中國應爲人民幣找到新的平衡

With the US Federal Reserve’s first rate rise approaching, China’s decision to allow the renminbi to depreciate bears similarities to the Swiss National Bank’s pre-emptive reaction to European quantitative easing in January. The lessons from other discarded currency pegs loom large. Asia and Latin America in the 1990s taught us that currency pegs reinforced and indeed exacerbated financial cycles. Asset prices tended to overshoot on the upside, creating macro imbalances that were eventually corrected through catastrophic devaluations.

隨着美聯儲(Fed)首次加息時間臨近，中國決定允許人民幣貶值，這與今年1月瑞士央行(Swiss National Bank)搶在歐洲啓動量化寬鬆之前採取行動有相似之處。其他國家放棄匯率錨定的先例帶給我們的經驗教訓歷歷在目。上世紀90年代亞洲和拉丁美洲的經歷告訴我們，匯率錨定強化且事實上加劇了金融週期。資產價格往往過度升高，導致宏觀經濟失衡，最終通過災難性貶值才得以糾正。

There are both parallels and differences in China’s case. The similarities are that the renminbi experienced a near decade-long appreciation against the dollar and most of its trading partner currencies. The trend was characterised by low volatility and high predictability. Incentives to speculate were large. Foreign capital, often disguised as trade or direct investment flows, circumvented capital controls to enter the real estate market. And after 2008 Chinese groups began to borrow aggressively abroad.

中國的情況與上述例子既有相似之處，又有不同之處。相似之處是近十年來，人民幣對美元以及其他大部分貿易伙伴國貨幣一直在升值，該趨勢具有低波動性和高可預測性的特點，極大地刺激了投機。外資往往僞裝成貿易流量或直接投資流量，避開資本管制進入房地產市場。2008年後，中國企業又開始在海外大舉借貸。

Unless the currency peg is dissolved at a point in the cycle when balance-of-payments flows are reasonably balanced, a de-peg tends to release any volatility that has been stored up, and the currency tends to overshoot in the direction against which the central bank has been leaning. In the Chinese case, as with Asia in the 1990s, the direction has become clearly weaker.

除非是在國際收支流動相對平衡時期的某一時點解除匯率錨定，否則這樣做會往往會釋放出以往被抑制的所有波動，該貨幣還往往會朝着與當地央行一直髮力的方向相反的方向過度變動。與亞洲上世紀90年代時的情況相似，中國這次的情況是，本幣匯率現在明顯走弱。

But the differences are important too. Unlike Asia in the 1990s, the renminbi shows few signs of overvaluation in its external balances. The current account surplus, while well down from its peak of 10 per cent of gross domestic product in 2007, is still 3 per cent. And exports have continued to gain market share globally.

但不同之處也很重要。與上世紀90年代的亞洲不同的是，就外部平衡而言，沒有多少跡象顯示人民幣幣值被高估。中國的經常項目順差仍達到國內生產總值(GDP)的3%，雖然這個數字遠低於2007年10%的峯值。而且中國的出口在國際市場所佔份額仍在增加。

Instead, the currency peg is inconsistent with internal balance, reflecting a growing debt overhang and impending balance-sheet recession. The corporate sector is buckling under a heavy debt burden and worsening producer price deflation. July marked the 40th consecutive month of deflation, as the trend worsened to a year-on-year fall of 5.4 per cent.

中國的匯率錨定反而與內部平衡不一致，這反映了不斷增長的未償債務，以及即將出現的資產負債表衰退。沉重的債務負擔，以及日益惡化的工業生產者出廠價格通縮已經要壓垮企業部門。隨着這一趨勢的惡化，7月工業生產者出廠價格指數(PPI)同比降幅達到5.4%，這一指數連續第40個月呈現通縮態勢。

Depreciation pressure is about industrial overcapacity born of excess investment. Companies are suffering from weak global trade demand, worsening profitability as labour costs rise, and high debt financing costs.

貶值壓力與過度投資導致的工業產能過剩有關。由於全球貿易需求疲軟、勞動力成本上升導致盈利能力下降以及債務融資成本高昂，中國企業現在的日子不好過。

Another difference between China and past peggers is that the capital account has been less liberalised. China’s foreign debt liabilities, measured at about $1tn, still pale in comparison with foreign reserves of $3.6tn. But scope for domestic capital flight is huge given the high degree of monetisation in the economy. M2 money supply, a measure of cash and short-term monetary liabilities, is more than 200 per cent of GDP, or nearly $22tn.

中國和過去的匯率錨定國之間另一個不同之處在於，中國資本賬戶的開放程度更低。中國約1萬億美元的外債餘額相對於其3.6萬億美元的外匯儲備還是算不了什麼。但考慮到中國經濟的高度貨幣化，國內資本外逃的空間很大。衡量現金與短期貨幣性負債的M2貨幣供應量達到了國內生產總值(GDP)的兩倍多，接近22萬億美元。

Modest domestic capital flight coupled with an unwind in foreign borrowing can make a serious dent in foreign reserves, impart significant depreciation pressure, or both. The strength of its foreign reserve buffer should not be overestimated. Accordingly China finds itself in similar circumstances to past peggers, but with distinct advantages: a large foreign reserve buffer and a less liberalised capital account.

輕度的國內資本外逃加上清償海外借債，可以嚴重減少外匯儲備，或帶來巨大的貶值壓力，或兩者兼而有之。中國外匯儲備的緩衝能力不應被高估。於是，中國發現自己遇到了與之前錨定國相似的處境，卻擁有獨特的優勢：巨大的外匯儲備緩衝以及開放程度較低的資本賬戶。

The decision to allow the renminbi to respond to market pressure for depreciation is belated but positive. China should heed the Swiss lesson to allow the currency to find a new equilibrium, intervening modestly to smooth the fall rather than to prop the currency up at levels inconsistent with domestic fundamentals.

中國允許人民幣響應來自市場的貶值壓力，這一決定雖然來得遲了些，但具有積極意義。中國應當吸取瑞士的經驗，讓人民幣找到一種新的平衡，適度干預以實現平穩下跌，而非將人民幣幣值支撐在與國內基本面不相符的水平。

To re-establish a stable equilibrium, the authorities need to resist the temptations of premature capital account liberalisation, write down bad debt and, once and for all, remove implicit guarantees on lending to the state sector that have been a driver of capital misallocation during previous administrations. When central banks unleash volatility, it is rarely positive for risk assets. In this case, the duration of that weakness will largely depend on other reform choices. Without reforms, depreciation pressure will only build. And more pressure will be brought to bear on central banks in Europe, Japan and emerging markets to lean against this with depreciations of their own.

要重建穩定的平衡，中國當局需要抵制過早開放資本賬戶的誘惑，減記壞賬並永久性取消對國有部門貸款的隱性擔保，這種擔保在前幾屆政府期間推動了資本的不當配置。當央行釋放波動性時，對風險資產極少有積極影響。在這種情況下，匯率走弱的持續時間將在很大程度上取決於其他的改革選擇。沒有改革，貶值壓力只會不斷積累。而且，還會給歐洲、日本和新興市場的央行帶來更大壓力，迫使它們通過本幣貶值來抵擋這種壓力。

Gene Frieda is a global strategist for Moore Europe Capital Management

吉恩弗裏達(Gene Frieda)是摩爾歐洲資本管理(Moore Europe Capital Management)全球策略師