普京如何改變了世界秩序 A world order reshapedby Putin's ambition

Moscow is out to change the world order, according to General Philip Breedlove, Nato’s military commander. The entire American military establishment has designated Russia the biggest threat to the US. In response, the Pentagon is beefing up its troops, armour and artillery in eastern Europe, and wants an additional $3.4bn to pay for it.

北約(Nato)軍事指揮官菲利普•布里德洛夫(Philip Breedlove)將軍表示，俄羅斯決心改變世界秩序。整個美國軍方把俄羅斯列爲美國的最大威脅。因應這種威脅，美國五角大樓(Pentagon)正在擴充駐東歐的部隊、裝甲力量和炮兵力量，並希望在這方面增加34億美元軍費。

Meanwhile Barack Obama, the US president, says Russia is “overextended and bleeding” in Syria, and its economy is shrinking “drastically”. The nation is dismissed by others as “a hollow superpower” with no real strategy behind its overseas adventures.

另一方面，美國總統巴拉克•奧巴馬(Barack Obama)表示，俄羅斯在敘利亞“手伸得過長，正在流血”，俄羅斯經濟“大幅度”萎縮。其他人認爲，俄羅斯不過是“一個空心的超級大國”，其海外冒險背後並無真實戰略的支撐。

So which picture is accurate? Both. The economy is shrinking. Poverty is on the rise. Without deep, wide-ranging reforms — which few expect on Vladimir Putin’s watch — its prospects are bleak. The president could legally remain in the Kremlin for many years to come, presiding over stagnation at home and, by way of compensation, a confrontational posture abroad.

那麼，哪種描述是準確的？都對。經濟在萎縮。貧困在加劇。若不進行深層次的全面改革——沒幾個人預期普京會在任內推行這種改革——俄羅斯的前景是暗淡的。在未來許多年內，普京可能繼續合法地執掌克里姆林宮，目睹國內經濟停滯，同時作爲補償，在國外採取一種對抗姿態。

With an economy and defence budget both a fraction of those of the US, the Russian leader has done rather well. He has held on to power for the best part of two decades. He has held the line against Nato in the former Soviet Union. And he has positioned himself as a dealmaker in the Middle East.

在國內經濟表現和國防預算都遠遜於美國的情況下，這位俄羅斯領導人幹得相當漂亮。在過去20年的大部分時間裏，他一直掌握着權力。他延續了前蘇聯與北約作對的立場。他把自己定位爲中東的“交易撮合人”。

His handling of Syria shows ruthlessness, skill, determination and judgment. Ignoring the brutality of President Bashar al-Assad, and with neither the US nor Europe willing to intervene in the civil war, he stepped into the vacuum and deploying air power changed the course of the conflict. Then he announced he was quitting the scene but left the door open to a return.

對敘利亞的干預展示出了他的無情、手腕、決心和判斷力。他無視敘利亞總統巴沙爾•阿薩德(Bashar al-Assad)的殘暴行徑，在美國和歐洲都不願捲入敘利亞內戰的情況下，進入了權力真空地帶，通過部署空軍力量改變了衝突走向。接着，他宣佈將離開這個舞臺，但爲重返留了一扇門。

Mission accomplished, then. Mr Assad has been saved and all parties to the civil war have been disabused of the idea that a military victory is possible. In a bizarre twist, Mr Putin’s intervention paved the way for the first serious ceasefire in the war and possibly real peace talks — on his own terms.

然後，使命完成了。阿薩德獲救了，內戰各方都不再抱着有可能取得軍事勝利的想法。敘利亞局勢迎來了一個離奇的轉折，普京的干預爲首次正式停火以及可能的真正和談鋪平了道路——按照他的條件。

More broadly, in the Middle East, Russia is back. It is at the centre of a complex web including not only Syria, but all other parties directly and indirectly involved in the larger conflict in the region — including the US and the EU. Moscow cannot solve the region’s problems (who can?) but now they cannot be solved without it either.

從更宏觀角度看，俄羅斯回到了中東。目前俄羅斯在一個錯綜複雜的關係網中居於中心位置，這個網絡不但包含敘利亞，而且包括直接和間接捲入更大範圍的中東衝突的其他所有各方——包括美國和歐盟(EU)。俄羅斯解決不了中東的問題（誰能呢？），但如今，要解決這些問題已離不開俄羅斯。

Syria shows that Russia, written off in the 1990s as a mere regional power, has a capable military and, given the opportunity, the will to use it. Does it also signal that Moscow has embarked on a new era of military adventurism? No. Mr Putin has walked up to, but not crossed, Nato’s red lines. Wars in Georgia in 2008, and from 2014 in Ukraine, were against nations not covered by Nato’s guarantee; they were fought to prevent them securing that guarantee. In Syria, Russia was confident that the US and its allies would not intervene.

敘利亞的事情表明，在上世紀90年代被認爲不過是一介地區強國的俄羅斯，仍擁有強大軍事實力，並且，如果獲得機遇，也有使用其軍事實力的意願。這是否也昭示着，莫斯科方面已進入一個新的軍事冒險主義的時代？並非如此。普京走到了北約的紅線附近，但並未過線。2008年的格魯吉亞戰爭，以及始於2014年的烏克蘭戰爭，針對的都是未被北約保護傘覆蓋的國家；戰爭的目的正是阻止這些國家進入北約保護傘。在敘利亞，俄羅斯相信，美國及其盟國不會干預。

What next? Mr Putin will probably challenge Nato in the Baltics but not militarily. He has a different toolkit, intended to undermine the alliance’s cohesion and confidence in its guarantee without triggering an armed response. Cyber operations, economic boycotts and nuclear threats are at his disposal. Those tools are relatively cheap; he can afford them.

接下來會發生什麼？普京很可能將在波羅的海國家挑戰北約，但不使用軍事手段。他有一個不同的工具箱，旨在削弱北約聯盟的凝聚力以及對其保護傘的信心，同時又不引發北約的軍事迴應。他可能採取的措施包括網絡戰、經濟抵制和核威脅。這些工具相對便宜；他能用得起。

The notion that economic troubles will hinder the Kremlin, that sanctions will force Russia to retreat from Ukraine and adopt a pliant posture, is proving wrong. The image of Russia as weak and withdrawn from the International arena, of its ruling elite focused on economic stability as a means of political survival, is also wrong. That was the 1990s — a period many in Russia remember and few care to recall.

有關經濟困境將束縛克里姆林宮的手腳、制裁將迫使俄羅斯從烏克蘭撤退並採取順從姿態的想法被證明是錯誤的。有關俄羅斯國力虛弱將退出國際舞臺、其執政精英爲了在政治上求生存將集中精力維護經濟穩定的想法也是錯誤的。那是上世紀90年代的情況——一個許多俄羅斯人記得、但很少人願意回憶的年代。

Moscow today has broader ambitions, greater resources and a willingness when challenged to challenge its adversaries in return. That is what Mr Putin has done in Syria and it is only prudent to expect him to do so again.

如今的莫斯科擁有更宏大的抱負、更多的資源，以及在遭到對手挑戰時以牙還牙的意願。這正是普京在敘利亞所做的事，預計他未來還會這麼做纔是明智的。

The writer is an associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

本文作者爲卡內基國際和平基金會(Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)研究員