權勢之爭:董事長與CEO之間的種種

US chief executives are beginning to wean themselves from their perplexing attachment to the role of chairman. But at a few large banks, the addiction persists.

美國的首席執行官(CEO)們開始不再兼任董事長職務。但一些大銀行的CEO們仍然癡迷於這一令人困惑的做法。

JPMorgan Chase’s directors are recommending rejection, for the second year running, of an investor proposal to split the role of chairman and chief executive, held by Jamie Dimon. Separation, they say, could cause “uncertainty, confusion and inefficiency”.

摩根大通(JPMorgan Chase)的董事們正連續第二年建議否決投資者要求將董事長和CEO職位分開的提議。他們稱，分開可能導致“不確定性、困惑和效率低下”。傑米•戴蒙(Jamie Dimon)是摩根大通的董事長兼CEO。

Well, I’d be happy to risk a little short-term uncertainty, confusion and inefficiency if it minimised the greater threat posed by executives who hold both jobs: overconfidence, over-reach and overload.

如果分開能夠最大化地避免身兼兩職帶來的更嚴重威脅：自負、野心膨脹和工作量過大，那我還是樂意稍微冒這個險，忍受短期內不確定、困惑和效率低下的後果。

But don’t take my word for it, ask Mr Dimon’s peers at the Group of 30, a forum for financiers and regulators. In a 2012 report, the G30 stated there was a “compelling logic” for splitting the senior roles at global financial institutions. “The pressures and breadth of responsibility borne by the CEO have grown almost beyond the capacity of a single person,” its working group wrote.

但如果你不相信我的話，問問30人小組(G30)中其他銀行的CEO們吧。G30是一個由金融家和監管者組成的論壇。G30在2012年的一份報告中指出，全球金融機構分離高級職位有着“不容置疑的邏輯”。G30的工作小組寫道：“CEO承受的壓力和職責發展到幾乎超過一個人所能承受的範圍。”

It also estimated chairmen-CEOs at financial groups spent 35 per cent of their time on board matters. An independent chairman lets the chief executive devote that time to managing the business. Separation cuts conflicts of interest and promotes constructive challenge in the boardroom. In short, a split not only limits problems caused when a student marks his own homework but gives him more time to do the homework in the first place.

該報告還估計，金融集團的CEO兼董事長拿出35%的時間解決董事會的問題。CEO若不兼任董事長，就可以把這些時間投入到管理企業當中。這樣減少了利益衝突，推動了董事會的建設性質詢。簡言之，CEO和董事長由不同的人擔任，不僅限制了學生給自己的家庭作業打分導致的問題，而且還讓學生首先有更多時間做家庭作業。

Many US companies have begun to favour the governance model that most big UK companies use, even though it used to be as alien as cricket. Booz and Co calculated new appointments of chair-CEOs were down from 40 per cent in 2000 to 18 per cent in 2011. The proportion of truly independent chairmen at Fortune 500 companies has risen from 9 to 20 per cent in a decade.

許多美國公司開始青睞大多數英國大公司採用的治理模式，即便它們以前曾與這種模式格格不入。博斯公司(Booz and Co)估計，在新獲任命中，CEO兼任董事長的比例從2000年的40%降至2011年的18%。在“財富500強”(Fortune 500)企業中，董事長真正由專人擔任的比例在十年內從9%升至20%。

Why then do JPMorgan and many others not follow suit? For two bad reasons: clubbiness and fear. Six of JPMorgan’s 11 directors are or were chairmen-CEOs. Its presiding director – charged with reining in the boss, if necessary – is currently Lee Raymond. He is no pushover. Steve Coll, author of Private Empire, wrote that he “ruled over ExxonMobil like an Emir”. But he is also the last person likely to spearhead a campaign for more power-sharing at the top.

那麼爲何摩根大通等許多公司沒有進行仿效？兩個蹩腳的理由是俱樂部文化和擔憂。在摩根大通的11位董事中，有6位董事現在或者曾經身兼董事長和CEO兩職。目前，摩根大通的主持董事是李•雷蒙德(Lee Raymond)，他負責在必要時限制CEO的權力。雷蒙德絕不是一個輕易屈服的人。《私人帝國》(Private Empire)一書的作者史蒂夫•科爾(Steve Coll)寫道，他“就像一位埃米爾（Emir，對穆斯林統治者的尊稱，譯者注）統治着埃克森美孚(ExxonMobil)”。但他也最不可能率先推動高層分享權力。

Directors and chief executives also know that Ken Lewis quit as chief executive of Bank of America mere months after shareholders voted by a tiny margin to appoint an independent chairman in 2009. The $6.2bn losses on the “London whale” derivatives trade and damaging allegations that risk management failed have blotted Mr Dimon’s shiny reputation. But JPMorgan’s directors must be afraid that if they appoint a separate chairman, Mr Dimon, an executive they still trust, will feel pushed towards the exit.

董事和CEO們也知道，2009年，就在美國銀行(Bank of America)的股東以微弱多數通過任命一位獨立董事長數月後，肯•劉易斯(Ken Lewis)辭去了CEO職務。摩根大通在“倫敦鯨”衍生品交易上虧損62億美元，以及外界對其風險管理失敗的頗有殺傷力的指控，已經讓戴蒙名譽掃地。但摩根大通的董事們必定擔心，如果他們任命一個獨立的董事長，那麼他們仍然信任的戴蒙將會覺得自己要被掃地出門。

I think such concerns are, to quote Mr Dimon’s initial verdict on the derivatives debacle, “a tempest in a teapot”. Citigroup operates under a chairman and a chief executive. JPMorgan itself and rival Morgan Stanley have in the past taken the half-step of splitting the role to smooth the transition to a new chief executive. One of the arguments made by BNY Mellon for double-badging its boss – that a “substantial majority of our peers” do it – already looks a little flimsy.

正如戴蒙最初聽聞衍生品交易鉅虧事件之後所言，我個人認爲此類擔憂是“茶壺裏的風暴”。花旗集團(Citigroup)分別有一個董事長和CEO。摩根大通自身及其競爭對手摩根士丹利(Morgan Stanley)過去曾邁出一小步，將這兩個職位分離以便向任命新CEO實現平穩過渡。紐約梅隆銀行(BNY Mellon)提出CEO身兼兩職的理由之一是“絕大多數銀行”都這麼做，現在看來這個理由有些牽強。

A split may not fit every company, so it shouldn’t be compulsory. A non-executive chairman couldn’t save Royal Bank of Scotland from near-collapse or keep Barclays out of the ethical abyss. New research also suggests that “demoting” chairmen of companies that are performing well undermines the share price.

分開不一定適用於每個公司，因此它不應是強制性的。一個非執行董事長不可能讓蘇格蘭皇家銀行(RBS)免於接近破產的境地，也不會把巴克萊(Barclays)救出道德深淵。新的研究還發現，“降職使用”表現優秀的董事長會讓該公司股價下跌。

But independent chairmanship should be the model for companies coming to market or planning a leadership succession. The role is not hard to grasp – the non-executive chairman runs the board and the chief executive runs the business – but it must be regularly explained. Too often, US chairmen see their appointment as an excuse to exercise their underused executive muscles.

但獨立的董事長角色應該成爲上市公司或計劃更換領導層的公司的模板。這種角色並不難理解——非執行董事長掌管董事會，而CEO管理企業——但公司必須定期解釋這種角色。美國公司的董事長往往利用其職位來行使他們未充分行使的執行權力。

The biggest problem in the US, however, is that the debate about which model to choose frequently turns into a test of machismo, in which activist investors vie to strip the chairman’s epaulettes from the humiliated executive’s shoulders. Splitting the roles is no panacea, but as long as the boss thinks of it as cruel and unusual punishment, directors will have an excuse to leave a vital tool of good governance in its box.

然而，美國最大的問題在於，圍繞選擇哪種模式的辯論往往會演變成一場“全武行”——維權投資者恨不得一腳把CEO從董事長職位上踹下去。分離這兩個職位並非萬靈藥，但只要CEO認爲分離是一個無情且非同尋常的懲罰措施，董事們就有理由暫不啓用這個通往良好治理的關鍵工具。