歐洲衰落源於創新乏力
Much of continental Europe is in poor shape. True, the aggregate wealth of people is little changed and the social capital in museums, parks and other amenities is still intact. Yet, in the western part, the economy is failing society.
Inclusion of ethnic minorities and youth in the economy — the backbone of their self-esteem and social integration — is more lacking than ever. Among those who do participate, fewer are prospering. It is a measure of the decline that, in almost every country, the growth of wage rates has steadily slowed since 1995. What has gone wrong?
推動少數族裔和年輕人蔘與到經濟中來（這是他們維持自尊並融入社會的基礎）的措施比任何時候都更爲匱乏。這些羣體裏真正參與經濟活動的人中，成功人士減少了。自1995年以來，歐洲幾乎所有國家的工資率增長都在穩步放緩，可見經濟在衰落。問題出在哪裏？European economists speak of a loss of competitiveness in southern Europe. They suggest that output and employment are down, relative to the past trend, because wages leapt ahead of productivity, making labour too expensive and forcing employers to cut back. Taking this perspective, some German economists argue that wages need to fall in the affected economies. Others argue instead for monetary stimulus — for instance, asset purchases by central banks — to raise prices and make current wage rates affordable.
歐洲經濟學家談到了南歐喪失競爭力的情況。他們表示，相對於過去的趨勢水平，產出和就業放緩了，因爲薪資漲幅超過了生產率增幅，這讓勞動力成本變得過於高昂，並迫使企業裁員。一些持這種看法的德國經濟學家主張，那些受影響的經濟體必須讓工資下降。還有一些經濟學家則建議採取貨幣刺激手段——例如央行的資產購買舉措——以提高物價並讓目前的工資率水平變得合理。
This helps explain why the proportion of men who are in employment declined in Italy, Greece and Spain over the previous decade. But the explanation raises a question. Europe has witnessed bigger drops in the employment-to-population ratio, which fell precipitously in Germany and Italy in the 1970s and in France in the 1980s and 1990s. Were those declines also caused by wage misalignments? And if so, why have we not seen wages draw back?
這有助於解釋上一個10年裏意大利、希臘和西班牙的男性就業比例爲何會下滑。但這種解釋引發了一個問題。歐洲的就業人口比率曾出現更大幅度下滑，比如上世紀70年代在德國和意大利，八、九十年代在法國，就業率都出現了大幅下滑。這些下滑是否也是薪資不合理引起的？如果是這樣的話，我們爲什麼沒有看到薪資回落？Economists of a classical bent lay a large part of the decline of employment, and thus lagging output, to a contraction of labour supply. And they lay that contraction largely to outbreaks of fiscal profligacy — as happened in Europe from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s.
古典學派的經濟學家將就業率下滑以及產出放緩主要歸咎於勞動力供應減少。他們認爲這種減少在很大程度上是由於財政揮霍——歐洲從上世紀90年代中期到二十一世紀頭十年中期就出現了這種情形。In Greece, Italy and, to a lesser extent, France, unsustainable tax cuts and spending sprees added to households’ estimates of their private wealth relative to their wage income. State benefits were expanded too, which added to people’s estimates of their social entitlements relative to their income. The EU’s structural funds, which transferred money to poorer countries, fuelled the fire. Bloated with wealth, many employees had weaker incentives to perform well so companies’ costs of production went up.
在希臘、意大利還有法國（後者程度較輕），不可持續的減稅和支出熱潮放大了家庭對個人財富相對於薪資收入的預期。政府還增加了福利，這提高了人們對於社會福利水平相對於自身收入水平的預期。歐盟(EU)的結構性基金（將資金轉移到較貧窮國家）更是火上澆油。財富的增加使得很多員工缺乏賣力工作的動機，因此企業的生產成本上升。Disciples of Keynes, who focus on aggregate demand, view any increase in household wealth as raising employment because they say it adds to consumer demand. They say Europe needs a lot more fiscal “profligacy” if it is to bring unemployment down. Some evidence favours the classics.
凱恩斯(Keynes)的門徒——他們關注總需求——將家庭財富增加等同於就業增加，因爲他們認爲這增加了消費者需求。他們表示，如果要降低失業率，歐洲需要更多的財政“揮霍”。一些證據支持古典學派的觀點。Yet both sides of this debate miss the critical force at work. The main cause of Europe’s deep fall — the losses of inclusion, job satisfaction and wage growth — is the devastating slowdown of productivity that began in the late 1990s and struck large swathes of the continent. It holds down the growth of wages rates and it depresses employment.
然而這場辯論的雙方都忽略了一個發揮關鍵作用的因素。歐洲深度衰落——體現在包容度、就業滿足感以及工資增長等方面——的主要原因是生產率的劇烈放緩，這始於上世紀90年代末，影響到歐洲大陸很多地區。它阻礙了工資率增長，抑制了就業。That slowdown resulted from narrowing innovation. Even in the postwar years, innovation in Europe was feeble by past standards. In the 1960s, it slackened again, leaving the continent largely dependent on America for new ideas that would generate further productivity growth. But in the 1970s American innovation, confined to Silicon Valley, waned in the aggregate. The pool of past American advances on which Europe could draw would narrow to a trickle and lead to the productivity slowdown on the continent in the late 1990s and which came later to Germany.
這種放緩源於創新減弱。即便在戰後時期，歐洲的創新狀況以過去的標準來看也是疲弱的。上世紀60年代，創新再次減弱，因此在利用創新進一步促進生產率增長方面，歐洲在很大程度上依賴美國。但在上世紀70年代，美國創新侷限於硅谷而整體減弱。歐洲可以吸收利用的美國創新與過去相比大大減少，導致90年代末歐洲大陸生產率放緩，這種情形後來波及到德國。In the aftermath of the financial crisis, much of Europe is still suffering a slump on top of its post-1990s fall. The slump will pass but the fall will not be easily overcome. The continent is haemorrhaging its best talent. It needs to fight for an economic life worth living.
除了始於上世紀90年代的衰落，在此次金融危機之後，歐洲很多國家還在受到低迷影響。這種低迷將會過去，但衰落卻不會輕易結束。歐洲大陸正在流失大量優秀人才。它必須爲創造一種有價值的經濟生活而奮鬥。
