希臘人面臨的兩難選擇 The difficult choices facing the Greeks

How would I vote in the referendum on the eurozone’s economic programme if I were Greek? The answer, alas, is that I am unsure. If I believed Greece could make a success of going it alone, I would surely vote against the programme. But I could not be certain: if Greece could use monetary sovereignty wisely, it would not be in its current state. If I voted in favour of the programme, I would not know whether it was still on offer: the eurozone says it is not, but it might be bluffing. What I would know is that, if Greece voted Yes, it might face years of retrenchment and depression. But that might still be better than post-exit chaos.

假如我是希臘人，在針對歐元區經濟計劃的公投上我會如何投票呢？唉，可惜我也不確定答案。如果我相信希臘單幹會取得成功，那麼我肯定會投票反對該計劃。但是我無法確定：如果希臘可以明智地運用貨幣自主權，它就不會處於如今的境地。如果我投票支持該計劃，我不知道歐元區是否仍然提供這個計劃：歐元區說現在不提供，但可能是虛張聲勢。我知道的是，如果希臘投贊成票，它也許將面臨數年緊縮和蕭條。但是這可能還是好過退出歐元區後的混亂。

I would also surely wonder whether there might be middle ground. Thus some arguethat it would be possible to stay inside the eurozone even if the government were in default. This might also justify a No vote.

我也肯定會猜想是否還有折中選擇。於是有人提出，即使政府違約，但希臘還是有可能留在歐元區。這也許也能成爲投反對票的理由。

In making my decision, I would bemoan both the idiotic leftism of my own government and the self-righteousness of the rest of the eurozone. Nobody comes out of this saga with credit.

在做決定時，我既會埋怨我國政府愚蠢的左翼主義，也會爲歐元區其他國家的自以爲是感到不滿。沒有哪一方會從這場鬧劇中得到讚賞。

The Syriza government has failed to put forward a credible programme of reform that might solve the multiple problems of the Greek economy and polity. It has instead made populist gestures. It is, in brief, a dreadful government produced by desperate times.

激進左翼聯盟黨(Syriza)政府沒能提出可信的改革計劃，本來改革或許可以解決希臘經濟、政治的多重問題。相反，該政府做出了民粹主義的舉動。簡而言之，這是個絕望時刻催生的可怕政府。

Yet the eurozone, too, deserves substantial blame for the outcome. One would never guess from its rhetoric that Germany was a serial defaulter in the 20th century. Moreover, there is no democracy, including the UK, whose politics would survive such a huge depression unscathed. Remember, when Germany last suffered a depression of this magnitude, Hitler came to power. Yes, Syriza is the outcome of infantile and irresponsible Greek politics. But it is also the result of blunders committed by the creditors since 2010 and, above all, insistence on bailing out Greece’s foolish private creditors at the expense of the Greek people.

不過，歐元區也理當爲這種後果擔負主要責任。從德國的言辭中，人們永遠也猜不到德國在20世紀曾是違約慣犯。此外，沒有哪個民主國家在經歷瞭如此巨大的蕭條之後，其政治還能毫髮無損，英國也不能。請不要忘記，當德國上一次經歷瞭如此程度的大蕭條時，希特勒上臺了。沒錯，激進左翼聯盟黨就是希臘幼稚而不負責任的政治的產物。但是，它同樣也是債權人自2010年以後所犯重大錯誤的結果，更是歐元區堅持以希臘人民爲代價紓困希臘愚蠢的私人債權人的結果。

Yet all these mistakes are now sunk costs. Greeks must look to the future.

不過，如今所有這些錯誤都成了沉沒成本。希臘必須着眼未來。

Even this perspective does not help as much as one would like. The bailout extension did not offer a plausible exit into recovery: it left too big a debt overhang and, more important, demanded too much short-term austerity. Given the recent backsliding, it seems to demand a move from a primary fiscal balance (before interest) of close to zero this year to a surplus of 3.5 per cent of gross domestic product by 2018. Achieving this outcome might demand fiscal measures that would raise the equivalent of 7 per cent of GDP and shrink the economy by 10 per cent.

即使是這個觀點也無法像人們所希望的那樣起到幫助。紓困延期並未提供一條通往復蘇的可行之路，而是造成過於龐大的債務負擔，更重要的是它要求希臘實施太多的短期財政緊縮。考慮到最近的經濟下滑，這似乎是要求希臘將基本財政餘額（付息前），從今年的接近於零，變成到2018年實現相當於國內生產總值(GDP)3.5%的盈餘。要實現這一結果，或許就得推出財政措施使財政收入達到GDP的7%，並使經濟收縮10%。

One does not put an overweight patient on a starvation diet just after a heart attack. Greece needs growth. Indeed, the economic collapse explains why its public debt has exploded relative to GDP. The programmeshould have eliminated further austerity until growth was established, focused on growth-promoting reforms, and promised debt relief on completion. If the programme on offer was so bad, should I risk voting No? In deciding that I would need to think through what would happen. The short-term position would be clear. The European Central Bank has curtailed emergency support for the Greek banks, forcing tight limits on withdrawals. Some argue this is a huge error. Others believe it is an incentive for voters to vote Yes.

人們不會讓肥胖病人在剛剛心臟病發作之後就進行飢餓節食。希臘需要經濟增長。的確，經濟崩盤解釋了希臘公共債務相對於GDP爆炸式增長的原因。歐元區的計劃本應該去掉進一步的緊縮，直到希臘重新建立經濟增長，應該關注促進增長的改革，並承諾完成改革就予以債務減免。如果歐元區提出的計劃太糟糕，那我應該冒險投反對票嗎？在做決定時，我需要仔細想想未來會發生什麼。短期形勢顯而易見。歐洲央行(ECB)已經減少對希臘銀行業的緊急支援，迫使希臘銀行業嚴格限制取款。有些人認爲，這是個巨大的錯誤。其他人則認爲，這是激勵選民投贊成票。

If the Greeks voted Yes, the curtailing of ECB support might be reversed. But it is hard to imagine a successful revival of the eurozone’s programme if the present government were still in charge. After campaigning for a No, the latter would surely have lost all the confidence of the creditors. So a new government would have to emerge. It would then also have to sign on the dotted line.

如果希臘人投贊成票，歐洲央行減少支援的情況也許會逆轉。但是，如果希臘現任政府繼續掌權的話，很難想象歐元區的計劃會成功復活。在遊說選民投反對票後，希臘當局無疑將失去債權人所有的信心。因此希臘將不得不推出新一屆政府。那時，新政府也將不得不簽字。

A Yes vote then would offer an unpleasant and uncertain, but at least imaginable future. Now imagine a No vote. There would then be two conceivable outcomes. One would be a true exit. The Greek government would introduce a new currency and convert all contracts under Greek law into it. The new currency would surely then collapse in value relative to the euro. How much it would fall would depend on the policies and institutions (particularly the governance of the central bank) established by the government.

如果希臘人投贊成票，那麼這將會帶來一個令人不悅而又前途未卜的未來，但這個未來至少是可以想象出來的。現在想象一下投票結果是反對，那麼將會有兩種可以想象到的結果。第一種是真正退出歐元區。希臘政府將引入新的貨幣，並在希臘法律下將所有合同轉化爲新貨幣計算。新貨幣必定將對歐元瘋狂貶值。它將貶值至何種地步，將取決於希臘政府制定的政策和制度（特別是央行的治理）。

One might reasonably fear the worst. Some even argue that Greece would remain “euroised”. If so, the collapse in the external value of the new currency might offer little gain in competitiveness. Personally, I would be more optimistic: the improvements in competitiveness might well be large.

人們有理由害怕最糟糕的結果。有些人甚至認爲，希臘將仍然保持“歐元化”。如果這樣，新貨幣對外價值的崩盤對希臘競爭力的提升可能微不足道。而我個人會更樂觀：競爭力的改善幅度很可能很大。

The second outcome would be to stay in the eurozone, despite an insolvent government. This is logically possible. The banking system could be recapitalised by converting uninsured bank liabilities into equity. This looks technically feasible. But it would impose a large negative shock on private wealth.

第二種結果是，儘管政府破產，但希臘繼續留在歐元區。這從邏輯上講是可能的。可以通過將無保險的銀行負債轉化爲權益來對銀行系統進行資產重組。這從技術角度來看是可行的。但是這將對私人財富造成巨大的負面衝擊。

Whether the ECB would then restart emergency lending and on what scale would become the big questions. This looks an unattractive option to me: it would present all the problems of being part of a currency union, with the additional disadvantages of a comprehensive government default. Better than that surely would be to vote Yes.

接下來，歐洲央行是否將重啓緊急貸款，以及規模會有多大，將成爲重要問題。這在我看來是個毫無吸引力的選項：它將帶來作爲貨幣聯盟一分子的所有麻煩，外加政府全面違約造成的損失。投贊成票肯定比這要好。

So I, as a Greek voter, face a choice between the devil and the deep blue sea. The devil is familiar: the never-ending demands of the eurozone for further austerity against which my people voted in the last general election. The deep blue sea is sovereign default and monetary sovereignty. If I am Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras, I think there is a third way — endless bailouts and few conditions. But I am sure he is deluded. So which would I choose? Being cautious I would be tempted to stick with the devil I know. but I might well do better to risk the sea.

因此，作爲一名希臘選民，我面臨的是一個刀山與火海的兩難選擇。刀山大家很熟悉：歐元區沒完沒了地要求希臘進一步緊縮，而希臘人民在上屆大選中就對此投了反對票。火海是主權債務違約以及貨幣自主。如果我是希臘總理亞歷克西斯•齊普拉斯(Alexis Tsipras)的話，我想還有第三條路——無止盡的紓困和極少的附加條件。但是我敢肯定他被矇蔽了。那麼我會怎麼選擇呢？謹慎些的話，我會傾向於堅持我熟悉的刀山。但是如果冒險投身火海，我很可能會過得更好。