特朗普的經濟計劃真會造福勞動階級
Following a brief market plunge, the President-elect’s speech on Tuesday night was more conciliatory than many expected and emphasised his commitment to infrastructure investment.
在短暫的市場暴跌後，當選總統特朗普在上週二晚的演講比很多人預期的更加溫和，強調了他對基礎設施投資的承諾。
Investors have, on balance, concluded that the combination of a shift to very expansionary fiscal policy and major reductions in regulation in sectors ranging from energy to finance to drug pricing will raise demand and reflate the American economy.
總的來說，投資者的結論是，向極具擴張性的財政政策轉變、結合大幅削減對從能源到金融再到藥品定價等多個領域的監管，將促進需求並刺激美國經濟。
The result has been a rise in real interest rates and inflation expectations, along with a strong stock market and a strong dollar.
結果是實際利率和通脹預期上升，同時股市走高、美元表現強勁。
Experience suggests, however, that initial market responses to major political events are poor predictors of their ultimate impact.
然而，經驗表明，市場對於重大政治事件的最初反應，通常無法準確預示事件的最終影響。
The late MIT economist Rudiger Dornbusch made an extensive study of the results of populist economic programmes around the world, finding that while they sometimes had immediate positive results, over the medium- and long-term they were catastrophic for the working class in whose name they were launched.
已故的麻省理工學院(MIT)經濟學家魯迪格.多恩佈施(Rudiger Dornbusch)在廣泛研究了世界各地民粹主義經濟計劃的結果後發現，儘管這些計劃有時會產生立竿見影的正面結果，但是從中期和長期來看，這些打着造福勞動階級旗號推出的計劃會對勞動階級造成災難性的打擊。
This could be the fate of the Trump programme given its design errors, implausible assumptions and reckless disregard for global economics.
鑑於特朗普計劃的設計錯誤、不合理的假設以及對全球經濟狀況的草率忽視，特朗普計劃可能也會難逃這樣的命運。
I have long been a strong advocate of debt-financed public investment in the context of low interest rates and a decaying US infrastructure,
我長期以來一直非常贊成在利率水平較低以及美國基礎設施陳舊的背景下，以債務融資進行公共投資。
So I was glad to see Mr Trump emphasise it.
因此，看到特朗普強調這一點我很高興。
Unfortunately, the plan presented by his advisers, Peter Navarro and Wilbur Ross, suggests an approach based on tax credits for equity investment and total private sector participation that will not cover the most important projects, not reach many of the most important investors, and involve substantial mis-targeting of public resources.
遺憾的是，他的顧問彼得.納瓦羅(Peter Navarro)和威爾伯.羅斯(Wilbur Ross)提出的方案表明，該計劃的實現方式將基於爲股權投資和全體私人部門參與提供稅務抵免，不會覆蓋一些最重要的項目、觸及不到很多最重要的投資者、並且將涉及公共資源的大量錯配。
Many of the highest return infrastructure investments — such as improving roads, repairing 60,000 structurally deficient bridges, upgrading schools or modernising the air traffic control system — do not generate a commercial return and so are excluded from his plan.
很多回報最高的基礎設施投資——比如改善道路狀況、修復60000座存在結構性缺陷的危橋、升級學校設施和空中交通管制系統——不會帶來商業回報，因此被排除在特朗普的計劃之外。
Nor can the non-taxable pension funds, endowments and sovereign wealth funds that are the most promising sources of capital for infrastructure take advantage of the program.
享受免稅待遇的養老基金、捐贈基金和主權財富基金這類最有可能爲基礎設施提供資金的機構，也無法受益於該計劃。
I am optimistic regarding the efficacy of fiscal expansion.
我看好財政擴張的效果。
But any responsible economist has to recognise that, past a point, it can lead to some combination of excessive foreign borrowing, inflation and even financial crisis.
但是任何負責的經濟學家都不得不承認，超過某個度，財政擴張可能會導致出現以下三種情況中的一種或多種：外債過高、通脹、甚至是金融危機。
As Dornbusch showed, in emerging markets this can happen quite quickly.
正如多恩佈施表明的那樣，在新興市場，這種局面可能會很快形成。
In the US the process would take longer.
在美國，該過程耗時會更長。
Even without taking account of the likely costs of the infrastructure plan (which the Trump team badly underestimates) or the propodefenceense build-up, the Trump tax reform proposals are too expensive.
即使不考慮特朗普的基礎設施計劃（特朗普團隊嚴重低估了該計劃的成本）以及鞏固國防提議的可能成本，特朗普的稅制改革提議也太過昂貴了。
Many, like the proposed abolition of the estate tax, will only benefit the high-saving wealthy.
就像廢除遺產稅的提議一樣，很多提議只會有益於儲蓄率較高的富人。
While drastic changes in the proposed domestic programme are necessary for it to work, the general direction of increasing public investment, reforming taxes and adjusting regulation is appropriate.
儘管特朗普針對國內事務所提出的計劃需要做出劇烈改變才能奏效，但是該計劃增加公共投資、改革稅制以及調整監管的總體方向是恰當的。
The same cannot be said of Mr Trump’s global plan, which rests on a misunderstanding of how the world economy operates.
特朗普針對全球的計劃則不然，後者是基於他對世界經濟運行方式的錯誤理解。
Consider the immediate effects of Mr Trump’s victory.
考慮一下特朗普獲勝後的直接影響。
The Mexican peso has depreciated about 10 per cent relative to the dollar over fears of new protectionist policies, and many other emerging market currencies have also fallen sharply.
由於市場擔心美國會出臺新的保護主義政策，墨西哥比索兌美元匯率下跌約10%，很多其他新興市場貨幣也急劇下跌。
The impact of this change is to raise the cost of anything the US exports to Mexico and to lower the cost of anything Mexico exports to the US.
這一變化的影響是增加了美國向墨西哥出口任何東西的成本、而降低了墨西哥向美國出口任何東西的成本。
It will also make Mexico and other emerging markets much cheaper relative to the US for global companies.
對於全球企業而言，這還將使墨西哥和其他新興市場相對美國的成本更加低廉。
So US workers, particularly in manufacturing, will see increased pressure.
因此美國的工人（特別是製造業工人），將承受更大壓力。
The plan seems to assume that we can pressure countries not to let their currencies depreciate, as suggested by the intention to have the new treasury secretary name China as an exchange rate manipulator.
該計劃似乎假定我們可以迫使他國不讓其貨幣貶值，正如特朗普讓新財長把中國定爲匯率操縱國的打算所顯示的那樣。
This is ludicrous.
這是荒唐的。
While there are reasonable arguments that China manipulated its exchange rate for commercial advantage in the past, the reality is that for the past year the country has intervened to prop up its exchange rate.
儘管有合理證據表明中國過去曾爲了貿易利益而操縱匯率，但是事實是中國過去一年一直通過干預支撐人民幣匯率。
The same is true of most emerging markets.
大多數新興市場也是一樣。
Not even US presidents with political mandates can repeal the laws of economics.
即便是擁有政治授權的美國總統也不能推翻經濟規律。
Populist economics will play out differently in the US than in emerging markets.
在美國實施民粹主義經濟計劃的過程將不同於在新興市場實施同類計劃的過程。
But the results will be no better.
但是結果會一樣糟糕。
All with a stake in the global economy must hope that now, as has happened often in the past, a US president faced with the responsibility of governing preserves the valid core of campaign economic plans while making major adjustments.
如今，所有參與全球經濟的國家肯定都期望，正如過去通常的情況一樣，面對治理責任的美國總統可以在保留競選經濟綱領中站得住腳的核心要素的同時，對該綱領做出重大調整。
