人民幣貶值將如何影響全球經濟 Has China just pressed the escape button

For many months, as dark clouds have gathered over the Chinese economy, it has seemed obvious that the authorities might be tempted to press an escape button that has been used by all the other major economies since 2008. That button is labelled “devaluation”. Yet, until Tuesday, this temptation was stoutly resisted. Premier Li Keqiang has never seemed particularly attracted to a traditional Asian devaluation strategy. Indeed, export-led growth is the reverse of the economic rebalancing that he has always championed.

一段時期以來，隨着中國經濟上空的烏雲不斷積聚，有一點看起來已經很明顯，那就是中國當局可能會禁不住誘惑、按下那個自2008年以來所有其他主要經濟體都使用過的逃跑按鈕。這個按鈕叫做“貨幣貶值”。然而，直至本週二之前，這種誘惑一直被堅決抵制。中國總理李克強對亞洲傳統的貨幣貶值策略似乎從來都不是特別感冒。事實上，出口拉動型增長與他一直倡導的經濟再平衡目標背道而馳。

China has now clearly blinked, and the renminbi has fallen by 4 per cent in two days. However, as so often in China, it is impossible to tell from official statements whether a major regime shift has actually taken place.

而今，中國顯然猶豫了，人民幣也在週二和週三兩天內下跌3.5%（注：本週四人民幣匯率中間價再跌1.1%）。然而，跟中國通常的情況一樣，我們不可能從官方陳述中看出，一個重大制度性轉變是否已事實上發生。

The PBOC is trying to describe the devaluation as nothing more than a tactical shift to allow market forces to work more actively, thus allowing the currency to enter the SDR fairly soon. But the PBOC has also warned that the short term market moves might be quite large. They may be seeking to dress up a deliberate devaluation in the clothes of a “market friendly” reform.

中國央行正試圖將此輪貶值描述爲不過是一種戰術轉變，其目的是讓市場發揮更積極的作用，從而使人民幣能夠在較短時間內被納入特別提款權(SDR)貨幣籃子。但中國央行也警告稱，短期的市場波動可能會非常大。他們或許在謀求爲一場蓄意的貶值披上“有利於市場”的改革的外衣。

If China really has pressed its own escape button, the consequences for everyone else will be far reaching.

如果中國真的已經按下自己的逃跑按鈕，將對所有其他人都產生廣泛影響。

Since 2005, when China first abandoned its fixed exchange rate regime, the renminbi’s real effective exchange rate has risen by more than 50 per cent, with almost a third of that rise coming in the past year. Initially, the rise was driven by a large trade surplus, along with controls over capital outflows. More recently, the rise in the dollar has dragged the renminbi upwards.

自2005年中國首次放棄固定匯率機制以來，人民幣實際有效匯率已上升逾50%，其中近三分之一的升幅發生在過去一年。起初，人民幣升值受鉅額貿易順差以及控制資本外流的驅動。最近的美元升值拉昇了人民幣幣值。

But the impact of these market forces has been severely dampened by the operation of a daily “fix” for the exchange rate, that has generally limited the speed of appreciation. The permitted 2 per cent trading band around the “fix” has been enforced by currency intervention, buying dollars against the renminbi. The resulting huge increase in foreign exchange reserves has been the subject of bitter complaints about “currency manipulation”, especially from some in the US Congress.

但是，這些市場因素的影響一直被人民幣匯率每日中間價機制嚴重削弱，後者總體上限制了人民幣升值的速度。貨幣干預利用允許的交易區間（中間價上下浮動2%），買入美元，拋出人民幣。由此造成的外匯儲備大增，一直引發外國人（尤其是一些美國國會議員）極大的不滿，他們指責中國“操縱匯率”。

This year, the direction of these market forces has changed completely. Large capital outflows have been triggered as confidence in the health of the Chinese financial system eroded, and the authorities have actually been forced to sell reserves in order to prevent the currency from weakening sharply.

今年，這些市場因素的作用方向發生了徹底轉變。對中國金融系統的健康狀況失去信心已經引發了大規模資本外流，中國當局實際上已被迫出售外匯儲備以避免人民幣急劇貶值。

Reserves have fallen by about $340bn since the peak in early 2014. This has resulted in an unintended tightening in the domestic money markets, which has been offset by reductions in reserve ratio requirements on the domestic banks. More cuts in the RRR are likely soon. But the PBOC has found it increasingly difficult to ease monetary policy as inflation has fallen and the economy has slowed.

自2014年初達到峯值以來，中國外匯儲備已經下降了約3400億美元。這導致國內貨幣市場出現了意想不到的緊縮，而下調國內銀行存款準備金率緩解了這種緊縮。當局可能很快就會進一步下調存款準備金率。但隨着通脹率的下降以及經濟增長放緩，中國央行發現，要放鬆貨幣政策越來越困難。

With the IMF now saying that the long-standing under-valuation of the RMB has been broadly eliminated, it is hard to see why the Chinese government has been so resistant to breaking the link with the dollar. Indeed, any other major economy, facing the same circumstances, would probably have acted much sooner.

考慮到國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)如今宣佈人民幣幣值長期以來被低估的狀況已不復存在，很難看出中國政府爲何一直如此抵制將人民幣與美元脫鉤。事實上，其他任何主要經濟體如果面對同樣的情況，都很可能早就採取行動了。

Of course, there are considerations pointing in the other direction. China wishes to avoid any hint of “currency manipulation”. It sees no advantage in starting a genuine currency war. But it no longer has to manipulate the currency market in order to achieve a devaluation. All it has to do is to stop manipulating the free market, and capital outflows will probably take the exchange rate much lower. There will be complaints from the Republicans in Congress, but their case does not seem as compelling as it once was.

當然，還有相反方向的考慮。中國希望與“操縱匯率”撇清關係。中國並不認爲發動一場真正的貨幣戰爭對自己有利。但它已不再需要通過操縱外匯市場來實現人民幣貶值了。它所要做的就是停止操縱自由市場，而資本外流很可能會使人民幣匯率降到低得多的水平。美國國會的共和黨人將會抱怨，但他們的理由看上去不像以前那樣令人信服了。

Nor does China want to lose control over a depreciating renminbi, in case that causes a crisis in the weakening financial system at home. But it is hard to see that happening: the reserves still provide almost unlimited ammunition for intervention if needed. China should be able to manage an orderly downward float if that is what it chooses to do.

中國也不希望失去對貶值中的人民幣的控制，以防貶值導致國內日益脆弱的金融體系出現危機。但很難看出會發生這種情形：如果需要，外匯儲備仍可爲干預提供幾乎無限量的彈藥。中國應該有能力實現人民幣有序貶值，如果這就是它的選擇的話。

The new regime seems to offer that possibility. A crawling downward peg could develop, as the daily fix takes into account market forces, and the behaviour of the dollar against other currencies, which the previous regime largely ignored. But we have little idea how far, or how fast, China wants the peg to “crawl” downwards. The authorities are denying that this is a major change, but they would, wouldn’t they?

這種新機制似乎提供了這種可能性。由於人民幣匯率中間價設定考慮了市場因素、以及美元對其他貨幣的升值行爲（之前的機制對此基本上予以忽略），可能會形成一種緩慢向下的掛鉤機制。但是我們並不清楚中國想讓掛鉤匯率水平向下“爬行”多遠，抑或以多快的速度向下“爬行”。中國當局否認這是一次重大變化，但是他們肯定會這麼說的，不是嗎？

At one extreme, this could prove to be a very modest change, a bit like earlier episodes where the trading bands have been widened. Economic fundamentals, however, seem to point to the need for a larger adjustment. Last week’s exports figures were somewhat alarming, and Tuesday’s activity data for July clearly suggest a renewed slowdown after the recent bounce.

在一種極端情況下，這會被證實是一次非常溫和的改變，有點像之前擴大人民幣交易區間。然而，經濟基本面似乎顯示存在進行更大幅度調整的需求。上週的出口數據在某種程度上令人擔憂，週二公佈的7月經濟活動數據清晰表明，在最近一次反彈後經濟再次出現放緩。

If devaluation were to bring with it a higher inflation rate, that may be no bad thing for an economy mired in deflation. Other countries have found that the exchange rate is the most effective way of easing monetary conditions, and China is now signalling that the era in which it was the sole major exception to this general rule is over.

如果人民幣貶值將帶來更高的通脹率，這對陷入通縮的經濟來說或許並非壞事。其他國家已經發現，通過匯率放鬆銀根是最有效的方式，而如今中國正在表明，其作爲這條普遍規律唯一例外的時代已經結束。

China will now probably want to eliminate a significant part of the 10 per cent rise that still remains from its real effective exchange rate increase since mid 2014. A catch-up of this type should not be described as a competitive devaluation, given the circumstances, but others might use the term. Only if China goes much further, driving the currency deep into undervalued territory, would that seem justified.

儘管有所下跌，但自2014年中期以來人民幣實際有效匯率仍然上漲了10%，現在中國可能會希望大舉消除這部分升值。鑑於這些情況，這種跟風貶值不應該被形容爲競爭性貶值，但是另一些人可能會使用這個詞。除非中國大幅加大貶值力度、使人民幣幣值進入被大幅低估的區間，競爭性貶值的說法似乎才成立。

Even so, any change in China’s exchange rate regime is bound to have important consequences. China’s willingness to allow its currency to rise alongside the dollar means that it has been a “sink” for global deflation, mopping up some of the deflation that would otherwise have been seen elsewhere. Other countries will now see their currencies tending to rise, not fall, against the renminbi, and that will add to declining price pressures in the US and Europe.

即便如此，人民幣匯率機制的任何變動必定會帶來重要影響。中國願意允許人民幣與美元一道升值意味着，它一直是全球緊縮的“蓄水池”，吸收了原本會出現在其他地方的部分通縮。現在其他國家將看到本國貨幣對人民幣趨向於升值、而非貶值，這將增加美國和歐洲物價下滑的壓力。

Markets have so far reacted to all this fairly rationally, pushing commodity prices and bond yields lower. A fairly large further devaluation in most Asian currencies seems highly likely.

市場對這一切的反應迄今一直相當理智，推動大宗商品價格和債券收益率下滑。接下來多數亞洲國家貨幣似乎很可能會進一步大幅貶值。

But the great unknown is the direction of equities in the developed world. On the one hand, the disappearance of the Chinese safety valve in the fight against global deflation is clearly a bad thing. But, against this, the US Federal Reserve might now delay its intended monetary tightening until December at least.

但是，真正存在巨大不確定性的是發達國家股市的走向。一方面，中國不再充當抵禦全球通縮的安全閥，明顯是件壞事。但是，針對這種情況，美聯儲(Fed)眼下或許會將計劃中的貨幣收緊行動推遲到至少12月份。

In equity markets, it is the Fed that normally wins the debate.

在股市方面，贏得辯論的通常是美聯儲。