如何理解一團亂麻的敘利亞衝突
The Middle East reminds us that there is nothing so unholy as a holy war. Europe learnt this in the 17th century. Confessional competition between Catholicism and Protestantism fused with temporal rivalry to provoke the Thirty Years’ War among the continent’s leading powers.
中東局勢提醒我們：沒有什麼比聖戰更加邪惡。歐洲曾在17世紀領教過這一點。當時，天主教和新教之間的宗教角力與世俗對抗糾纏在一起，使歐洲大陸領先強國之間爆發了一場曠日持久的戰爭——“三十年戰爭”(Thirty Years' War)。
The fighting, bloodier than any previously seen, ended when raison d’état triumphed over theology. The Peace of Westphalia in 1648 marked the end of Europe’s great wars of religion. This should tell us something about the present conflict in Syria.
這場空前血腥的戰爭一直到世俗權力戰勝神學權力的那一刻才宣告結束。1648年簽署的《威斯特伐利亞和約》(Peace of Westphalia)標誌着歐洲宗教大戰的終結。這應該可以給我們一些關於當前敘利亞衝突的啓示。
The wholesale slaughter that followed could not have been imagined in 1618, when mainly Protestant Bohemia rose up against the Catholic Holy Roman Empire. The subsequent wars — there were several — drew in Habsburg Spain and Austria, France, the Netherlands, Sweden, Poland, Russia, Denmark and the big German principalities. England, Scotland, the Ottoman Empire and Russia all claimed walk-on parts.
當1618年信奉新教的波西米亞(Bohemia)奮起反抗信奉天主教的神聖羅馬帝國(Holy Roman Empire)時，沒人想象得到後來發生的大規模屠殺。隨後的多場戰爭將哈布斯堡王朝(Habsburg)統治下的西班牙和奧地利、法國、荷蘭、瑞典、波蘭、俄羅斯、丹麥以及德意志各大公國都拖入其中。英格蘭、蘇格蘭、奧斯曼帝國(Ottoman Empire)以及俄羅斯也都聲稱自己是這場戰爭的“次要演員”。
The fighting was mostly on German soil, but the battles were between armies of foreign mercenaries. As befits wars conducted in the name of God, cruelty and brutality were endemic. By many accounts, the population of Germany was cut by a third or more. Torture and mass burnings of alleged witches were commonplace.
雖然這場戰爭主要在德意志的領土上進行，但參加戰鬥的都是由外國僱傭軍組成的軍隊。就像所有以上帝之名進行的戰爭，殘忍與暴行無處不在。據多方記載，德意志地區的人口減少了三分之一或者更多。酷刑以及集中燒死據稱的女巫之類的現象司空見慣。
For Catholic and Protestant, read Shia and Sunni. There are, I am sure, a hundred differences between the horrors that engulfed Europe and the flames consuming Syria. There are also uncomfortable coincidences. The brutality flowing from the intertwining of the spiritual and territorial is one; the misfortune of a patch of ground — Germany then, Syria now — in becoming a battlefield for outside powers is another.
當年的天主教和新教的角色，可以對應於如今伊斯蘭教的什葉派與遜尼派的角色。我相信，當年席捲歐洲的恐怖場面與如今吞噬敘利亞的戰火之間存在着千差萬別的不同。但也有一些令人不安的一致性：宗教與領土問題相互糾纏所產生的暴行；以及不幸淪爲外部強國的戰場——彼時是德意志，如今是敘利亞。
The Thirty Years’ War began as an assertion of independence by the Protestant princes of Bohemia and Germany against the Catholic Holy Roman Empire. But it was also about France’s fear of encirclement by the Habsburgs of Spain and Austria, the Dutch struggle for independence from Spain, Sweden’s bid to assert itself, Poland’s eclipse and Denmark’s last throw as a big power. Half-a-dozen other states also claimed a vital national interest in the outcome.
當信奉新教的波西米亞及德意志的大公們表達他們反抗信奉天主教的神聖羅馬帝國的獨立性時，“三十年戰爭”開始了。但這場戰爭也牽涉到法國擔憂被哈布斯堡王朝的西班牙和奧地利包圍；荷蘭爭取從西班牙獲得獨立；瑞典確立本國地位的努力；波蘭的衰落以及丹麥作爲大國的最後一搏。另外六個國家也在戰爭的結局中看到對自己至關重要的國家利益。
Confessional loyalties were sometimes elbowed aside by secular ambitions. Thus Catholic France joined with Protestant Sweden against its co-religionists in Spain and Austria — just, perhaps, as Shia Iran now finds advantage in allying itself with Sunni Hamas. Protestant Denmark fought at different moments on either side of the confessional divide. Competing Lutherans and Calvinists sometimes questioned if Rome was the real enemy.
宗教信仰有時會讓位於世俗野心。於是，信奉天主教的法國與信奉新教的瑞典聯手，對抗同樣信奉天主教的西班牙與奧地利——也許就像什葉派的伊朗現在發現與遜尼派的哈馬斯結盟可以獲得優勢一樣。信奉新教的丹麥在不同的時刻加入不同的宗教陣營。相互衝突的路德教徒與加爾文教徒有時懷疑羅馬教廷是不是自己真正的敵人。
By 1648, the wars had recast the geopolitical balance. France emerged a victor, the Holy Roman Empire a loser. Westphalia became a foundation for the modern European state. If there was a thread running through the various treaties that settled the territorial disputes it was that the confessional choices of states should no longer be a casus belli. Today’s Middle East, with the same combustible mix of theological and earthly rivalry, is a long way from reaching such an understanding.
到1648年，這場戰爭已經重新確立了地緣政治平衡。法國崛起爲贏家，神聖羅馬帝國敗亡。《威斯特法利亞和約》成爲現代歐洲國家的根基。如果有一條貫穿於解決領土爭端的各種條約的主線，那就是國家的宗教選擇不應再成爲開戰理由。當今的中東——同樣是宗教與世俗對抗的易爆混合體——距離達成這樣的諒解還很遙遠。
One way of looking at the fighting in Syria is an uprising of the majority Sunni against the Alawite, or quasi-Shia, regime of Bashar al-Assad. This is the obverse, you could say, of what happened in Iraq: the fanatics of the self-styled Islamic State have prospered with the support of Iraqi Sunnis dispossessed by the toppling of Saddam Hussein.
從某種角度看，敘利亞內戰是占人口多數的遜尼派對巴沙爾阿薩德(Bashar al-assad)的阿拉維派（或稱“準什葉派”）政權的反抗。你可以說，這與伊拉克的情況正好相反：自封伊斯蘭國(ISIS)的狂熱分子之所以能做大，是得益於因薩達姆侯賽因(Saddam Hussein)倒臺而被剝奪了權利的伊拉克遜尼派的支持。
The dividing lines on the ground are important. But, as in 17th-century Europe, what has kept the fires burning has been the involvement of outside powers. Syria has become the arena for the long-simmering regional contest between (Sunni) Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies on one side, and (Shia) Iran on the other. Russia sees a vital national interest in sustaining the regime in Damascus; Turkey in overthrowing it.
陸上的分界線很重要。但正如17世紀的歐洲，戰火持續燃燒的原因在於外部勢力的介入。敘利亞已成爲醞釀已久的地區衝突的舞臺：一方是（遜尼派）沙特阿拉伯及其海灣盟國，另一方是（什葉派）伊朗。俄羅斯認爲，維持大馬士革政權對於俄羅斯國家利益至關重要；但土耳其認爲推翻該政權符合本國利益。
Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkish president, talks about the enemies of Mr Assad as his “Sunni brothers”. But the shooting down of a Russian jet by Turkish warplanes patrolling the Syrian border has little to do with rival versions of Islam. Ankara’s fear is the emergence of a powerful Kurdish entity in northern Syria and Iraq — a concern that explains its dangerous ambivalence towards Isis. Russia, like the US and Europe, sees Isis as a serious threat, but does not want to risk losing its Mediterranean naval base.
土耳其總統雷傑普吠伊普埃爾多安(Recep Tayyip Erdogan)在講話中形容阿薩德的敵人爲自己的“遜尼派兄弟”。但是，土耳其戰機擊落一架在敘利亞邊境巡邏的俄羅斯飛機之舉，與伊斯蘭教內部的教派衝突關係不大。安卡拉懼怕的是在敘利亞和伊拉克北部出現一個強大的庫爾德人政權——這種擔憂可以解釋該國對待ISIS的危險的曖昧態度。像美國和歐洲一樣，俄羅斯也將ISIS視爲嚴重威脅，但莫斯科不想冒失去其地中海海軍基地的風險。
For Tehran, the preservation of the Assad regime is part of a strategy that has seen Iran push its influence deep into the Arab world. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf monarchies want to counter what they fear is Iranian encirclement. These Sunni states also want to see Isis defeated, but not at the price of a victory for Tehran. And here are just a few of the dizzying complexities of the conflict.
對德黑蘭而言，保住阿薩德政權是其深入影響阿拉伯世界戰略的一部分。沙特與其他海灣君主國想要反制他們所懼怕的伊朗包圍圈。這些遜尼派國家也希望看到ISIS被擊潰，但不是以德黑蘭的勝利爲代價。以上這些只是這場衝突令人頭暈的複雜性的一部分。
For the US and its allies, the overarching interest is the re-establishment of regional stability and the defeat of the Isis jihadis. But this is a conflict that defies partial solutions. An eventual peace will demand the unravelling of the confessional and the temporal — that religion surrenders to realpolitik.
對美國及其盟友而言，首要利益是恢復地區穩定和擊敗ISIS聖戰分子。但這是一場無法用不到位的解決方案平息的衝突。最終的和平將需要理順宗教與世俗勢力的關係——宗教屈從於現實政治。
The Gordian knot is the struggle between Iran and Saudi Arabia, but a settlement would have also to acknowledge Russia’s interests and Turkey’s fears. Impossible, many will say. Maybe. But until it happens, today’s Syria will live the horrors of 17th-century Germany; and Isis will continue to find a safe haven for its twisted credo.
癥結在於伊朗與沙特之間的鬥爭，但是和解方案也將不得不承認俄羅斯的利益以及土耳其的擔憂。很多人會說，這不可能。也許是。但在做到這一點之前，如今的敘利亞將經歷17世紀德意志地區所遭遇的恐怖；而ISIS可以繼續爲自己扭曲的教義找到避風港。
