美聯儲不應爲中國操心 Fed should start making clear it faces difficult trade offs

In the past five years, 15 of the OECD’s 36 member countries have raised policy rates, some prematurely, only to cut them again. Last week’s decision by the Federal Reserve to hold the rate steady showed that it has yet to find the confidence to be the 16th. Unlike its peers, though, the Fed is sometimes uniquely conflicted, having to balance both domestic and global factors.

過去五年裏，經合組織(OECD) 36個成員國中有15個提高了政策利率，其中一些國家動手太早，結果再次降息。上週，美聯儲(Fed)決定保持利率不變，證明其尚不具備成爲第16個加息的OECD國家央行的信心。不過，與其他央行不同，美聯儲有時會陷入獨一無二的矛盾處境，因爲它不得不平衡國內和全球因素。

While the domestic argument for an initial policy rate change remains firm, the Fed acknowledged that global developments centred around China and emerging markets, which had led to market and economic turbulence, had swung opinion back again. But August’s tremors were not isolated or random, and force us to ask how long this stand-off can go on, given that China’s travails, for example, are not going to end anytime soon. And what if it did go on? The US economic case for a gradual exit from zero rates has been growing steadily, with decent employment growth, unemployment at just over 5 per cent, and wage and salary formation starting to build slowly. It is true that some labour market indicators, such as the employment-to-population and labour force participation ratios, are at a 35-year low, though some of this is structural.

雖然對美國國內來說，開始調整政策利率的理由依然十分充分，但美聯儲承認，圍繞中國和新興市場的全球事態（這些事態已導致市場和經濟動盪）已令它改變想法。不過，8月的動盪既不是孤立現象，也不是隨機現象。它迫使我們問這樣的問題：假如中國的陣痛不會在短期內結束，這種對峙狀況能夠持續多久？如果它真的持續下去，會發生什麼？就美國經濟而言，逐步退出零利率狀態的理由一直在穩步增強，這些理由包括就業增長較快，失業率僅略高於5%，薪資正開始緩慢增長。當然，一些勞動力市場指標，如就業佔總人口的比例以及勞動力參與率，正處於35年來最低水平，儘管這其中有一部分是結構性的。

That said, the so-called U6 unemployment rate (including people marginally attached to the labour force and those working part-time for economic reasons) is at the same level it was when the Fed initiated its last tightening cycle in 2004. The core personal consumption deflator then, moreover, was only 0.3 per cent higher than August’s 1.4 per cent.

話雖如此，所謂的U6失業率（包括了那些待業和因經濟原因而兼職的人）與2004年美聯儲啓動上一輪收緊週期時處於同一水平。那時的個人消費支出平減指數也只比今年8月份的1.4%高了0.3%。

The International backdrop, though, is sensitive. Twice before, Fed tightening cycles and a robust US dollar have been associated with emerging market crises. US monetary policy in 1979-82 proved too much for indebted Latin America, and in 1994-95 it contributed to the Asian crisis. This time, a change in US monetary policy would not so much trigger a China or emerging markets crisis that has already started as accentuate it. As Janet Yellensuggested after last week’s Fed meeting, that crisis could also affect the US in coming months. It is easy to see why Fed officials backed away from these risks. A paper by the Bank for International settlements pointed to strong spillovers into emerging markets from US monetary policies that go far beyond interest rate and exchange rate relationships.

不過，目前的國際大環境相當敏感。美聯儲收緊週期和美元走強的局面曾兩度伴隨新興市場危機。美國在1979年到1982年期間的貨幣政策，使債臺高築的拉美不堪重負。而1994年到1995年期間的美國貨幣政策又間接導致了亞洲金融危機。這一次，美國貨幣政策的調整與其說引爆中國或新興市場的危機（這些危機已經開場），不如說加劇這些危機。正如珍妮特耶倫(Janet Yellen)在上週美聯儲議息會議後所暗示的，在接下來幾個月裏，這些危機可能也會影響美國。美聯儲官員在這類風險面前知難而退的原因不言自明。國際清算銀行(Bank for International Settlements)一篇論文指出，美國貨幣政策對新興市場存在強大的溢出效應，遠遠超越利率和匯率關係的範疇。

During the past few years of easy money, the US dollar’s special role as a funding and financing currency has contributed to balance sheet, asset price and domestic credit excesses that are reversing, first with US dollar appreciation, and next, if or when US policy rates go up. The consequences for economic and investment growth in emerging markets are clear.

在過去幾年的寬鬆貨幣時代，美元作爲籌融資貨幣的特殊地位，對資產負債表、資產價格和國內過度信貸起到了推波助瀾的作用。這些過度正在逆轉，最初是由於美元升值，下一個觸發因素則會是美國政策利率上升。對新興市場的經濟和投資增長來說，後果顯而易見。

This should not be a reason to desist from making a policy rate change if otherwise justified. It would not be painless, but many important emerging markets have experienced sharp currency depreciations, have lengthening debt maturity profiles and still have relatively high levels of reserves. China, at the heart of the emerging market maelstrom, faces a multiyear period in which the investment share of GDP is likely to drop from an unprecedented 45 per cent to something closer to 35 per cent, in keeping with the experience of Japan and other “tiger” economies.

不過，這不應成爲即使條件具備也不改變政策利率的理由。加息不會毫無痛苦，然而許多重要的新型市場的貨幣已經大幅貶值，具有越來越長的債務期限，其外匯儲備水平相對也仍然較高。處於新興市場風暴核心的中國，目前面臨一個持續多年的調整時期，其間投資佔國內生產總值(GDP)的比例可能會從史無前例的45%滑落至更接近35%的水平，與日本及其他“老虎”經濟體的經歷相符。

The downswing is being driven by a structural real estate overhang and chronic industrial overcapacity, not helped by the continuing shortcomings of state enterprise reforms. No one can foresee how this transition will be managed, especially given a highly uncertain political and policy backdrop, or what the cyclical or currency consequences might entail. This begs the question: how long should the Fed cite China or emerging markets as a reason for keeping rates on hold, especially if the domestic case for not doing so becomes even more compelling? Seven years of zero interest rates have contributed to mounting financial distortions in emerging markets.

中國這次下行是結構性房地產過剩和慢性工業產能過剩導致的，國企改革的種種持續性弊端也於事無補。沒人能預見這種轉型將得到怎樣的管理——尤其是考慮到高度不確定的政治和政策大背景、或者週期或匯率後果可能會牽涉的方方面面。這令人不得不問：美聯儲應在多長時間內將中國或新興市場作爲保持利率不變的理由，尤其是在美國國內的加息理由變得更加充分的情況下？長達7年的零利率助長了新興市場愈演愈烈的金融扭曲。

If the Fed continued with financial market stability as the leitmotif of policymaking, a later but more disruptive policy adjustment and greater instability are the all too likely outcomes. The Fed should start telling markets about the difficult trade-offs it faces.

若美聯儲繼續把金融市場的穩定性作爲政策制定的指導思想，極有可能出現的結果是更遲出臺但更具破壞性的政策調整以及更大的不穩定。美聯儲應開始將其面臨的艱難抉擇告知市場。

George Magnus is a senior economic adviser at UBS and an associate at Oxford university’s China Centre

喬治氠格努斯(George Magnus)是瑞銀(UBS)高級經濟顧問、牛津大學(Oxford University)中國中心(China Centre)研究員