一個險些推遲二戰結束的事件 plot that nearly prevented war from ending
On the night of August 14 1945, as Japan prepared to surrender to the Allies, a group of rebel officers launched a coup d’état and seized control of Tokyo’s Imperial Palace.
1945年8月14日夜裏，就在日本準備向盟軍投降之際，一羣反叛的軍官發動了一次政變，控制了日本皇宮。
Determined to fight on, even if it meant the annihilation of their country, the plotters ransacked the palace looking for the prepared recording of Emperor Hirohito’s surrender message and very nearly prevented the end of the second world war.
政變的策劃者下定決心要繼續戰鬥——即使這意味着整個日本被消滅也在所不辭。他們全面搜查了皇宮，尋找已準備好的裕仁天皇(Emperor Hirohito)宣讀投降詔書的錄音，差一點就阻止了二戰的結束。
The events of that night — symbolising a loss of political control over the military — have come sharply into focus on Friday’s 70th anniversary as Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, seeks to reinterpret Japan’s pacifist constitution and make it easier for its armed forces to fight.
當晚發生的事件，象徵着日本政界喪失了對軍方的控制。在日本首相安倍晉三(Shinzo Abe)試圖重新解釋和平憲法、減少日本軍隊作戰的法律障礙之際，這一事件在週五的日本投降70週年紀念日上突然引起極大關注。
The main actors from that August night are long dead, but one man still living spoke with almost all of them. In the mid-1960s, Kazutoshi Hando interviewed the protagonists for his book Japan’s Longest Day , a classic account of the hours leading up to the surrender. “Even 20 or 30 years later the plotters still thought it was wrong for Japan to capitulate,” he said in an interview with the Financial Times.
當晚的主要行動人員久已不在人世。不過，一位曾和幾乎所有人談話過的人依然健在。上世紀60年代中期，半藤一利(Kazutoshi Hando)曾採訪過事件的當事人，以便爲他的《日本最漫長的一天》(Japan's Longest Day)提供素材。該書是一部解釋日本投降前多個小時內所發生事情的經典著作。在接受英國《金融時報》採訪時，半藤一利表示：“即使在二三十年後，政變的策劃者仍然認爲日本投降是錯誤的決定。”
The book — remade as a film for the 70th anniversary — is almost unbearably tense. The fanatics plead with the head of the army to lead their coup, only for him to commit ritual suicide instead, while gangs of students roam the streets seeking to assassinate the prime minister.
爲紀念日本投降70週年，該書被翻拍成一部電影。這本書節奏極其緊張，令人幾乎喘不過氣來。當時，政變者狂熱地請求軍隊首腦領導他們的政變，結果卻導致他以自殺收場。與此同時，成羣的學生在街上游蕩，試圖刺殺日本首相。
It is often assumed that Japan’s surrender was inevitable after the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but even after the devastation of those cities half of the cabinet refused to accept the allies’ terms. The deadlock was only broken when the prime minister in an unprecedented step asked the Emperor, a constitutional figurehead, to decide whether to surrender.
人們往往有一種想當然的看法，認爲在廣島和長崎遭遇原子彈襲擊後，日本投降已不可避免。然而，即使是在這兩座城市遭遇毀滅性打擊之後，日本內閣仍有半數成員拒絕接受盟軍條款。日本首相採取了史無前例的舉措，纔打破了這一僵局：他請日本憲法規定的最高首腦——日本天皇——決定是否投降。
The surrender came as a shock to a military that was planning to fight to the last man.
對於打算戰鬥至最後一人的日本軍方來說，投降的命令令他們極爲震驚。
A successful coup was plausible. “The plotters probably thought they had a 50:50 chance,” says Mr Hando. The moment of greatest danger came on the morning of August 14 when the rebel officers knew the cabinet would meet at the prime minister’s residence. They planned to confine all members of the peace faction then install a military government.
就這樣，發動一場成功的政變似乎很有道理。半藤一利表示：“策劃者們也許認爲，他們成功的機會一半對一半。”最危險的一刻發生在8月14日早晨。當時，反叛的軍官瞭解到，日本內閣將在首相的官邸會晤。這些軍官計劃扣押所有主和派成員，再任命一屆軍政府。
If that had happened, says Mr Hando: “There would have been no way to form a new cabinet with the power to surrender. It would have ended as it did in Nazi Germany.” The Allies would have invaded Japan to be met by waves of suicide attacks.
半藤一利表示，如果這一切真的發生，“或許就沒辦法組建有權投降的新內閣了。結局可能會像德國納粹政府那樣。”盟軍將入侵日本，並遭遇一輪又一輪的自殺式襲擊。
But the prime minister got wind of the danger and had his colleagues meet at the Imperial Palace instead, The plotters seized the palace later in the night in a desperate attempt to prevent the Emperor’s broadcast of surrender.
不過，當時的首相聽到了危險的風聲，要求他的同僚改在日本皇宮會晤。當夜晚些時候，策劃者佔領了皇宮，以一種絕望的企圖，試圖阻止日本天皇發出投降廣播。
In the book it is striking just how little the atomic devastation of two cities seemed to play on the minds of the politicians planning surrender and the officers trying to stop them.
在這本書中，一個有趣的問題是，在計劃投降的政客和試圖阻止他們的軍官頭腦裏，兩座城市被原子彈毀滅似乎沒有產生什麼影響。
Years after writing Japan’s Longest Day, Mr Hando says he came to think the atomic attacks were more significant: they shocked Japan’s top brass, who had been told such weapons could not be ready in time for the war, but now feared an atomic attack on Tokyo.
半藤一利表示，在完成《日本最漫長的一天》多年之後，他逐漸認識到原子彈襲擊的意義要更大一些：這兩次襲擊震驚了日本高層軍官。這些人此前一直被告知，這種武器不會被及時研發出來，投入此次戰爭。然而如今，他們卻要擔心對東京的原子彈襲擊。
But he says Japan’s leadership had a sketchy understanding of what nuclear weapons really meant: it took until three days after Hiroshima, for example, to confirm the weapon used was atomic. “The leaders understood better than the general public, but there were still many who didn’t comprehend it fully,” says Mr Hando.
不過，半藤一利表示，日本領導層對核武器的真正威力理解十分膚淺：比如，直到廣島遭襲三天後，他們才確認襲擊廣島的武器是原子彈。半藤一利表示：“領導人瞭解的情況比普通公衆更多一些，但仍有許多人未完全瞭解這種武器。”
The author, now aged 85, is part of the dying generation with personal memories of the war. He remembers feeling deeply moved when Japan adopted its pacifist constitution in 1947, and while he says an old man has no right to decide, he clearly opposes Mr Abe’s changes.
這位現年85歲的作者，也是正在死去的擁有戰爭個人記憶的一代人中的一份子。他還記得，1947年日本採納和平憲法時，他大受感動。此外，雖然他表示作爲一位老人無權決定什麼，但是他明確反對安倍的改革。
Japan’s greatest assets is the international trust its post-war pacifism has earned, says Mr Hando. “To throw that away on a needless national security law...I think is completely unnecessary.”
半藤一利表示，日本最大的資產，是通過戰後的和平主義戰略贏得的國際社會的信任。“我認爲，爲了一條不必要的防務安全法律拋棄這一切，是完全不必要的。”
