不再耀眼的美國銀行業 How the vampire squid became a flattened slug

A decade ago, Goldman Sachs reported that its return on common shareholder equity had hit a dazzling 39.8 per cent. It symbolised a gilded age: back in 2006, as markets boomed, the power — and profits — of big banks seemed unstoppable.

10年前，高盛(Goldman Sachs)曾公佈39.8%的耀眼淨資產收益率(return on common shareholder equity)。那代表着一個鍍金時代：在2006年，隨着市場的繁榮，大銀行的影響力（和利潤）似乎無法阻擋。

How times change. This week, American banks unveiled downbeat results, with revenues for the biggest five tumbling 16 per cent year-on-year. But Goldman was even weaker: net income was 56 per cent lower, while return on equity, a key measure of profitability, was 6.4 per cent, below even the sector average in 2015 of 10.3 per cent.

時過境遷。最近，美國的銀行公佈了令人沮喪的財報：最大的五家銀行的收入同比大減16%。但高盛的情況更糟：淨利潤暴跌56%，衡量盈利能力的關鍵指標股本回報率(ROE)爲6.4%，甚至比2015年的行業平均水平（10.3%）還低。

A bank which was once so adept at sucking out profits that it was called a “vampire squid” (by Rolling Stone magazine) is thus producing returns more commonly associated with a utility. The phrase “flattened slug” might seem appropriate.

一家曾如此擅長吸取利潤、因而被（《滾石》雜誌(Rolling Stone)）冠以“吸血烏賊”(vampire squid)稱號的銀行，現在的回報率卻更像是一家公用事業單位。“扁平鼻涕蟲”這個稱呼似乎適合現在的它。

Is this just a temporary downturn? Financiers certainly hope so. After all, they point out, this week’s results did feature some upbeat (ish) points. None of America’s banks actually blew up in the first quarter of the year, even though markets gyrated in dramatic ways; the post-crisis reforms have improved risk controls and reserves.

這只是暫時的低迷嗎？金融業人士肯定希望如此。畢竟，他們指出，今年第一季度的財報確實包含一些（微弱的）亮點。儘管今年第一季度市場大幅波動，但美國的銀行沒有一家真正出現大問題；後危機時代的改革已改善了風險控制和資本準備金。

Meanwhile, banking in America looks healthier than in Europe, where the reform process has been slower. Overall credit quality at American banks, outside the energy sector, does not seem alarming. Net interest margins are now increasing a touch, after several years of decline, because the Federal Reserve has raised rates.

與此同時，美國銀行業看上去比歐洲更健康——歐洲的改革進程一直較爲緩慢。美國各銀行的總體信貸質量（除能源行業以外）看上去沒什麼問題。在經歷了多年的下滑以後，淨利差現在正在擴大，因爲美聯儲(Fed)上調了利率。

The last quarter’s results might have been depressed by temporary geopolitical woes, such as business uncertainty about Brexit, the American elections, oil prices and the Chinese economy. Once this angst fades away later this year, returns may rebound; analysts expect the Goldman ROE, for example, to move towards 10 per cent later this year. “The market feels a little fragile,” says Harvey Schwartz, its chief financial officer. “[But] it feels like that is behind us.”

上一季度的財報可能受到暫時的地緣政治問題的不利影響，例如業界對英國脫歐問題的不確定、美國大選、油價和中國經濟。一旦這些擔憂在今年晚些時候消散，回報率可能會反彈；例如，分析師預測，高盛的股本回報率將在今年晚些時候向10%攀升。“市場感覺有些脆弱，”高盛首席財務官哈維•施瓦茨(Harvey Schwartz)表示，“（但）這種情況似乎已經過去。”

Perhaps. But even if this “optimism” is justified, nobody should ignore the cognitive shift. After all, a decade ago, an ROE of 10 per cent was considered a disaster, not a relief, at Goldman Sachs. So perhaps the most important lesson from this week is this: if American regulators had hoped to make the banks look truly dull — not dazzling — in this post-crisis era, they are now succeeding better than anyone might have thought.

或許如此吧。然而即便這種“樂觀主義”有充分理由，我們也不應忽視這種認識上的變化。畢竟，在10年前的高盛，10%的股本回報率會被視爲糟糕透頂，而非好消息。因此，或許上週帶給我們的最重要教訓是：如果美國監管機構曾經希望讓銀行在後危機時代變得業績平平（而非耀眼）的話，那麼他們現在已經比所有人可能想象到的更成功了。

It is not the first time this has occurred. In the 1920s, American finance also dazzled. Indeed, profits were so high that the economists Thomas Philippon and Ariell Reshef estimated that average banker pay was 1.6 times higher than other professions in 1928 (which, in a neat twist of history, was the same ratio seen in 2006.)

這種情況並非首次發生。上世紀20年代，美國金融業也曾光芒耀眼。實際上，當時的銀行利潤非常高，據經濟學家托馬•菲利蓬(Thomas Philippon)和阿里埃勒•雷謝夫(Ariell Reshef)估計，1928年，銀行家的平均工資是其他職業的1.6倍（歷史真是曲折迂迴，2006年也恰好是這個數字。）

But when the 1929 crash happened, banks went bust and the financial sector subsequently became more utility-like: so much so that between 1940s and 1960s the banker pay ratio was nearer to 1.1. Tighter regulation was one reason for that. Another, less widely noticed, factor that cut bank profits was the fact that real interest rates in the US and UK were kept slightly negative in the postwar years, in a policy known as “financial repression”.

然而，1929年的大崩盤後，銀行紛紛破產，金融業後來變得更像是公用事業單位：最明顯的是在上世紀40年代至60年代，銀行家與其他職業的薪資比率接近1.1。更嚴格的監管是原因之一。另外一個不太顯眼的壓低銀行利潤的因素是，美國和英國的實際利率在戰後那些年保持在略低於零的水平，這一政策被稱爲“金融抑制”(financial repression)。

The pattern is not entirely identical this time around, since there is nowhere near the same state control over finance. But a regulatory squeeze is also under way, financial globalisation is in retreat and real interest rates are negative in some markets. And, unlike the 1950s, banks are also being disrupted by internet technology and the shadow banks. Pay is declining too: total compensation at Goldman Sachs is now 40 per cent lower than a year before, reflecting an industry trend.

這一次的情況並非完全一樣，因爲現在政府對金融的控制遠不如從前。但監管同樣在收緊，金融全球化在倒退，一些市場的實際利率爲負。與上世紀50年代不同，銀行還正在被互聯網科技以及影子銀行顛覆。銀行業薪資也在下降：高盛現在的總薪酬比上一年下滑40%，這反映出一種行業趨勢。

Critics of Wall Street — such as Bernie Sanders, Hillary Clinton’s opponent in the Democratic primaries — will certainly not shed a tear about this. Nor will some shareholders, who argue that banks need to cut pay further if they are ever to boost their ROEs. And some regulators, such as Thomas Hoenig, vice-chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, fear that the reform process is still incomplete, particularly given the continued power of the big banks. Indeed, as the economist Henry Kaufman points out, one irony of the post-crisis world is that big banks have become relatively bigger: the top ten players control 80 per cent of US assets.

華爾街的批評者們（例如民主黨初選中希拉里•克林頓(Hillary Clinton)的競爭對手伯尼•桑德斯(Bernie Sanders)）肯定絲毫不會爲之動容。一些股東也不會，他們認爲，如果還想提高股本回報率，銀行需要進一步降薪。一些監管者（例如聯邦存款保險公司(Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation)副董事長托馬斯•霍尼格(Thomas Hoenig)）擔心，改革進程仍未完成，尤其是考慮到大銀行仍擁有影響力。實際上，正如經濟學家亨利•考夫曼(Henry Kaufman)指出的那樣，危機後世界荒謬的一點是大銀行變得更大了：前10大銀行控制着美國80%的資產。

Nevertheless, if financiers or angry politicians want to find thrills in finance today, they should look at asset managers, particularly the shadow banks. That is where some financiers are still reaping returns of 40 per cent. In today’s boring world, few want to shout about that; least of all if they used to work at Goldman Sachs.

然而，如果金融業人士或憤怒的政治人士希望在當今的金融業找到一些亮色的話，他們應該看看資產管理公司，尤其是影子銀行。在這一領域，一些金融業人士仍在獲得40%的回報率。在當今這個沉悶的世界，這件事幾乎無人想要聲張；尤其是如果他們曾經效力於高盛的話。