東芝會計醜聞帶來投資機遇
Hisao Tanaka, Toshiba’s chief executive, gave a 15-second bow on Tuesday as he resigned over a $1.2bn accounting scandal. Mr Tanaka and seven other executives took responsibility for deceptions that started in 2008. Taro Aso, Japan’s finance minister, warned that this could “lose the market’s trust”.
東芝公司(Toshiba)社長田中久雄(Hisao Tanaka)週二因12億美元的會計醜聞引咎辭職時鞠躬15秒錶示悔悟。他和其他7名高管爲始於2008年的欺騙行爲承擔了責任。日本財政大臣麻生太郎(Taro Aso)警告稱，這可能“喪失市場的信任”。
Mr Aso is right that the debacle at one of Japan’s leading industrial conglomerates, on paper a leader in corporate governance reform, is serious. Together with the $1.7bn fraud exposed by Olympus’s chief executive Michael Woodford in 2011, it suggests that Japanese companies are prone to manipulating their accounts. But foreign investors should not give up and go home.
麻生太郎說得沒錯，作爲日本主要的工業集團之一，東芝發生的醜聞很嚴重——東芝名義上還是企業治理改革的領軍者。加上2011年奧林巴斯(Olympus)首席執行官邁克爾伍德福德(Michael Woodford)曝光的17億美元欺詐，這表明日本公司很容易操縱賬目。但外國投資者不應放棄而打道回府。
The reverse is true. Here is an opportunity — whether to short shares in companies that will be struck by scandal next, to buy those that will be forced to change their ways, or to do both these things in turn. Japan is an imperfect market and its slow, bumpy, yet inexorable progress towards cleaning up its corporate act provides a target.
正好相反，這是一個機會——無論是做空接下來將遭受醜聞打擊的公司，還是購買那些被迫改變做事方式的公司的股票，或者依次採取這兩種策略。日本是一個不完美的市場，它在清理企業行爲方面緩慢、崎嶇但不可阻擋的進程提供了投資目標。
Japan is not unique in any of this, despite a succession of scandals over the past two decades at Yamaichi Securities, Kanebo Nikko Cordial, Livedoor and others. The US was a pioneer with Enron and WorldCom in the early 2000s, and companies in many countries understate losses, misprice contracts and overstate revenues.
日本絕非唯一爆發會計操縱醜聞的國家，儘管在過去20年裏，山一證券(Yamaichi Securities)、嘉娜寶(Kanebo)、日興證券(Nikko Cordial)、活力門(Livedoor)以及其他公司接連爆發了醜聞。美國在本世紀初率先曝出安然(Enron)和世通(WorldCom)的醜聞，許多國家的公司低報虧損，虛報合同金額並誇大收入。
Managers at US or European companies will also groan in sympathy at the pressure Toshiba’s executives felt when faced with “challenges” from their head office to squeeze out higher profits at results season. At Toshiba, they responded by cooking the books, helping the bosses to hide the damage done by the 2008 financial crisis and the 2011 Fukushima earthquake.
在財報季，東芝高管們面對總部要求擠出更多利潤的“挑戰”而感到的壓力，美國或歐洲公司的經理們也會感同身受。在東芝，他們的對策是粉飾報表，幫助老闆隱藏2008年金融危機和2011年福島地震造成的損失。
The difference in Japan is that losses get handed down across generations, hidden on behalf of previous bosses. There is no such thing as the kitchen sink— the grand writing-off of underperforming divisions and old problems by a new chief executive, publicly ditching the errors of his or her predecessors instead of inheriting the burden.
日本的不同在於，虧損一代代往下傳，後繼者幫前任老闆隱藏虧損。日本沒有“廚房水槽”之類的東西——即新任首席執行官大舉清理表現欠佳部門和老問題，公開擺脫其前任的錯誤，而不是繼承這些負擔。
The first thing Norio Sasaki should have done when he became Toshiba’s chief executive in 2009 was expose his predecessor, Atsutoshi Nishida, under whom the deception started. After all, the two were rivals, disliked each other, and even squabbled at a 2013 press conference to announce that Mr Sasaki was stepping down to become vice-chair. LINK TO SQUABBLING?
在2009年出任社長的時候，佐佐木則夫(Norio Sasaki)本應做的第一件事是曝光開始欺騙行爲的前任西田厚聰(Atsutoshi Nishida)。畢竟，這兩人是競爭對手，彼此討厭對方，甚至在2013年宣佈佐佐木則夫卸任社長、擔任副董事長的一場記者招待會上還發生了爭吵。
But even with a motive, a weapon, and an opportunity, Mr Sasaki refused to wield the knife, instead taking on and expanding the deception. One obstacle was that Mr Nishida had become chairman and was looking over his shoulder — in Japan, the old boss never quite departs. Mr Nishida was an adviser to Toshiba and Mr Sasaki a senior figure on its board until this week.
但即便有動機、有武器也有機會，佐佐木則夫還是拒絕拿起刀，而是接過並擴大了欺騙行爲。一個障礙是，西田厚聰已經是董事長，關注着佐佐木則夫的一舉一動——在日本，舊日老闆從來不會完全離開。直至本週前西田厚聰還是東芝的一名顧問，而佐佐木則夫是副董事長。
Japanese companies also prize loyalty and social cohesion. “There are life-long relationships between superiors and juniors. You often place your loyalty for the whole of your career with the person who showed you around when you first entered the company,” says Simon Wong, a visiting fellow at the London School of Economics.
日本公司也重視忠誠和社會凝聚力。倫敦政治經濟學院(London School of Economics)訪問學者西蒙謠(Simon Wong)表示：“上下級之間存在一生的關係。你往往會在整個職業生涯中，對那個在你剛進公司時帶你熟悉情況的人保持忠誠。”
As a result, many of the corporate governance reforms encouraged by Shinzo Abe’s government are adopted more in theory than in practice. These include the hoped-for shift from boards being inwardly-turned management committees to bodies on which outside directors play a significant role in strategic decisions, executive appointments and financial oversight.
因此，安倍晉三(Shinzo Abe)政府鼓勵的很多公司治理改革，更多是在理論上得到採納，沒有落實。其中包括備受期待的改革：董事會從關注內部的管理委員會，變成外部董事在戰略決策、行政任命以及財務監督方面發揮重要作用的機構。
Toshiba is a prime example. It is a blue-chip, bigger and more significant than Olympus, and was regarded as a reform pioneer, appointing independent directors in 2001 and forming board committees, including its easily deceived audit committee, in 2003. But two of the four outsiders were former diplomats, lacking financial expertise, and little really changed.
東芝是一個最好的例子。它是一隻藍籌股，規模和重要性都超過奧林巴斯，而且被視爲改革先鋒，該公司在2001年任命獨立董事，並在2003年成立了董事會委員會，包括輕易被騙的審計委員會。但在4名外部董事中，有兩名是外交官，缺乏財務技能，實際上幾乎什麼都沒改變。
The government seeks reform to attract investment and boost growth. But the corporate code introduced in June betrays Japan’s ambiguity — and the doubts of traditionalists such as the Keidanren business federation — about empowering boards.
日本政府推動改革是爲了吸引投資並推動增長。但今年6月頒佈的公司治理法規暴露了日本在賦予董事會權力方面的含糊不清，以及日本經濟團體聯合會(Keidanren)等傳統人士的質疑。
The code includes an assurance to managers that it “does not place excessive emphasis on avoiding or limiting risk, or the prevention of corporate scandals,” and asks only for companies to appoint “at least two” independent directors. Japan needs to be tougher than that to counter scandals such as those at Olympus and Toshiba.
法規中有一條向管理者保證，“不會過分強調避免或控制風險，或者防範公司醜聞，”同時只要求公司任命“至少兩名”獨立董事。日本需要採取更強硬的做法，對抗奧林巴斯和東芝這類醜聞。
