美國爲何能對國際足聯下手

It is half-time in the match between the US justice system and Fifa. In the first half, the Americans took a shock early lead, with the unexpected arrest of several of Fifa’s leading players. But world football’s governing body struck back with a defiant equaliser — re-electing its discredited president, Sepp Blatter.

現在是美國司法系統與國際足聯(Fifa)比賽的中場休息時間。上半場，美國方面率先取得驚人的領先優勢，出人意料地逮捕了國際足聯幾名主要“球員”。但世界足球管理機構用一個挑釁性的扳平球予以了回擊——選舉受到懷疑的塞普•布拉特(Sepp Blatter)連任主席。（根據最新的消息，布拉特已經宣佈辭職——編者注）

The ultimate outcome of this match will be of interest all around the world, and not just to football fans. President Vladimir Putin of Russia has denounced the Fifa arrests as yet another example of the abuse of American power. His reaction illustrates that the Fifa struggle has become a highly visible test-case of one of the central questions in world politics — is the US still powerful enough to call the shots in global organisations? Or is the sole superpower’s grip on global institutions slipping?

這場比賽的最終結果將引起全世界範圍的興趣，而且感興趣的將不只是球迷。俄羅斯總統弗拉基米爾•普京(Vladimir Putin)譴責此番逮捕國際足聯官員是美國濫用權力的又一例證。普京的反應說明，圍繞國際足聯的鬥爭分明已成爲測試世界政治領域一個核心問題的事例：美國仍強大到足以在國際組織中發號施令嗎？或者，這個唯一超級大國對全球性機構的控制力下降了嗎？

Fifa, of course, is a niche organisation. But the same questions of whether ultimate power still lies in the west applies to much more systemically important global institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the UN and its sub-organisations including the UN Human Rights Council. It is also increasingly a question in the network of non-governmental organisations that provide the wiring for the world economic system; from Swift, the organisation that handles international financial transfers between banks, to Icann which regulates the internet.

當然，國際足聯是一個專業領域的組織。但關於西方是否仍然掌握着終極權力之類的問題，可適用於更加具有系統重要性的全球機構，如國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)和聯合國及其下屬機構，如聯合國人權理事會(UN Human Rights Council)。這在爲世界經濟體系提供聯接作用的非政府組織中也日益成爲一個問題，包括處理銀行間國際金融轉賬的環球銀行金融電信協會(Swift)以及負責監管互聯網的互聯網名稱與數字地址分配機構(Icann)。

Until last week, Fifa looked like the archetype of an international organisation that was slipping out of the control of the west. Bids to stage the 2018 and 2022 World Cups from England, Spain, the Netherlands, the US and Australia had been rejected in favour of Russia and Qatar. The western press was full of accusations of corruption at Fifa. But Mr Blatter and his acolytesbrushed them aside.

在逮捕事件發生以前，國際足聯一直以來都像是一個脫離西方控制的國際組織。英格蘭、西班牙、荷蘭、美國以及澳大利亞舉辦2018年和2022年世界盃的申請都遭到了否決，這兩屆的主辦權分別花落俄羅斯和卡塔爾。西方媒體鋪天蓋地都是對國際足聯腐敗的指控。但是，布拉特及其親信們根本無視這些指控。

The dramatic arrests in Zurich changed this picture of western powerlessness. This was something that only the US could or would do. Switzerland has launched its own investigation but is unlikely to have acted alone, without prompting from the FBI in ¬Washington.

發生在蘇黎世的戲劇性逮捕行動改變了西方無能的形象。這樣的事也只有美國才能做到或者願意做。瑞士已經啓動了自己的調查，但它不大可能在沒有美國聯邦調查局(FBI)的敦促下單獨行動。

But what allowed America to act in this way? Is that US power transferable to other domains? And is it slipping?

但是，美國何以能如此行動？因爲美國的權力可以轉移到其他領域嗎？它正在下滑嗎？

One key fact is the centrality of the American financial system to the world economy — something that in turn rests on the importance of US-based banks and the role of the dollar as the pre-eminent global reserve currency. The US has standing in the Fifa cases because allegedly corrupt transactions were made through banks operating in the US.

一個關鍵事實是，美國金融體系在世界經濟中處於中心地位，這一地位反過來取決於總部位於美國的銀行的重要性以及美元作爲全球最主要儲備貨幣的角色。美國介入國際足聯案件，因爲涉嫌的腐敗交易是通過在美國運營的銀行進行的。

On other occasions, it is not just the direct use of the US financial system that drags outsiders into America’s net. Some US sanctions regimes force foreigners to obey American law, even outside the US, or to be subjected to sanctions themselves. Swift, for example, is based in Belgium. But had Swift’s directors refused to obey US law imposing sanctions on Iran, they risked being refused entry to America. So they chose to co-operate.

在其他場合，並非只有對美國金融體系的直接利用可以使外國人落入美國的大網。美國的有些制裁機制迫使外國人遵守美國法律（甚至在美國以外的地區），否則他們自身就會遭受制裁。例如，Swift的總部設在比利時，但如果該機構負責人拒絕遵守美國製裁伊朗的法律，他們就得冒着被美國拒絕入境的風險。所以，他們選擇合作。

This is the kind of power that no other country can yet wield. China, for instance, is a huge market and is not averse to using its market-power to threaten countries that do things Beijing dislikes, such as meet the Dalai Lama or recognise Taiwan. The renminbi is not a global currency however and access to the Chinese financial system is not yet critical to a global business. Nor does a threat to bar an individual from travelling to China have the chilling effect of a potential travel ban to the US. (As for the Russian travel bans, issued last week on 89 EU citizens, few would regard these as an unbearable imposition.)

美國擁有的這種權力至今還沒有其他國家能夠行使。例如，中國是一個巨大的市場，而且它並不忌諱利用自己的市場力量威脅那些做事令北京不悅的國家，比如會見達賴喇嘛或承認臺灣。然而，人民幣並非全球性貨幣，能否利用中國的金融體系對一家跨國企業來說尚未達到至關重要的程度。威脅禁止某位公民前往中國也產生不了潛在的赴美禁令所帶來的寒蟬效應。（至於俄羅斯上週針對89名歐盟公民發佈的入境禁令，很少有人會認爲這些是難以承受的懲罰。）

Could this change? Possibly. But it would probably require the Chinese currency to become a global reserve currency to rival the dollar. That is why the IMF’s decision later this year about whether to include China in the basket of currencies from which it makes up its special-drawing-rights will be keenly watched. Such a move would be a visible step along the road to turning the renminbi into a global reserve currency. That, in turn, might ultimately threaten the dollar’s unique global position — and the power that it confers on the US.

這種情形會發生變化嗎？有可能。但這可能會要求人民幣成爲與美元比肩的全球儲備貨幣。正是因爲這一點，IMF今年晚些時候有關是否將人民幣納入特別提款權(SDR)貨幣籃子的決定將備受矚目。此舉將是人民幣在成爲全球儲備貨幣道路上前進的重要一步。反過來，這最終可能會威脅到美元獨一無二的全球地位及其所賦予美國的權力。

The US may oppose any IMF move to elevate the status of the renminbi. It will have to tread carefully, however. Opposition that was based on the fact that China’s currency is not yet fully convertible could well be seen as legitimate. Opposition that looked like little more than an unjustified effort to hang on to a privileged position could end up weakening the US.

美國或許會反對IMF提升人民幣地位的任何舉動。然而，它將不得不謹慎行事。如果美國反對的事實依據是人民幣還不能完全自由兌換，那這很可能被視爲是合理的。如果其反對看起來僅僅是爲保住特權地位，那就顯得沒有道理了，最終可能會削弱美國的權力。（根據最新的消息，德國財長表示，七國集團（G7）原則上同意把人民幣納入IMF特別提款權（SDR）貨幣籃子——編者注）

For the final lesson of the Fifa affair is that America’s power does not just rest on the size of its market or the power of its military. Its justice system also still possesses a moral authority that stems from its roots in an open, democratic and law-governed society.

從國際足聯事件得出的最後一個結論是，美國的權力不僅僅仰仗其市場規模或軍事力量。美國的司法體系也仍然具有道德權威，這種權威源於其根植在一個開放、民主、法治的社會。

The justice dispensed by the US system can seem rough, particularly given its use of threats and plea bargains. But if the US Department of Justice says there is a serious case to answer, it still carries global credibility. The same benefit of the doubt would not be extended to a prosecutor in Moscow or Beijing.

美國司法體系所維護的正義看似粗糙，特別是考慮到其訴諸威脅和辯訴交易這類手段。但如果美國司法部宣稱被告需要就一起重案進行答辯，它仍然在全球具有可信性。同樣的疑罪從無(benefit of the doubt)不會適用於莫斯科或者北京的檢察官。

China is certainly closing the wealth gap with America, just as Asia is closing the gap with the west. But the reputation of American institutions for integrity remains a vital intangible asset. It is that reputation that allowed the US to tackle Fifa.

當然，中國正在縮小與美國之間的貧富差距，一如亞洲與西方的差距在縮小。但美國機構正直的聲譽仍然是一筆至關重要的無形資產。正是這種聲譽讓美國能夠對付國際足聯。