中國海外併購日益受到不友好對待?

China’s investment around the world is an important and developing phenomenon. But both its successes and its setbacks are being overstated. This risks warping business and policy decision-making. In particular, there is no sign at the global level of greater hostility in host countries toward Chinese companies.

中國在世界各地的投資是一個重要的“發展中”現象，但其成功和挫折都被誇大了，以致有扭曲商業和政策決策之虞。更何況，在全球層面上並沒有跡象表明東道國對中國企業敵意增加。

The problem starts with the definition of success. Sources offer 2016 figures as high as $247bn for the PRC’s overseas deals in 2016. But the indicator used is closer to “circulated acquisition ideas” than “deals.”

第一個問題是關於成功交易的定義。據若干數據來源，2016年中國海外併購交易額高達2470億美元。但它們所用的指標更接近於“流傳的收購意向”，而不是“交易”。

The American Enterprise Institute’s China Global Investment Tracker and China’s Ministry of Commerce agree on a first estimate of $170bn for outbound investment. While the $170bn results could be revised upward, they also include greenfield investment. Total investment rose sharply in 2016. It certainly did not double over 2015, as some claim.

美國企業研究所(American Enterprise Institute)編制的“中國全球投資跟蹤”(China Global Investment Tracker)，以及中國商務部都同意一個初步估計，即2016年中國對外投資爲1700億美元。雖然這一數值可能被上修，但其中還包括了“綠地投資”(greenfield investment)。2016年總投資額出現大幅上升，但據某些人表示，肯定達不到2015年的兩倍。

If the 2016 baseline is wrong, it will yield an inaccurate view of 2017. A $200bn figure for verifiable Chinese investment in 2017 would be a further increase, not a surprising decline. Numbers along the lines of $250bn just for 2016 acquisitions are not useful for comparison.

如果2016年數據是錯誤的，以其作爲基準進行比較，將導致對2017年形勢的誤讀。2017年中國可證實的投資假如達到2000億美元，那就是有所增加，而不是意外下降。2016年海外收購在2500億美元左右這樣的數據並無比較價值。

Directly connected to the overstatement of successful investment is the overstatement of failed investment. If transactions that are merely proposed are added in, the value of “failed” transactions will inevitably soar, given the likelihood of failure at the proposal stage is high.

對成功投資的誇大，與對失敗投資的誇大直接相關。如果擬議的交易也計算在內，“失敗”交易的數額必然大增，因爲提議階段的交易失敗的可能性很高。

The biggest example of a purported deal that is neither investment nor failure is Tsinghua Unigroup’s fake $23bn bid for Micron. Tsinghua pretending it had the money and was soon to submit a proper bid was not anything close to an acquisition. Even worse would be counting it as a meaningful failure — it was much closer to farce.

既不算投資、也算不上失敗投資的最大一筆傳聞交易就是紫光集團(Tsinghua Unigroup)230億美元假收購美光科技(Micron Technology)。紫光集團假裝自己有這筆資金，並迅速提交合理報價，但該交易連收購的邊都沾不上。更糟糕的是將它當做一次有意義的失敗，其實它更接近於鬧劇。

As such, it can hardly qualify as being blocked by American political opposition. In fact, host country opposition accounted for only a minor part of China’s 2016 investment problems.

因此，這筆交易不能算作受阻於美國政界的反對。事實上，在中國2016年的投資問題中，東道國的反對只佔了很小一部分。

An illustration here is Anbang’s $14bn attempt to buy Starwood early last year. Anbang seemed to give up because it did not want to compete with Marriott, though more likely Anbang did not have the funds and could not get them from state-owned Chinese banks. Neither popular nor government opposition in the US was a factor.

以去年初安邦(Anbang)提出以140億美元收購喜達屋(Starwood)爲例。安邦之所以放棄，似乎是因爲不想與萬豪(Marriott)競爭，但更可能是安邦缺乏資金，且無法從中國國有銀行獲得融資。其原因不包括美國民衆或政府的反對。

The result was due to a conventional commercial judgment, an error by the company, or reluctance by the Chinese state. Measuring deals lost to conventional commercial developments has no purpose — there are no business or policy implications of such outcomes. Tallying these transactions just generates a larger figure, conflating real issues with normal business.

這起收購案的失敗原因可歸結於常規商業判斷、企業失誤或中國政府不同意。因爲常規商業發展而失敗的交易沒有計算的意義——這種結果不具有商業或政策上的含義。統計這些交易只是生成了一個更大的數字，從而與正常業務的真實問題混爲一談。

Host country opposition, errors by Chinese firms and Chinese government opposition are all included in a set of “troubled” transactions in the American Enterprise Institute data set. The goals in collecting this data are to include only legitimate transactions and exclude conventional business issues as reasons for failure or impairment.

東道國的反對、中國企業的錯誤和中國政府的反對，都包含在美國企業研究所數據庫裏一組叫做“問題”交易的數據中。收集這些數據的目的是隻篩選真實的交易，剔除掉因常規商業問題導致的失敗或受挫交易。

There are almost surely some mistakes in the list. Nonetheless, it involves a consistent methodology and includes slightly over 200 transactions worth more than $300bn. It starts with the politically driven collapse of China National Offshore Oil’s $18bn bid for Unocal in 2005, a collapse that actually signalled the start of large-scale Chinese outbound investment.

幾乎可以肯定這組數據中存在一些錯誤。儘管如此，但它用的是一種一以貫之的方法，其中包括了略多於200筆交易，交易總值超過3000億美元。第一筆“問題”交易是2005年中國海洋石油有限公司（China National Offshore Oil Corp，簡稱中海油）以180億美元競購優尼科(Unocal)失敗，屬於受政治因素影響的失敗交易。實際上，那次收購失敗標誌着中國大規模海外投資的開始。

Chinese companies struggled most with their investments in 2008 and 2009. This is not surprising given the world economic situation and the inexperience of Chinese investors, such as Ping An, at the time. The initial set of investors, mostly commodities firms, is far more sophisticated now.

2008年和2009年是中國企業投資最受挫的時期。考慮到當時世界經濟的狀況以及平安保險(Ping An)等中國投資者缺乏經驗的情況，這並不奇怪。最初的那批投資者——主要是大宗商品公司——如今變得老練多了。

In 2016, the inexperience lies with a new batch of privately owned Chinese investors. For last year, the “troubled” list currently shows 25 troubled transactions worth more than $31bn, about the same as 2015. The 2016 figure will rise, because some transactions are impaired over time in the form of long-term delays or belatedly being curtailed.

2016年，缺乏經驗的情況出現在一批新的中國私營投資者身上。2016年“問題“列表目前顯示有25筆、總值超過310億美元的問題交易，與2015年的數字基本一致。2016年的數字將有所增加，因爲隨着時間推移，一些交易會以被長期拖延或者拖了很久終於被縮小規模的形式受挫。

Even if the 2016 troubled figure ultimately rises all the way to $45bn, though, this increase will only mirror the 2016 increase in successful investment. It will not signal new hostility toward Chinese spending overseas. In contrast, it was striking how little opposition last year’s investment surge generated, at least initially.

即使2016年問題交易額最終一直增加至450億美元，其增長也只能映襯2016年成功投資的增長，而不能表明中國海外投資遭遇新一波敵意。倒是去年（至少在最初階段）中國海外投資飆升所遭遇的反對如此之少令人驚訝。

Much attention has been paid to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. On the AEI count over $4bn worth of blocked or downsised transactions in 2016 is attributable to CFIUS. This may seem substantial, but the AEI figure for Chinese investment in the US last year exceeds $50bn (from $19bn in 2015).

人們非常關注美國外國投資委員會(Committee on Foreign Investment)。根據美國企業研究所的統計，2016年由該委員會造成的受到阻攔或縮小規模的交易總值超過40億美元。這看起來或許是一個很大的數字，但美國企業研究所估算，去年中國在美投資總額超過了500億美元（2015年僅爲190億美元）。

China’s global investment may decline this year. The proper basis to determine that is not intended transactions but those in progress or completed. Moreover, it is Beijing’s concerns about capital flight that are likely to cause any decline. There is no sign of greater foreign hostility to Chinese money or an extraordinary amount of investor mistakes.

今年中國的全球投資規模可能出現下滑。能確定這一點的比較基數不是意向交易，而是那些正在推進或已經完成的交易。而且，如果真的下滑，北京方面對資本外逃的擔憂可能是造成下滑的原因。目前沒有跡象顯示外國對中國資本敵意增加或存在大量的投資者錯誤。

Derek Scissors is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, a US public policy think-tank

本文作者爲美國公共政策智庫——美國企業研究所(American Enterprise Institute)常駐學者