美國生產率負增長之謎

Look around you. From your drone home delivery to that oncoming driverless car, change seems to be accelerating. Warren Buffett, the great investor, promises that our children’s generation will be the “luckiest crop in history”.

環顧你的周圍。從無人機遞送到家服務，到即將問世的無人駕駛汽車，變化似乎正在加速。偉大投資家沃倫•巴菲特(Warren Buffett)承諾，我們孩子那一代人將是“歷史上最幸運的一羣人”。

Everywhere the world is speeding up except, that is, in the productivity numbers. This year, for the first time in more than 30 years, US productivity growth will almost certainly turn negative following a decade of sharp slowdown. Yet our Fitbits seem to be telling us otherwise. Which should we trust — the economic statistics or our own lying eyes?

世界上的一切都在加速，唯獨生產率數字是個例外。繼10年大幅放緩之後，今年美國的生產率幾乎肯定將出現30多年來首次負增長。不過， Fitbit（可穿戴健身追蹤器）似乎告訴了我們不同的情況。經濟統計數據和我們自己會說謊的眼睛，我們應該相信哪一個？

A lot hinges on the answer. Productivity is the ultimate test of our ability to create wealth. In the short term you can boost growth by working longer hours, for example, or importing more people. Or you could lift the retirement age. After a while these options lose steam.

許多事情要取決於這個問題的答案。生產率是對我們創造財富能力的終極考驗。比如說，短期而言，你可以通過延長工作時間或者輸入更多人員來提振增長。或者，你可以提高退休年齡。一段時間過後，這些做法就會失去效果。

Unless we become smarter at how we work, growth will start to exhaust itself too.

除非我們的工作方法變得更智能，否則增長本身也將開始失去勢頭。

Other measures bear out the pessimists. At just over 2 per cent, US trend growth is barely half the level it was a generation ago. As Paul Krugman put it: “Productivity isn’t everything, but in the long run it is almost everything.”

其他衡量指標也支持悲觀者。當前美國的趨勢增長率略高於2%，勉強達到一代人以前水平的一半。正如保羅•克魯格曼(Paul Krugman)所說：“生產率並非一切，但從長遠看，它幾乎就是一切。”

It is possible we are simply mismeasuring things. Some economists believe the statistics fail to capture the utility of setting up a Facebook profile, for example, or downloading free information from Wikipedia. The gig economy has yet to be properly valued. Yet this argument cuts both ways. Productivity is calculated by dividing the value of what we produce by how many hours we work — data provided by employers. But recent studies — and common sense — say our iPhones chain us to our employers even when we are at leisure. We may thus be exaggerating productivity growth by undercounting how much we work.

可能我們衡量事物的方法是錯誤的。比如，有些經濟學家認爲，統計數據沒法衡量在Facebook上建立一個個人主頁或者從維基百科(Wikipedia)獲取免費信息的效用。“零工經濟”(gig economy)尚未得到正確的評價。不過，這一觀點在兩個方向上都站得住腳。我們用產值除以工作時間（僱主提供的數據）計算出生產率。但近來的研究——以及常識——表明，即便在休息時間，iPhone也把我們跟僱主捆綁到了一起。因此，我們或許少計了工作時間，從而誇大了生產率增速。

The latter certainly fits with the experience of most of the US labour force. It is no coincidence that since 2004 a majority of Americans began to tell pollsters they expected their children to be worse off — the same year in which the internet-fuelled productivity leaps of the 1990s started to vanish. Most Americans have suffered from indifferent or declining wages in the past 15 years or so. A college graduate’s starting salary today is in real terms well below where it was in 2000. For the first time the next generation of US workers will be less educated than the previous, according to the OECD, which means worse is probably yet to come. Last week’s US productivity report bears that out.

後一種情況肯定跟大多數美國僱員的經驗相吻合。並非偶然的是，自2004年以來，大多數美國人開始告訴民意測驗機構，他們預計自己的孩子會過得更糟糕——同樣在2004年，1990年代互聯網推動的生產率大幅增長開始失去勢頭。過去15年左右，多數美國人的工資停滯不前，甚至有所降低。如今，大學畢業生的實際起薪遠低於2000年的水平。經合組織(OECD)數據顯示，下一代美國工人的受教育程度將低於上一代工人，這是首次出現的情況。這意味着，更糟糕的局面還在前面。美國上週公佈的生產率報告證明了這一點。

It is also possible we are on the cusp of a renaissance — we just don’t yet see it. The economist, Robert Solow, quipped: “You can see the computer age everywhere but in the productivity statistics”. That was in 1987. A few years later the computer age showed up in big numbers. By the same token, we may be on the cusp of reaping the benefit of artificial intelligence, personalised medicine or take your pick. This may better fit our own fevered imaginations. Or it could be a chimera.

我們也可能正處於復興的前夜——我們只是尚未看到。經濟學家羅伯特•索洛(Robert Solow)曾嘲諷地說：“你到處都可以看到計算機時代，唯獨在生產率統計數據中看不到。”那是1987年的事。幾年之後，計算機時代帶動生產率大幅提升。同樣，我們或許也正處於收穫人工智能(AI)、個性化醫藥或者其他技術突破的效益的前夜。或許這跟我們自己的狂熱想象更爲吻合。抑或這可能是個幻想。

Until then, the US and most of the west are stuck with a deepening productivity crisis. The slowdown has one manifest effect and a seductive remedy. The first, an embittered backlash against business as usual, is already upon us. Witness Donald Trump’s ascent. Most of his proposed cures for middle America’s anguish are worse than the disease. Shutting down immigration and erecting trade barriers would subtract from US growth. Likewise, it is hard to think of a bigger waste of resources than another budget-busting tax cut for the highest earners. Yet his popularity is clearly fuelled by economic frustration.

在那樣的美景成爲現實之前，美國和大部分西方國家正陷入一種不斷加深的生產率危機。生產率放緩有一個明顯的後果，還有一個誘人的補救措施。前一個，也就是針對現狀的憤怒反彈，已出現在我們眼前。看看唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)的崛起。他對美國中產階級苦悶開出的多數處方比疾病本身更糟糕。阻止移民進入和豎起貿易壁壘，都將損害美國的經濟增長。同樣，不顧預算需要而再次對收入最高人羣減稅，很難想象還有什麼做法比這更浪費資源了。然而，經濟上的挫折感顯然助推着他的人氣。

One or two of Mr Trump’s ideas, such as investing heavily in US infrastructure, would be helpful. Indeed, at a time like this, it is all but a given — and a rare point of agreement with Hillary Clinton. Research shows that a growing share of US growth is created in small number of hyper-connected, urban hubs, such as Los Angeles and the corridor between Boston and New York. Steps that would better link America’s urban boomlands to the large economic backwaters around them would help spread growth more widely. Such projects would take time to bear fruit. Yet it is worth sticking to that “hunger games” image for a moment.

特朗普的一兩個主張，比如大舉投資於美國基礎設施，將是有益的。的確，在當今這樣的時刻，這幾乎是板上釘釘的事情，也是特朗普與希拉里•克林頓(Hillary Clinton)之間難得的共識。研究表明，美國經濟增長有越來越大的一部分是在少量超連結的城市樞紐創造出來的，比如洛杉磯以及波士頓與紐約之間的走廊。將幫助美國的都市繁榮地帶更好地與其周圍大片經濟不景氣地區聯接起來的措施，將有助於把增長擴展到更廣範圍。這類項目將需要時間才能結出果實。不過，在一段時間內堅持那種“飢餓遊戲”形象是值得的。

Imagine the US takes much the same course in the next ten years as it has over the last. That would mean a further corrosion of US infrastructure, continued relative decline in the quality of public education, and atrophying middle workforce skills. It would also hasten the breakaway of urban America’s most gilded enclaves, further enriching the educated elites. It could also, quite possibly, trigger a breakdown in democratic order. If you think Mr Trump’s rise is ominous, picture America after another decade like the last.

想象一下，美國在未來10年所走的路線跟過去10年基本相同。那將意味着，美國基礎設施進一步老化、公共教育質量相對繼續衰落，以及中產工人技能繼續退化。那也將意味着，美國都市最富有的孤立地區將加速脫穎而出，受過教育的精英會更加富有。這很可能引發民主秩序的崩潰。如果你認爲特朗普的崛起是不祥之兆，那麼想象一下美國如果不改變路線，10年後會是什麼景象。

Which brings me to the remedy: a universal basic income. UBI has several plus points. It draws support from all parts of the ideological spectrum: libertarian and socialist alike. It would replace today’s messy overlap of benefits and do away with the humiliation of proving your eligibility to federal bureaucrats. Most important of all, however, it would buy a measure of social peace. Today’s stagnation may be temporary or lasting. We have no way of telling. Common sense dictates we must act as though it is here to stay.

這讓我想到了解決方案：普遍基本收入。普遍基本收入有幾條優勢。它會獲得持有各種意識形態者的支持：從自由意志主義者和社會主義者都不例外。它將取代當今各種混亂、重疊的福利，消除向聯邦官僚證明自己合格的屈辱。但最重要的是，它將“買到”一定程度的社會安寧。如今的停滯或許是暫時的，或許會曠日持久。我們無從判斷。常識要求我們在假定它會持續下去的情況下采取行動。