加入SDR將爲中國帶來多少外資

The move to confer reserve status on China’s currency is part of a process that could lead to nearly $3tn being injected into the country’s bond and equity markets. We’ve taken a close look at where the money could come from.

中國貨幣獲得儲備貨幣地位，可能導致近3萬億美元被注入中國的債券和股票市場。我們對這筆資金的可能來源進行了仔細的研究。

On its own, the inclusion of the renminbi in the International Monetary Fund’s basket of reserve currencies, known as the Special Drawing Right (SDR), could lead to capital flows of $30bn into China within the next 12 months.

將人民幣納入國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)儲備貨幣籃子（被稱爲特別提款權(SDR)）這一舉動本身，可能導致300億美元在接下來的12個月裏流入中國。

These will come from countries that receive IMF funding. IMF programs use SDR as a unit of account, and countries that benefit from these programs need to hedge their liabilities in the underlying SDR currencies. The SDR basket is equivalent to $280bn, and the IMF has announced that the RMB will account for 10.92 per cent of the basket—hence the $30bn.

這部分資金將來自接受IMF資金的國家。IMF項目使用SDR作爲記賬單位，這些項目的受益國需要以SDR的基礎貨幣對衝它們的負債。SDR貨幣籃子相當於2800億美元，IMF宣佈，人民幣在貨幣籃子的權重將爲10.92%，即相當於300億美元。

This is relatively small in the scheme of things, however. The significance of the renminbi’s inclusion in the SDR is that it’s a measure of the progress China has made to date with key reforms, such as the internationalisation of its currency and the liberalisation of its capital account.

然而，這個金額對從全局來看微不足道。人民幣納入SDR貨幣籃子的意義在於，這體現了中國到目前爲止，在人民幣國際化和資本賬戶開放等關鍵改革中取得了多大進展。

Our research shows that a continuation of these reforms will force a rebalancing of global portfolios that could result in inflows to China of nearly $3tn by 2020.

我們的研究結果顯示，繼續這些改革將強力推動國際投資組合再平衡，可能導致到2020年近3萬億美元流入中國。

To put these figures in perspective, and to gain a sense of the overall shape of the portfolio rebalancing, we have carried out an analysis of the likely sources of these flows and how they will be distributed across China’s capital markets.

爲了客觀衡量這些數字，並大致瞭解投資組合再平衡的全貌，我們對這些資金可能來自哪裏以及將如何在中國各資本市場分配進行了分析。

We have analysed expected flows by asset category based on index weightings, types of investors and what we know of investors’ typical asset-allocation patterns.

基於指數權重、投資者類型以及我們所知的投資者經典資產配置模式，我們分析了不同資產類別的預期資金流入。

$2.5tn for China’s Bonds…

2.5萬億美元將流入中國債券市場…

Given the size of China’s government bond market, we expect it to account for 6.8 per cent of the Citi World Government Bond Index. The index will be capitalised at around $21.3tn after the bonds’ inclusion, so flows into the sector will need to be about $1.46tn just for portfolios to maintain index weight.

鑑於中國政府債券市場的規模，我們預計其在花旗全球政府債券指數(Citi World Government Bond index)中的權重將達6.8%。中國政府債券被納入之後，該指數規模將達到近21.3萬億美元，那麼，投資組合若要維持指數權重，將需要大約1.46萬億美元流入中國政府債券市場。

We see this happening in two phases, the first being an incremental increase from central banks which started this July and a bigger step for private investors when the global index is altered.

我們認爲，這一局面將分兩個階段達成，第一階段是從今年7月開始的各央行逐漸增持，而當這個全球指數發生改變時，私人投資者將進行更大力度的投資。

Of these flows, we expect $783bn from global central banks, based on our assumption that they allocate about 7 per cent of their $11.18tn in foreign exchange reserve assets into renminbi, and that they invest most of it in government bonds.

在這些資金流中，我們預計7830億美元將來自於全球各央行，理由是，我們假定，全球央行會把11.18萬億美元外匯儲備的約7%配置成人民幣，並絕大部分投資於政府債券。

Another $90bn will come from other public sector investors, such as sovereign wealth funds and public pensions. Their assets under management, excluding foreign exchange reserves, total $18.24tn. There are no detailed breakdowns of portfolio allocations, however, so we assume that these institutions allocate a total 66 per cent to bonds, of which 25 per cent is allocated overseas and 60 per cent is allocated to government bonds. From this, we estimate that 5 per cent, or $90bn, will be allocated to Chinese government bonds. Private sector investors will account for $584bn ($1.46tn minus $783bn minus $90bn).

另外900億美元將來自其他公共部門的投資者，比如主權財富基金和公共養老金。他們管理的資產，不包括外匯儲備，總計18.24萬億美元。然而，如今這些資產的具體配置情況不得而知，因此我們假定這些機構將66%的資產配置成債券，其中25%配置在海外，60%配置在主權債上。其中我們估計5%的資產將配置成中國主權債，也就是900億美元。私營部門的投資者將佔5840億（1.46萬億減去7830億再減去900億）美元。

China’s corporate and quasi-sovereign bond sectors could receive inflows of $1.07tn. We estimate this on the fact that municipalities, policy banks and corporate bonds currently have about $5.4tn on issue, and on the assumption that overseas investors in these sectors will hold 20 per cent (which is similar to foreign investor holdings in comparable markets elsewhere).

中國企業債和準主權債部門可能接收1.07萬億美元的資金流入。我們預測的理由是地方政府、政策性銀行、企業目前發行在外的債券有約5.4萬億美元，以及假設海外投資者在這些領域的持有比例將爲20%（與外國投資者在其他地方的類似市場持有的比例類似）。

In total, China’s government and corporate bond markets will soak up inflows of $2.53tn ($1.46tn plus $1.07tn).

中國政府債券和公司債市場總計將吸收2.53萬億（1.46萬億加上1.07萬億）美元的資金流入。

…and $384bn for Equities

還有3840億美元將流入股市

Our research suggests that foreign capital inflows into China’s equity markets will total $384bn in 2016. This figure is based on a statement by index provider MSCI that China A shares will account for 10.2 per cent of the MSCI Emerging Market Index and on our estimate that the index will be capitalized at $3.76tn when China is included.

我們的研究表明，2016年流入中國股市的外國資本總計將達到3840億美元。該數字基於兩點：一是指數提供商MSCI明晟稱中國A股市場在MSCI新興市場指數中的權重將達到10.2%、二是我們估計，當A股被納入後，該指數成分股總市值將達到3.76萬億美元。

Of this $384bn, $43bn will come from sovereign wealth funds and public pensions. We arrived at this figure by assuming that these investors allocate 22 per cent of their $18.24tn assets to equities and, of this, 10.6 per cent to emerging markets and then 10.2 per cent of that amount to China A shares. The balance of the $341bn ($384bn minus $43bn) will be held by private investors.

在這3840億美元中，430億美元將來自主權財富基金和公共養老金。這個數字是這樣計算出來的：假設這些投資者將其18.24萬億美元資產的22%配置成股票，其中10.6%配置在新興市場，這其中的10.2%配置在中國A股市場，結果就是430億美元。私人投資者將持有其餘的3410億（3840億減去430億）美元。

In light of these estimates, we believe that investors should maintain a balanced view of the risks and opportunities in China, weighing the country’s slowing economic growth against the long-term benefits—such as these inflows—which are likely to result from the government’s reforms.

根據這些估算，我們認爲投資者應該全面看待中國市場的風險和機遇，將中國經濟增長放緩與中國政府改革可能帶來的長期利益（比如這些資金流入）進行權衡。

Hayden Briscoe is director, Asia Pacific Fixed Income, and Vincent Tsui is Economist—Asia Pacific, at AllianceBernstein. The views expressed herein do not constitute research, investment advice or trade recommendations and do not necessarily represent the views of all AB portfolio-management teams.

海登布里斯科(Hayden Briscoe)爲聯博(AllianceBernstein)亞太固定收益主管，Vincent Tsui爲聯博亞太經濟學家。以上觀點不構成研究、投資建議或交易推薦，也未必代表聯博所有投資組合管理團隊的觀點。