"殭屍銀行"成歐洲最新經濟刺激行動中的定時炸彈

The European Central Bank has pointed its economic bazooka in the wrong direction.

歐洲央行（European Central Bank）的經濟復甦火力瞄錯了方向。

The ECB announced a series of economic stimulus measures on Thursday designed to induce banks to put more of their cash to work. But policies intended to “force” banks to lend rarely, if ever, work, especially if those banks are barely solvent. Europe needs to get real about its so-called “zombie bank” problem and take the hits needed to unclog its lending machine. Throwing more grease on the problem won’t loosen up the gears — it’s probably more likely to start a grease fire.

上週四，歐洲央行發佈了一系列經濟刺激政策，旨在誘使銀行將更多的現金運作起來。但意圖“迫使”銀行放貸的政策就算能奏效，也很罕見，特別是在這些銀行缺乏償付能力的情況下。歐洲需要認真對待所謂的“殭屍銀行”問題，同時承受因爲疏通貸款機器而帶來的衝擊。在這個問題上抹更多的潤滑油不會讓這些齒輪鬆快起來，反而更有可能因潤滑油氾濫引發火災。

Mario Draghi, the head of the ECB, famously promised two years ago that he’d do “whatever it takes” to save the euro. That statement was so powerful it effectively ended a two-year crisis of confidence that had infected the eurozone sovereign debt market. Overnight, sovereign bond yields fell as investors and banks poured back into the market.

歐洲央行行長馬里奧o德拉吉兩年前就曾信誓旦旦地表示，他將“採取一些手段”來拯救歐元。這項聲明擲地有聲，有效終結了危及歐元區主權債市場的兩年信心危機。一夜之間，主權債收益率下跌，投資者和銀行都涌向這一市場。

Draghi did exactly what he set out to do. He did this by basically making it free for local banks to borrow cash from the central bank–provided that the banks, mostly those in Spain and Italy, use those funds to buy up sovereign debt. In effect, Draghi used the banks as a pass-through vehicle to stabilize the eurozone debt market.

德拉吉的的確確做到了他承諾的事情。他的做法基本上是隻要當地銀行（主要是西班牙和意大利銀行）能將相關資金用於購買主權債，歐洲央行就能爲這些銀行免費提供現金。實際上，德拉吉將這些銀行作爲渠道以穩定歐元區債券市場。

Two years on, the euro is still standing. Unfortunately, the eurozone economy remains down in the dumps. With the euro saved and stable, Draghi has now set his sights on boosting the zone’s anemic economic growth rate.

兩年過去了，歐元仍屹立不倒。不幸的是，歐元區經濟仍一團糟。鑑於歐元得到拯救並保持穩定，現在德拉吉把他的目光投向如何提升歐元區乏力的經濟增長。

For the record, deflation isn’t the disease here–it’s just a symptom. The goal is to stimulate the economy, not to fight deflation.

必須申明的一點是，通縮並不是疾病本身，它只是一個症狀。目標是刺激經濟，而不是對抗通縮。

Draghi is attempting to do this by once again using the banks as a pass-through to achieve his goals. But instead of forcing the banks to buy and hold dodgy sovereign bonds, he will now force them to lend to the private sector.

德拉吉正準備再次利用這些銀行作爲渠道實現他的目標。但不是迫使銀行購買、持有劣質主權債，他將迫使它們向私營企業放貸。

He is doing this in two ways. The first, which has received way too much attention in the media, is to charge the banks a fee to park their excess reserves with the central bank. That’s what’s meant by a “negative” deposit rate. By doing this, Draghi hopes that the banks would take all their excess cash that they normally park at the central bank and lend it out to businesses. But this assumes that businesses are having a hard time getting loans (for which there is little evidence) and that the banks won’t just take their reserves out of the ECB and put them in their vaults to avoid a fee.

他會通過兩種方式來達到這個目的。第一種方式已獲得媒體非常非常多的關注，是對銀行向歐洲央行繳存的超額準備金收取費用，這也就是“負”存款利率的含義。德拉吉希望通過這麼做，銀行能將它們通常繳存在歐洲央行的全部超額現金取出來，貸給企業。但這麼做的前提是假定企業難以獲得貸款（幾乎沒有證據證明這一點），而且這些銀行爲避免產生費用，不會將超額準備金從歐洲央行取出後轉而放進自己的金庫。

This policy isn’t as unprecedented as some believe. Indeed, Denmark did it a couple years ago in an attempt to stimulate growth. It recently reversed that policy in April because it didn’t work. It still costs something ridiculous like $3 or $4 to buy a bottle of water in Copenhagen. Danish exports still don’t have a chance.

這項政策並不像一些人認爲的那樣沒有先例。實際上，丹麥幾年前在嘗試刺激經濟增長的時候就曾經這麼幹過。這個國家最近在4月份推翻了這項政策，因爲它不起作用。成本仍然高得離譜，在哥本哈根買一瓶水要3美元或4美元。丹麥出口仍然沒有機會。

Few are talking about the second, more troubling measure announced by the ECB on Thursday. The central bank will attempt to link proportionally all the free money the ECB has been lending to the banks, plus some more with a new acronym, to how much the banks lend out to the public. The more money banks lend, the more cash they get from the ECB.

而對於歐洲央行上週四宣佈的第二種更麻煩的方式，鮮有人討論。歐洲央行將嘗試把它借給這些銀行的免費資金以及類似資金與這些銀行放貸給公衆的金額掛鉤。這些銀行放貸數額越多，它們從歐洲央行獲得的現金就越多。

But by placing conditions on that money, the ECB could effectively deny much-needed capital to banks in need. These so-called “zombie” banks are the ones that lost tons of money during the financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis and are alive today because of the lending life support they have received from the ECB.

但通過對這些錢設定條件，歐洲央行實際上可以拒絕這些銀行急需的資本。這些所謂的“殭屍”銀行在金融危機和主權債務危機中損失了大量的錢，如今隨着它們從歐洲央行獲得貸款支持，它們又活了過來。

This new policy risks upsetting that balance and would expose the weak banks in the system based on lending capacity. Those banks that, for whatever reason, aren’t lending could be identified as zombies. Investors could then end up running away from these banks in horror, exacerbating the capital shortfall at these half-dead banks.

這個新政策的風險在於，它可能打破平衡，按放貸能力將系統中的弱勢銀行暴露在風險之中。無論什麼原因，不進行放貸的那些銀行被視爲“殭屍”。投資者最終將驚恐地逃離這些銀行，加劇這些半死不活的銀行存在的資本短缺問題。

So in instituting this policy, Draghi is betting that eurozone banks are now strong enough to keep an adequate amount of capital on hand to meet the required 10% eurozone bank capital minimum; continue buying sovereign bonds to prop up the euro; cover the losses associated with the various busted investing bubbles still haunting the continent; lend out just enough capital to “stimulate” growth; and make enough profit to make it all worthwhile.

因此，德拉吉在制訂這項政策時認定，歐元區銀行手頭有充足的資本，能滿足歐元區銀行10%的最低資本金要求；能繼續購買主權債以支撐歐元；能彌補仍然困擾着歐洲的各種投資泡沫破裂所產生的損失；有足夠的資本進行放貸以“刺激”經濟增長；能賺取足夠的利潤使之值得嘗試。

Are European banks ready for this?

歐洲銀行爲這些做好準備了嗎？

Some are, but many are not. They still have billions of euros in unrecognized losses sucking up all their capital. That’s the real reason why banks aren’t lending — they can’t. Trying to force them to do so by creating disincentives doesn’t seem like it is going to do much. If anything, it could backfire as it would expose the zombies. Nothing kills confidence like a rash of bank failures.

有些銀行準備好了，但很多銀行並沒有。它們仍舊有數十億歐元的未確認損失在蠶食它們的資本金。這是銀行不進行放貸的真實原因——它們沒法放貸。試圖通過設置阻礙迫使它們這麼做，看來不會起多大作用。如果有什麼作用的話，可能也事與願違，因爲這會暴露這些殭屍銀行。沒有比銀行紛紛倒閉更能打擊市場信心的事了。

It is doubtful the ECB will stand by and watch banks collapse; it can pull these policies at any time. But all this highlights just how difficult it has become to get Europe back on the road to real economic recovery.

歐洲央行是否會袖手旁觀，看着這些銀行倒閉，這一點令人懷疑；歐洲央行隨時可以收回這些政策。但所有這些都凸顯了，讓歐洲走回經濟真正復甦的正軌有多麼困難。

If the ECB really wants to get the economy going, it needs to start from the bottom and build its way back up. The first step would be to recapitalize its zombie banks. Lending cash to these institutions on a short-term basis just isn’t cutting it–they need equity. That means allowing the banks to actually recognize the losses they have carried for years so that they can raise equity on the open markets. Whatever capital the banks can’t raise in the open markets, they could receive from the ECB or some national government, perhaps Germany (it doesn’t matter).

如果歐洲央行真的想讓歐洲經濟繼續發展，它應當從下而上，逐步實施。第一步是殭屍銀行資本重整。向這些機構短期借貸現金並不解決問題——它們需要股本。這意味着這些銀行實際上切實承認它們多年來承擔的損失，以便能在公開市場籌集股本。它們不能在公開市場上籌集的資本，不論是多少，都可以從歐洲央行或一些國家政府獲得，也許是德國（無所謂）。

This isn’t economic rocket science. It’s what the U.S. government did with its banks following the credit crisis. This policy (TARP) successfully reset the banks back to zero, giving them time to lick their wounds and organically start lending again. Eventually, the government sold their stakes in the banks back to the public (mostly at a profit), but it took several years to get there–but they got there. Now the U.S. has a growth rate that is three times greater than that of the eurozone.

這並不是什麼經濟火箭科學。這就是美國政府在信貸危機之後爲美國的銀行系統所做的事情。這項問題資產救助計劃（TARP）最終成功地讓銀行回到了起點，讓它們有時間癒合傷口，並從內部開始再次進行放貸。最終，美國政府將手頭持有的銀行股份賣給公衆（且大多盈利）。雖然需要幾年的時間來實現，但它們最終還是實現了。如今，美國的經濟增長率是歐元區經濟增長率的4倍。

In Draghi’s defense, it would be difficult to implement such a plan without some sort of banking union, something European politicians have been dragging their feet on for nearly two years. Unfortunately, politicians seldom act unless there is a crisis. The ECB’s new lending plan might just give them the crisis they need to get in gear.

但我們在這裏也要爲德拉吉說幾句。在欠缺某種銀行聯盟的情況下要實施這樣的計劃很困難，歐洲政界一些人近兩年來一直在拖後腿。不幸的是，除非出現危機，政客們很少會採取行動。歐洲央行的新放貸計劃可能給了他們採取行動所需要的一個危機契機。