eBay 惠普等科技公司分拆 對雲計算的未來有何預示

Few words raise more consternation than ‘this time is different.’ Yet in the world of enterprise tech today, times are different — and they are likely to stay that way for a while.

很少有哪句話比“這次不一樣”更讓人緊張。在如今的企業科技領域，時代的確是不同了，而且這樣一個時代很可能會駐留一陣子。

It’s not everyday that $100-plus billion companies split themselves in two. Recall late last month, eBay’s decided to spin off its fast-growing payments division, PayPal; last week, Hewlett-Packard HP -5.89% moved to separate its PC and printer divisions off from its enterprise hardware and service groups. And most recently, Symantec’s potential split into security and data storage.

不是每天都上演資產超千億美元的大企業的分拆大戲。但就在上個月，eBay公司決定剝離其快速增長的支付部門PayPal；就在上週，惠普公司（Hewlett-Packard）決定將PC和打印機部門與企業硬件和服務部門分拆。最新消息是，賽門鐵克（Symantec）很可能會分拆爲兩家分別從事安全與數據存儲業務的公司。

On the other end, we just witnessed the largest acquisition in the history of cloud computing — where one of the largest software companies in the world, SAP SAP -0.77% , is buying Concur, a provider of on-demand travel and expense management software-as-a-service, for $8.3 billion.

另一方面，我們剛剛見證了雲計算曆史上最大的一筆收購交易：全球最大的軟件公司之一SAP，正在收購企業報銷管理服務商，軟件即服務類公司Concur。

Beyond the question of what these tech companies are worth, it’s important to ask what’s going on here? The developments can only be described as an “inversion” caused by a new shift in cloud computing. And I say inversion because the pattern we see today is almost the reverse of developments evident in the past.

我們暫且不去討論這些公司價值多少錢，目前亟需搞清楚一個問題：究竟發生了什麼？這些新動向只能用雲計算的新轉變所引發的“逆變”來解釋。我之所以用“逆變”這個詞，是因爲今天我們所見到的模式，與過去的發展軌跡幾乎截然相反。

The last time technology dominated the news cycle was in 1999-2000, during which we saw something interesting happen in the years leading up to the collapse of the tech bubble — we witnessed the simultaneous rise of not just new tech companies, but established ones too. While the number of companies going public eclipsed 300, the dominant players, such as Akamai AKAM -1.77% , BEA, Cisco CSCO -1.76% , EMC EMC -1.57% , Exodus, Level 3 LVLT -2.31% , Oracle ORCL 0.34% , Sun, etc. were able to sell both the technology infrastructure picks and shovels to both new and existing companies within the Fortune 500 (many of whom were busy preparing for what turned out to be the over-hyped Y2Kopalypse).

上一次科技話題主宰媒體圈，還是1999年到2000年的事情。在科技泡沫破裂前的那幾年，我們看到了一些有趣的現象: 科技新貴強勢崛起崛起，但老牌科技公司的表現也相當不錯。當時扎堆上市的新科技公司超過了300家。另一方面，一些市場主宰者，比如阿卡邁（Akamai）、BEA、思科（Cisco）、EMC、Exodus、Level 3、甲骨文（Oracle）和Sun，也能夠把自家的技術架構工具賣給新興和老牌《財富》500強企業（其中很多公司當年都在忙着應戰被過度炒作的“千年蟲”問題）。

A rising tide was indeed floating all boats back then: As big established companies provided fundamental technological infrastructure to new tech firms, the businesses of existing firms grew rapidly. Cisco, for example, grew its revenue at rates of 50% to 60%, topping $500 billion in market cap; it was widely expected to become the first $1 trillion market cap company.

所謂水漲船高。隨着老牌軟件公司積極向新型科技公司提供基本技術架構，這些企業也在迅速壯大。比如，思科公司的營收以50%至60%的速度增長，市值一度高達5000億美元。很多人認爲它有可能成爲史上第一家市值超萬億美元的公司。

As evident today, that didn’t happen: Cisco’s market cap stands nearly 80% below its peak level. Meanwhile, the other large established companies that benefited greatly in the 1999 to 2000 run-up are either out of business (e.g., Exodus) or have been acquired (e.g., Sun, BEA, and Peoplesoft — all by Oracle). And if they’re still standalone companies (such as Akamai, Cisco, EMC, Oracle, Microsoft, IBM, HP), then they’re showing very slow, if any, organic growth in their core computing businesses.

正如你今天所見，這一幕並未發生。目前思科的市值只有全盛時期的20%。與此同時，其他在1999年到2000年大賺特賺的老牌軟件公司要麼退市（如Exodus），要麼被收購（如Sun、BEA和Peoplesoft——這三家正好都被甲骨文收購）。如果他們目前還是獨立存在的公司（如阿卡邁、思科、EMC、甲骨文、微軟、IBM和惠普等），其核心計算業務的內生增長也是非常緩慢的，甚或沒有任何增長。

While all this is going on, what’s particularly interesting is that the number of companies being formed and amount of dollars invested in new enterprise technologies is growing significantly. Why the disconnect? How can enterprise tech be both out of favor and wildly in favor?

與此同時，特別令人感興趣的是，現在無論是新成立公司的數量，還是新型企業科技所吸引的投資額，都呈現出顯著的增長。爲什麼會產生這種“脫節”現象？企業科技爲什麼一方面遇冷，一方面又倍受青睞？

The obvious answer is that there’s a classic technology platform shift happening, driven by the move toward cloud-based computing. But perhaps less obvious is where, and how, this platform shift is happening. And what does it tell us about what may be coming next?

最明顯的答案是，經典的技術平臺正在發生變革，它正朝着雲計算平臺方向轉型。但另一個答案不太明顯的問題是，這種平臺變革正在什麼地方，以什麼方式發生？它是否預示着下一步將會發生什麼事情？

The first elements of the cloud-computing shift took place at the applications level: New companies were created to deliver existing application functionality via a cloud-based, software-as-a-service (SaaS) model. Think of examples like CRM -2.81% for customer relationship management, or Workday for human resources.

向雲計算平臺的轉型首先發生在應用層面上。近年來，一批新建立的公司開始通過基於雲技術的“軟件即服務”模式向用戶交付現有應用功能，比如客戶關係管理應用和人力資源應用Workday。

The second elements of the cloud-computing shift are being seen at more infrastructural levels of the technology stack: databases, networking technologies, storage technologies, and so on. Think of examples like Nicira (acquired by VMware for $1.25 billion) in software-defined networking; Servicenow (a recent IPO) in systems management; or Arista Networks (another recent IPO) in networking equipment.

向雲計算平臺轉型的第二波發生在基礎架構層面，如數據庫、網絡技術和存儲技術等等。比如Nicira（已被VMware以12.5億美元收購）的軟件定義網絡；Servicenow（最近剛剛上市）的系統管理技術；Arista Network（另一家最近剛剛上市的公司）的網絡設備等等。

But here’s the thing: Unlike in the 1999 to 2000 era, where established tech companies were the natural beneficiaries of venture capital investment into new companies (and turned out to be the survivors after all the dust settled), this time the established firms are potential casualties of a cloud-computing platform shift.

與1999年至2000年那個時代不同的是，在那股風投資本進入新公司的熱潮中，老牌科技公司是自然而然的受益者，也是塵埃落定後的倖存者。然而這一次，在向雲計算平臺的轉型中，老牌科技公司很可能成爲受害者。

To be fair, established technology platforms haven’t entirely disappeared. As we’ve seen in past platform shifts, enterprises have big investments in existing applications that rely on this infrastructure — so obsoleting them overnight is never an option.

必須承認，傳統的技術平臺並沒有完全消失。我們在過去幾次平臺轉型中也曾發現，企業對依賴於這種技術架構的現有應用做了大量投資，所以要想一夜之間讓它們退出歷史舞臺是不可能的。

But as new applications take advantage of modern technologies, the existing technologies go largely into “maintenance” mode. That means that new revenue from licenses at legacy businesses starts growing more slowly and declines over time, while the annual maintenance and support streams from existing customers becomes the primary source of revenue. For example, IBM IBM -1.30% has reported nine straight quarters of declining top-line growth in its core business. And we are seeing early signs of this for most other established tech companies: Strong cash flows are being generated by the maintenance revenue streams, but new license revenue growth from the legacy businesses is slowing substantially.

但是隨着運用現代技術的新型應用不斷出現，現有技術在很大程度上進入了“維護”模式。這意味着傳統軟件的銷售收入將增長得越來越慢，最終會逐漸衰退，而維護與支持現有客戶所產生的收益將成爲其主要收入來源。比如，IBM公司的核心業務增長率連續9個季度下滑，其它大多數老牌科技公司也顯現出了這種狀況的早期徵兆：大量現金流來自維護收入，而傳統業務的銷售收入顯著減緩。

So who will remain standing in the aftermath of the current shift? Acquisition activity is one great indicator. That’s where news that SAP decided to acquire Concur, coupled with its previous acquisition of SuccessFactors (which was founded byAndreessen Horowitz partner Lars Dalgaard), signals that the company is leading the charge in evolving to the cloud-computing paradigm. Their acquisition strategy to date illustrates that SAP is committed to being a leading player in cloud applications in the same way as it created a massive enterprise applications franchise by riding the previous client-server platform shift.

那麼在這波轉型徹度完成後，誰將會繼續屹立不倒呢？收購行爲可以被視爲一個很好的指標。比如SAP決定收購Concur，再加上此前它已經收購了SuccessFactors（該公司由安德里森o霍洛維茨基金合夥人拉爾斯o達爾加德創辦），說明這家公司正在全力向雲計算領域進軍。SAP的收購戰略說明它致力於成爲雲應用領域的領軍者，正如上一次在向用戶—服務器平臺轉型過程中，它在企業應用領域大獲成功一樣。

SAP is not standing idly by. Why? Because the financial consequences of being on the wrong side of technology platform shifts can be monumental.

SAP並沒有坐以待斃。爲什麼？因爲在科技平臺的轉型中，“站錯隊”的經濟後果可能極爲嚴重。

Take a look at the market cap of the 10 largest enterprise incumbents (of which SAP is a member): There’s more than $1.3 trillion of market cap in this group. But if you look at the 2012 to 2014 class of enterprise IPOs, we’ve created only about $60 billion in new market cap (and one company, Workday WDAY -1.08% , is around 25% of that amount). Add in enterprise M&A by the top incumbents in that same timeframe (before the $8.3 billion SAP-Concur acquisition) and we’ve seen only $30 billion in acquisitions. And most of those acquisitions were not really of modern cloud-based technologies. There’s much more to come.

我們不妨看一下目前十家最大的企業科技巨頭的市值（SAP也是其中之一）：它們的總市值超過1.3萬億美元。但如果再看看2012年到2014年的IPO數據，你就會發現，這些IPO只創造了600億美元的市值（Workday一家公司就貢獻了其中的25%）。如果把同一時期十巨頭的併購行爲也計算在內（在SAP以83億美元收購Concur之前），我們發現收購總額只有300億美元。其中大多數收購標的並不是真正意義上的雲技術。

So despite all the excitement about the number of new enterprise technology IPOs of late, we haven’t seen the final salvo in the battle. Not even close. As the above numbers illustrated, there’s more than 10 times the amount of legacy market cap outstanding compared with the amount of new market cap created through IPOs or acquisitions to date.

所以說，儘管最近企業科技領域的一連串IPO讓很多人興奮不已，但現在還沒有到雲技術向傳統平臺發起“總攻”的時候，甚至差得還遠。正如前文數字所說，傳統技術佔據的市值與最近的IPO和併購所創造的市值相比，相差何止十倍。

That means we’re going to see the acquisition ‘arms race’ escalate, and number of new enterprise IPOs continue to grow. And not only will we see the legacy players engage in more acquisitions, but we will likely see acquisitions from some of the larger new incumbents — like and Workday — as they seek to stay ahead of the curve.

這意味着，我們將會看到收購領域的“軍備競賽”持續升級，同時，加入IPO大軍的企業科技公司也會越來越多。不僅傳統科技公司會進行更多的收購行爲，一些新興科技巨頭很可能也要大舉收購，以保持競爭優勢，比如和Workday。

Acquisitions alone don’t tell the entire story, though. Perhaps even more interesting is the corporate splits and spinoffs I mentioned earlier. The legacy enterprise players are now reconfiguring themselves into more focused, slimmer, and presumably more agile players so they can better compete in the brave new world. (To further complicate things, making targeted acquisitions of new technology companies will most certainly be part of the legacy players’ post-split strategy, too).

不過，收購併不等於全部。更有意思的是前文提到的企業分拆與剝離。傳統企業科技公司現在正想方設法地使自己變得更專注，更苗條，進而成爲更靈活的競爭者，以便更好地在這個全新的世界中競爭致勝。（對新型科技公司進行定向收購，幾乎肯定是這些傳統科技公司在分拆後會採取的策略。）

Either way, the signal is clear: There’s a platform shift happening. This time, the legacy players won’t survive by relying on their old lines of businesses. And as previous startups are becoming the new legacy players, some of the older incumbents are trying to reconfigure themselves into startup-like businesses. Another inversion of sorts.

不管怎樣，信號都是明顯的：目前平臺轉型正在發生。這一次，傳統科技公司恐怕難以依賴老舊的業務吃老本。上一批初創公司即將變成新的“傳統”公司，同時一些“守成者”則試圖瘦身成類似初創公司那樣的企業。這又是另一種逆變。

Acquire or split. No one seems to be going at this organically, from within. Something that’s been forgotten is that Concur started out as a conventional on-premise software company before making the difficult and sometimes costly shift to being a SaaS company. As its CEO noted over five years ago:

不管是收購還是分拆，似乎沒有人願意自發地從內部變革自己。人們大概忘了：Concur一開始也是一家傳統軟件公司，後來它做了個艱難的決定，付出了高昂的代價，才轉型成一家軟件即服務類公司。該公司CEO五年前曾表示：

“I don’t believe large companies can make the conversion. Forget their genetic code. How many will take the pain? Companies won’t reinvent themselves… Cash flow will get crushed. You have to layoff. The transition is really hard and it’s very sudden. If you’re north of $100M it’s hard. Over $1B it’s impossible.”

“我不相信大公司能實現這種轉型。且不說什麼‘基因密碼’，有多少家公司願意承受這種痛苦？企業都不想重塑自己……現金流會被摧毀，而且你需要裁員。轉型的過程是非常艱難的，而且非常突然。如果你的市值是1億美元以上，轉型會非常艱難；如果超過10億美元，那就是不可能的事情。”

There, at least, not much has changed.

至少從這個角度來看，目前還沒有多大改變。