中國借亞投行釋出合作意願 China plays ball with its development lending

When China announced in 2013 that it would create the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank to lend to developing countries in the region, a common belief held that this marked another sad stage in the slow death of multilateral co-operation.

2013年中國宣佈將發起設立“亞洲基礎設施投資銀行”(Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank，簡稱：亞投行)，專門向該地區的發展中國家發放貸款。當時，人們普遍認爲，多邊合作慢慢走向死亡的過程令人遺憾地進入了一個新階段。

Rather than channel its vast foreign exchange reserves through global agencies like the World Bank, the argument went, China was setting up its own development bank which it could dominate and in which other creditor countries could participate only on terms in effect set by Beijing.

根據這種觀點，中國不願通過世界銀行(World Bank)等國際機構把自己龐大的外匯儲備投放出去，而是要設立一家自己可以主導的開發銀行，其他債權國只有接受實際上由北京方面制定的條款才能參與。

With this week’s news that the AIIB will undertake a joint loan with the Asian Development Bank (ADB), this pessimistic scenario looks mercifully less likely. There is a strong argument for seeing the AIIB’s creation as a move by China towards embracing international co-operation, not rejecting it.

但在本週傳出亞投行將與亞洲開發銀行(ADB)開展一項聯合貸款的消息之後，上述的悲觀情景似乎不太可能出現了。這裏存在一個強有力的理由，可以據此認爲亞投行的成立標誌着中國朝着擁抱、而不是拒絕國際合作的方向邁出了一步。

By the time Beijing announced the AIIB, it had already been hurtling rapidly away from multilateralism in the field of development finance for more than a decade. Starting in the early 2000s, China began to deploy its huge currency reserves to lend bilaterally to developing countries, often for infrastructure projects in Africa, through agencies such as the China Development Bank and the China ExIm Bank.

在宣佈成立亞投行消息之前，中國在開發融資領域與多邊主義背道而馳已有十多年了。中國從本世紀初開始通過中國國家開發銀行(CDB)和中國進出口銀行(China ExIm Bank)等機構，將鉅額外匯儲備用於向發展中國家提供雙邊貸款，通常是投向非洲的基礎設施項目。

Frequently, these loans were tied to mercantile interests of Chinese companies and political backing for Beijing’s foreign policy goals from the recipient governments. They were, however, largely free of the human rights and environmental standards that have helped to make World Bank loans increasingly cumbersome to take out. This featherlight-touch approach proved a highly popular feature. By 2010, Chinese development lending had exceeded that of the World Bank.

這些貸款項目往往與中國企業的商業利益有關，也與接收國政府對中國外交政策目標的政治支持脫不開干係。然而，這些項目基本不受人權和環境標準的限制，而這些標準是使世行越來越不容易發放貸款的因素之一。中國這種輕柔的接觸方式被證實是極受歡迎的。到2010年，中國發放的開發性貸款的規模已經超過了世行。

However, a string of projects failing to work out, including a big loan to Ghana to develop its nascent oil industry, encouraged China to supplement its bilateral lending with a plurilateral project in the form of the AIIB. The US might not have liked it, and unwisely tried to discourage other governments such as the UK from joining the new bank, but creating a new international institution, even at the cost of bypassing the existing ones, was on balance a positive development.

然而，一系列項目未能實施，其中包括向加納發放的一筆用於發展其新興的石油產業的大額貸款，這促使中方決定以亞投行的形式開展諸邊項目，作爲雙邊貸款的補充。美國或許不喜歡亞投行，也曾不明智地試圖阻止英國等其他國家加入亞投行，但創建一家新的國際機構——即使以繞過現有機構爲代價——總的來說是一個積極進展。

Assuming it is confirmed and goes ahead, the loan with the Asian Development Bank is important both symbolically and in practice. The ADB, which has been around since 1966, has long been seen as a Japanese fiefdom, with Tokyo in effect appointing its head and Washington giving it support. Neither the US nor Japan has joined the AIIB. For Beijing in effect to co-operate with one of its main foreign policy rivals in the region suggests it is signalling that the AIIB is not simply intended to project Chinese interests.

假定得到證實並向前推進，與亞開行的聯合貸款將具有重要的象徵和實際意義。創立於1966年的亞開行，長期以來被視爲日本的勢力範圍，實質上由日本任命行長，並得到美國支持。美國或日本都沒有加入亞投行。通過與域內的一個主要外交政策對手進行合作，中國正在發出一個信號：亞投行的存在並非單純爲了投射中國的利益。

Moreover, the ADB, somewhat like the World Bank, has rules on social and environmental protection which it says will apply to the joint project: thus it will allow China, at least partly, to submit itself to global norms of development lending.

此外，亞開行多多少少像世行一樣，擁有社會和環保方面的規則。亞開行聲稱，這些規則將適用於與亞投行的聯合貸款項目。這將使中國——起碼在一定程度上——能夠按照開發性貸款的國際標準行事。

These are early days for the AIIB, which has still to demonstrate which rules will constrain the bulk of its activities. It is, however, all to the good that it is sending out signals in the direction of international co-operation.

亞投行處於早期階段，它必須向外界展示其大部分行動將遵守哪些規則。不過，它現在發出自己正朝着國際合作的方向邁進的信號無疑是大好事。

The initial hand-wringing, particularly in Washington, over the creation of the AIIB has been excessive. China will continue to lend bilaterally on a huge scale, and the new bank should be regarded as a pilot project rather than a dominant new model. By showing respect to the existing development agencies, Beijing is signalling that the AIIB is not simply the extension of Chinese influence by other means.

亞投行創立之初引發了過度的焦慮，尤其是在華盛頓。中國將繼續大規模地發放雙邊貸款，這家新銀行應被視爲一個試點項目，而不是一種主導性的新模式。北京方面向現有開發銀行表現出尊重，從而發出這樣的信號：中國設立亞投行並不只是要通過其他方式擴大自身影響力。