811匯改動盪已成遙遠記憶
This time last year, the biggest early-day news about the renminbi appeared to be an announcement of a new, improved Rmb100 note to fight counterfeiting. It was until China’s central bank fixed the currency 1.9 per cent weaker than it had the previous day.
去年今日的早上，有關人民幣的最大新聞似乎是有關新版100元面額人民幣將有助於防僞的消息。隨後傳出一條更大的新聞：中國央行(PBoC)把人民幣兌美元匯率中間價較前一日下調1.9%。
Traders were so stunned they initially thought there was something wrong with their hearing.
交易員們如此震驚，以至於他們最初以爲自己的聽力出了問題。
That change in the daily fix, around which the onshore renminbi trades 2 per cent either side, was five times the size of any fix move by the People’s Bank of China before then, and is still twice the size of any change since the turmoil it triggered.
那次人民幣匯率中間價——在岸匯率每天波動幅度被限定在中間價上下2%的範圍內——的降幅，是此前中國央行最大中間價調整幅度的5倍，並且仍是自那次調整引發動盪以來最大變動幅度的兩倍。
One year on, the renminbi market is more or less calm once more as those speculating on further falls have either given up or found more profitable bets elsewhere.
一年後的今天，隨着很多猜測人民幣進一步下跌的人要麼已經死心、要麼找到了其他更有利可圖的打賭對象，人民幣市場差不多恢復了平靜。
But that would not be the case without the events of last August, which forced the PBoC to communicate better, and taught many investors that alongside the old maxim “don’t fight the Fed” they should perhaps add another: “don’t push the PBoC”.
但是，如果沒有去年8月那場風波，情況不會是現在的樣子。那場風波迫使中國央行改進溝通，並使很多投資者領悟到：除了古老的格言“不要與美聯儲(Fed)對着幹”以外，他們或許還應該再加上一條：“不要逼中國央行”。
“The motive [for currency reform] was right but they fumbled the process [last August], and they’ve learnt a lot since,” says David Mahon, chairman of Mahon Beijing Investment Management Advisors. “Western observers make too much of what they see as currency manipulation. This [suspicion] comes from a lack of understanding of the Chinese economy.”
“（匯改的）動機沒錯，但是（去年8月）他們搞砸了這個過程，自那以來他們學到了很多經驗，”馬鴻（北京）投資管理顧問公司(Mahon Beijing Investment Management Advisors)董事長馬大偉(David Mahon)表示，“西方觀察人士太過糾結於他們眼裏的匯率操縱行爲。這種（疑心）源自對中國經濟缺乏理解。”
The PBoC’s increased willingness to communicate is the biggest change. On August 11th, the momentous fixing was accompanied by a very brief statement that talked only of a “one-time adjustment” and a shift — with no details — to a market-focused regime.
中國央行的溝通意願增加是最大變化。去年8月11日的那次重大調整伴隨着一份非常簡短的聲明，只表示此舉是爲了完善人民幣市場化機制而進行的“一次性校正”和變動，沒有細節。
That limited information prompted fears the depreciation was really a sign China’s economy was in far worse state than realised and that the PBoC’s control over capital flows could be cracking.
這一有限的信息促使外界擔憂，那次貶值是中國經濟比人們預想的要糟糕得多的一個標誌，而中國央行對資本流動的管制可能正在出現裂縫。
They also worried that China was opening a new front in the currency wars, seeking competitive devaluation to bolster its exports.
他們還擔心，中國正在匯率戰爭中開闢一條新戰線，尋求競爭性貶值來提振出口。
“The market impact was clearly underestimated by policymakers,” says Mansoor Mohi-uddin, senior markets strategist at RBS. “They’ve had to change a lot since then.”
“政策制定者顯然低估了對市場造成的衝擊，”蘇格蘭皇家銀行(RBS)高級市場策略師曼蘇爾•莫希-烏丁(Mansoor Mohi-uddin)表示。“自那以來，他們不得不做出很大改變。”
Communications have developed in several steps. In December the PBoC began publishing the composition of the basket of currencies against which it tracks the renminbi. Analysts have since mostly concluded that the central bank does follow market pricing in setting the renminbi fix — at least, to a far greater degree than before, and so long as it suits it to.
溝通分幾步發展。去年12月，中國央行開始公佈其追蹤人民幣匯率時參考的一籃子貨幣的構成。自那以來，多數分析師得出的結論是中國央行在設定人民幣中間價時確實在遵循市場定價——至少比以前在更大程度上遵循市場，而且只要這麼做符合當局的意圖。
Talking publicly was a bigger ask: except for a brief appearance in September, Zhou Xiaochuan, the PBoC governor, only broke silence in February, in a magazine interview. That only came following heavy criticism of January’s tumbling renminbi that in turn produced fresh global turmoil.
公開發表談話則是更大的奢求：除了去年9月的一次短暫露面，中國央行行長周小川直至今年2月接受一家雜誌採訪時纔打破沉默——這還是在1月人民幣匯率大跌引發新一輪全球動盪、招致各方批評後才發生的。
“PBoC officials have stepped up their communication game,” says Frederic Neumann, head of Asian economic research at HSBC. “They [have] let investors understand that [currency reform] is about flexibility, not an opening shot in the global currency wars.”
“中國央行官員已經加強了他們的溝通，”匯豐(HSBC)亞洲經濟研究主管範力民(Frederic Neumann)說，“他們（已經）讓投資者明白（匯率改革）關乎彈性，而非打響全球匯率戰的第一槍。”
The central bank has also demonstrated it is prepared to play hard ball. In January, heavy intervention in the offshore market hurt short-sellers and stemmed the renminbi’s fall. Meanwhile, new reserve requirements, imposed on offshore deposits for the first time, sent short-term renminbi borrowing rates in Hong Kong negative for a day by the end of March. The result was the renminbi ended the quarter stronger.
中國央行也證明了其已經準備好打硬仗。今年1月，對離岸市場的大舉干預打擊了空頭，阻止了人民幣下跌。與此同時，首次對離岸人民幣存款執行新的準備金要求，使得香港短期人民幣借款利率在3月底的一天跌至負值。其結果是人民幣在結束第一季度之際走強。
Bearish bets now appear to have been rethought to the extent that last month, when the renminbi slipped to five-year lows, it was not met with anything like the same fevered reaction as last August.
看跌人民幣的投機者似乎已改變主意，以至於上月人民幣匯率跌至5年低點時，市場並未出現去年8月的那種激烈反應。
The PBoC’s actions have also made it clear that China maintains a strong grip on its capital account.
中國央行的舉措也明確表明，中國依然有力管制着資本賬戶。
After its FX reserves fell by more than $100bn in both December and January, bolstering the case for renminbi bears, subsequent outflows slowed sharply amid reports China was tightening its controls in several ways.
在去年12月和今年1月，中國外匯儲備分別下降逾1000億美元，這支持了看跌人民幣的理由。但隨後資本外流急劇放緩，有報道稱中國通過多種方式收緊管制。
Some of these enforced existing rules. While approval had always been needed from the State Administration of Foreign Exchange for big overseas acquisitions, there was now a sense that “you really had to have a deal worth prioritising above other outbound investments”, according to one source.
其中一些方式是執行現有規則。一位消息人士稱，儘管大型海外收購始終需要獲得中國國家外匯管理局(SAFE)的批准，但現在人們感覺，“你真的需要有一筆值得優先於其他對外投資的交易”。
New measures have also been brought in: from February, the PBoC started capping the transactions of mainlanders buying life insurance in Hong Kong to stop them from exploiting a loophole to move funds offshore.
中國還出臺了新的措施：從今年2月開始，中國央行開始爲內地人士在香港購買人壽保險的交易設置上限，以阻止他們利用漏洞向海外轉移資金。
SAFE stopped allocating quotas allowing domestic investors to invest abroad, and stopped its launch of the second Qualified Domestic Institutional Investor scheme that allows domestic investors to buy equity abroad.
外管局不再向國內投資者授予海外投資額度，並停止開展第二批合格境內機構投資者(QDII)項目。QDII項目允許國內投資者在國外購買股票。
Officials also began encouraging big banks and would-be acquirers of foreign companies to borrow in dollars to create cash pools offshore rather than move existing renminbi.
官員們也開始鼓勵大型銀行和外國企業的潛在收購方借入美元以創建離岸資金池，而不是將現有人民幣資金轉移出去。
The final reason for the lack of recent upsets may simply be that other crises have emerged elsewhere.
最近沒有風波的最後一個原因可能是全球其他地區爆發了其他危機。
“People have become distracted: global events such as Brexit have meant there’s less attention and scrutiny of the PBoC’s management of the renminbi,” says Mr Mahon.
馬大偉表示：“人們已經分散了注意力：英國退歐等全球性事件意味着，中國央行管理人民幣受到的關注和審視減少了。”
In spite of its improved communications and market-focused currency management, that is something the PBoC is likely to welcome.
儘管中國央行加強了溝通，並致力於市場化匯率管理，但它仍可能歡迎全球大格局的這種變化。
