主導的時代，中國是市場開放，貿易投資自由的主要受益者，現在，中國也要求在政經領域和維持區域和世界秩序方面，有自己的獨立話語權。

After the 2008 global economic crisis China doubled down on its efforts to shape its region using its economic strength to build connectivity and institutions consolidating the Eurasian landmass. It launched the “One Belt One Road” initiative created the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the BRICS New Development Bank and negotiated the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP as opposed to the U.S.-sponsored Trans-Pacific Partnership). China also promoted the use of the renminbi as an international currency and promoted regional trade—10 years ago all except one of China’s neighbors traded more with the United States than with China; today China is the largest trading partner of all its neighbors. Faced with Western sanctions Russia looks to China to buy the energy and commodity exports on which it depends. Even the United States China’s main strategic competitor is economically tied to China in fundamental ways.

08年全球金融危機後，中國加倍努力，利用其經濟力量推動歐亞大陸的互聯互通，打造自己的勢力範圍。中國發起一帶一路倡議，建立亞投行和金磚國家新開發銀行，協商區域全面經濟夥伴關係（即RCEP，以抗衡美國發起的TPP）。中國推動人民幣國際化，促進區域貿易---10年前，中國鄰國中只有一個國家對中交易多於對美交易，而現在，中國是其所有鄰國的最大貿易伙伴。受西方制裁的俄羅斯尋求中國合作，向中國出口所需的能源和大宗商品，而主要戰略對手美國，也在經濟的基本方面與中國關聯密切

All of these moves will have global impact as the Asia-Pacific is increasingly the center of gravity of the global economy and politics. It is also the locus of political contention between the old Western order and a new emerging one.

這些舉措將會產生全球性影響，因爲亞太地區正日益成爲全球經濟和政治的重心，它也是舊的西方秩序與新興勢力的政治爭奪焦點。

MANAGING GROWTH EXPECTATIONS

調整增長預期

Internally China’s rapid economic growth gave the CCP legitimacy. The CCP today is a victim of its own success: With an $11 trillion-economy and per capita income of almost $14000 China cannot sustain 10 percent-plus growth rates forever. It also needs to readjust its economy from a reliance on exports and government-led investment to internal demand and consumption-led growth.

中國經濟的快速增長鞏固了party的合法性。但party也受累於自身的成功：如今中國經濟規模達11兆美元，人均收入近14000美元，但它不可能永遠維持兩位數的經濟增長率。另外中國還需調整經濟結構，改變依賴出口和政府主導投資的現狀，拉動內需，向消費主導型增長轉型。

Can it make this adjustment without a major internal economic crisis? A command economy like China—where government has fiscal and other tools not available in market economies—should find it possible to transition to a lower growth path of about 3 to 5 percent GDP growth each year. It won’t be easy and it will cause social pain. In fact the social consequences of the nature and speed of China’s growth have actually diminished the CCP’s ability to control the lives of ordinary Chinese citizens as have the effects of the information communication technology revolution. The CCP must now look for new sources of ideological legitimacy while trying to use modern technology to buttress its hold on power.

中國能夠避開重大內部危機完成經濟調整麼？中國是計劃經濟，政府擁有市場經濟體所沒有的財政調控工具以及其他手段，應該可以過渡到GDP年增長率3%-5%的較低的水平，過程無疑是困難而痛苦的。事實上，中國的經濟增長類型和增長速度帶來的社會後果，加上信息技術革命的發展，減弱了party對公民日常生活的掌控。因此party需要尋求新的角度來證實其意識形態的正確性，也需要藉助更高新的科技手段來強化權力掌控（這是說不許咱翻牆麼。。。。）

What does China’s rise in this form mean for the world?

中國以這種形式崛起，對世界而言，意味着什麼？

As China tries to avoid the middle income trap and as economic growth slows the CCP turns increasingly to nationalism to provide legitimacy in the eyes of its own people. Hence some of the recent shrillness in Chinese responses to external events. In the past China’s stated foreign policy goals were modest and humble—it has now dropped those. It now officially describes itself as a great power implicitly an equal of the United States.

隨着經濟放緩，中國試圖避免“中等收入陷阱，party也頻頻藉助民族主義來確保國民對其政權合法性的認可。因此，在最近的一些外交事件中中國態度強硬。曾經中國奉行謙虛謙遜的外交政策，如今。。。俱往矣。。。。。中國現在將自己定位爲與美國相當的強國。

China’s economic growth has enabled it increase defense spending by double digits for over 25 years. Since 2008 it has reignited maritime disputes in the East China Sea with Japan and in the South China Sea with Vietnam and other ASEAN members—and has begun a much more muscular defense of an expanded definition of its core interests.

中國的經濟增長使其能夠連續25年保持國防開支兩位數增率。自2008以來，它在東海與日本，在南海與越南等東盟國家發生領海糾紛，中國也開始採用更強硬的手段來捍衛核心利益

What does this presage for China’s future behaviour? Scholars’ predictions run the spectrum from China’s imminent collapse to a China that will “rule the world.” The truth is somewhere in between and much more complex.

這預示着中國未來的行爲會是怎樣呢？學者們的預測相差甚遠，從中國即將崩潰到中國將“統治世界”都有。其實在某些方面是介於兩者之間且複雜得多。

history has left China with a fear of barbarian encirclement and a strong drive to “maintain face” after what the Chinese regard as “a century of humiliation” and colonial degradation. The goals that China pursues in the international system today are a direct result of this narrative of Chinese history which the CCP has appropriated to argue that only the Communist Party can realize and restore China’s pride. In short history and the trauma of the long 19th century left China self-centered touchy lonely and seeking respect.

在經歷了所謂“百年屈辱”和殖民退化的歷史後，中國懼怕蠻族包圍，並有強大的動力去“保住面子”。在今天的國際體系中，中國奉行的目標正是中國歷史訴求的直接結果，也爲中共所冒功，稱只有共產黨才能實現和恢復中國的榮耀。19世紀只是歷史的一瞬，卻是漫長的創傷，留給中國以自我爲中心的敏感、孤獨和尋求尊重。

These are heightened by the effects of geography and China’s present condition. Unlike the United States which is protected by two of the world’s largest oceans China is in a crowded neighborhood and shares borders with 14 countries. It has only two allies—Pakistan and North Korea—and has difficult relations with some neighbors (namely Japan India and Vietnam) that have also been accumulating hard and soft power. Rising nationalist rhetoric in China and the region has contributed to a worsening of her relations with most of its neighbors.

這些又爲地理環境影響和中國現狀而增強。不像美國受世界上最大的兩個海洋保護，中國鄰國衆多，與14個國家接壤。它只有兩個盟友－巴基斯坦和朝鮮，並與一些也積累了硬實力和軟實力的鄰國（即日本、印度和越南）關係緊張。在中國和該地區日益增長的民族主義言論加劇了她與大多數鄰國關係惡化。

Despite the considerable strides that China has made in acquiring power it still lacks the capability to manage devise or impose a political or security order in the Asia-Pacific. This is a function not just of the balance of power and the presence of the United States but of its inability to offer a normative frxwork and of the nature of its relations with significant countries like India Japan Vietnam Indonesia Russia and others.

儘管中國在獲取權力方面取得長足進展，它仍然缺少在亞太地區整合理念或者導入政治或安全秩序的能力。這種功能不光是處理權力平衡和美國的存在，而是它無力提供一個規範性的框架，也天然地包括處理與印度、日本、越南、印尼、俄羅斯等重要國家和其他國家關係。

If China cannot—and the United States doesn’t—provide security in the global commons through alliances and bases we should expect continued instability in the Asia-Pacific. Optimists and those who want to change the status quo like China call it multipolarity and welcome it as instability offers space to pursue their interests and improve their position.

如果中國未能——而美國也沒有——通過結盟和基地在全球領域提供安全，我們只能預料亞太地區仍將不穩定。樂觀主義者和那些希望改變現狀的人歡迎中國所謂的多極化，因爲不穩定纔會給他們追求利益和提高地位的空間。

Can the world economy recover and prosper amidst such political and security instability? I think not. The natural reaction to prolonged insecurity and strategic competition would be to form countervailing coalitions and alliances formal or informal—I suspect we will see more of that.

在政局動盪安全不穩的情況下世界經濟能夠復甦繁榮麼？我想是不能的，長期處於不安全的環境和戰略競爭之中，人們的自然反應就是建立各種正式非正式的聯盟相互對抗---我猜我們將會看到很多這樣的情況

Just as its professed dedication to freedom or democracy has never been an accurate predictor of U.S. behavior China’s professions of win-win diplomacy Confucian benevolence and economic priorities are unlikely to indicate future Chinese behavior. Instead the drivers of Chinese foreign policy are likely to remain the quest for status and to acquire power— political military and economic. The only consideration that might override them in unlikely circumstances is regime continuity in China. If rule by the CCP elite is threatened by the consequences of the drive for status and power that push will be limited or modified. But for the present expect more of the “assertive” China.

美國曾自詡重視民主自由，可言行卻不一致。由此可見，雖然中國自稱奉行雙贏外交，實行儒家仁政，以發展經濟爲優先任務，以後也不見得就會真的這麼做。相反，中國外交政策的驅動力可能仍然是在政治軍事經濟各方面尋求地位和攫取權力。唯一能讓他們憂心的就是逆境中如何保持政權的連續性。如果追求地位和權利帶來的結果會威脅到party的精英統治，他們也許會有所收斂改正。但是目前，更可能出現的是一個“堅定自信”的中國。