高科技企業的財務粉刷術

How much did LinkedIn make over the past three years? Sounds a simple enough question doesn’t it? But it is also one that is capable of being answered in multiple and very diverse ways.

過去三年領英(LinkedIn)賺了多少錢？這問題聽起來夠簡單，不是麼？然而，這也是個能以多種極其不同的方式回答的問題。

First, let’s look at the figure the US online networking site wants you to focus on. That’s a mouthful called adjusted earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation (ebitda), and the total there between 2013 and 2015 came in at a positive $1.7bn.

首先，讓我們看看這家美國在線人脈網站希望你關注的數據。那是一個極其繞口的詞：息稅折舊及攤銷前利潤(Ebitda)，2013年至2015年期間該數據的總額爲17億美元。

Sounds pretty hunky dory? Well, now check out the operating profit line for the business — the one calculated according to the generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) that companies must present but often don’t emphasise. Over the same period, LinkedIn racked up a $67m loss.

聽起來相當不錯？那麼，再看看該企業的營運利潤這一欄。這一數字是根據美國公認會計原則(GAAP)計算得出的，企業必須提供這一數字，但往往不會強調它。在同一時期內，領英累計錄得6700萬美元虧損。

What explains the yawning $1.8bn difference between those two figures? It isn’t simply the depreciation and amortisation charges the company took against the value of its assets. Those, while pretty hefty, came to just $791m. No, the biggest single reason for the negative swing was the $1bn cost of the stock LinkedIn stuffed into its employees’ pay packets over those three years.

兩個數字間18億美元的巨大差異該如何解釋？其原因不能簡單地認爲是該公司對其資產價值的折舊和攤銷所導致的。這兩項雖然也很高，但總共才7.91億美元。該數據負面波動的最大原因，是那三年裏領英塞到其員工工資袋裏的股票所導致的10億美元成本。

LinkedIn is just one of a number of US tech companies that airbrush out such payments when presenting results to investors. It is part of a broader trend that has seen companies strain to put the best possible spin on their numbers, excluding inconvenient non-cash or supposedly non recurring items they claim obscure rather than elucidate the underlying performance of the business.

領英只是向投資者陳述財報時掩飾這類成本的衆多美國高科技企業之一。此舉是更大範圍趨勢的一部分：企業以儘可能積極的方式呈現業績，剔除不方便的非現金項目或非經常性項目，聲稱這類項目模糊而不是說明根本的業務表現。

Mark Mahaney, an analyst at RBC Capital Markets, recently outed some of the large-cap tech groups that are the biggest payers of stock to their employees. Number one on the list was Twitter. Over the past two years the messaging platform has on average issued shares to employees with a value equivalent to 124 per cent of operating income.

最近，加拿大皇家銀行資本市場(RBC Capital Markets)分析師馬克•馬哈尼(Mark Mahaney)揭露了向員工支付股票規模最大的一些高市值高科技集團。名單上排在第一位的是Twitter。過去兩年，這個即時消息平臺向員工發行的股票價值平均相當於營業利潤的1.24倍。

Not that you would know this when looking at the company’s earnings releases. In its recently announced first-quarter figures, Twitter reported pro forma earnings of 15 cents a share. It is only when you dig out the GAAP number the company also supplies, but does not emphasise, that the uglier reality becomes apparent: it actually lost 12 cents a share.

查看該公司發佈的財報時，你是找不到這個事實的。在最近發佈的第一季度財報數據中，Twitter報出備考盈利每股15美分。只有當你挖掘出該公司同時提供、卻不強調的GAAP數據後，更醜陋的現實才會浮出水面：該公司實際上每股虧損12美分。

It may seem odd that companies are still engaging in this less-than-innocent deception. After all, it is hard to find a convincing argument for excluding stock compensation from earnings.

企業仍在搞這種不夠厚道的欺騙手段，似乎有點不可思議。畢竟，對於把股票報酬排除在盈利數據以外的做法，很難找到有說服力的理由。

While no cash may change hands when a company issues equity to its employees, the firm denies itself the chance to sell those shares or options for value in the market. Failing to recognise that forgone cash effectively understates the cost the company has incurred in employing those individuals. That’s not only imprudent, it makes it harder to compare that business with other firms that take a more sensible approach.

儘管當企業向員工發行股份時不會有現金上的交易，但企業這麼做就失去了自己在市場上出售這些股份或期權以兌現價值的可能性。未能承認這些被放棄的現金，實際上低估了企業僱用這些人的成本。這麼做不僅僅是不夠謹慎，還令人更難將該公司與其他採取更明智做法的公司進行比較。

Tech companies are not the only offenders, of course, and stock compensation isn’t the only cost that magically vanishes when companies present non-GAAP figures. Indeed, the practice is mushrooming. According to the Analyst’s Accounting Observer, 90 per cent of the constituents in the Standard & Poor’s 500 index produced non-GAAP figures last year, up from 72 per cent in 2009.

當然，高科技企業並不是唯一這麼做的企業，股票報酬也不是企業提供非GAAP數據時唯一魔術般消失的成本。的確，這類做法如雨後春筍般層出不窮。據《分析師會計觀察》(Analyst's Accounting Observer)介紹，標普500(S&P 500)指數90%的成分股公司去年報出的數據不符合美國公認會計准則，高於2009年的72%。

All sorts of costs are being vaporised as companies present their results with increasing creativity. They range from such items as preferred dividends and even severance payments to the legal and restructuring costs that Valeant, an acquisitive pharmaceutical company, notoriously deducted from its expense lines.

隨着企業以越來越高的“創造性”展示其業績，各種各樣的成本蒸發了。這些成本從優先股息和遣散費，到法律和重組成本——收購意識較強的製藥公司Valeant就以從開支中移除法律和重組成本而留下壞名聲。

Inevitably, non-GAAP figures are diverging ever further from accounting reality. In a study of 380 S&P 500 companies, the Analyst’s Accounting Observer calculated that their “adjusted” net income rose 6.6 per cent to $804bn last year. It sounds great until you discover that under GAAP precisely the opposite was happening. Net income at those same companies actually declined almost 11 per cent to $562bn — a full 30 per cent less.

不可避免的是，非GAAP數據與會計現實漸行漸遠。在對380家標普500成分股企業的研究中，《分析師會計觀察》計算得出，去年它們“調整後”的淨利潤增長了6.6%，達到8040億美元。這個數字聽起來相當好，然而按照GAAP原則計算一下，你會發現情況恰恰相反。同一批企業的淨利潤其實下滑了近11%，至5620億美元——足足少了30%。

Obsessed by top-line growth, shareholders seem happy to acquiesce in these practices. In the meantime, most analysts have loyally focused on adjusted numbers, perhaps feeling under pressure from company bosses to play along.

糾結於頂線增長的股東，似乎樂於默許這類行爲。與此同時，多數分析師忠實地關注調整後的數字，也許是因爲他們受到了來自企業老闆的壓力，要求他們配合。

But these acts of self-deception carry real risks for investors. For instance, excluding the cost of stock grants can lead to inflated executive pay levels. There is also the problem of what happens when the share price falters. Then, to avoid losing its valuable employees, the company may have the unpalatable choice of either diluting investors further — or switching suddenly to cash compensation that it may struggle to afford.

然而，這種自我欺騙的行爲給投資者帶來真切的風險。比如，將授予股份的成本排除在外，可能會導致虛高的高管薪資水平。此外，股價下跌時也會出現問題。到那時候，爲避免有價值的員工流失，企業也許會面臨一個不愉快的選擇：要麼進一步稀釋投資者，要麼突然轉而採取它也許難以承擔的現金薪酬。

While keeping it real may make for a less inspiring income statement, it does at least proof figures against this sort of unpleasant eventuality. For now investors may be content to play along with companies’ accounting fantasies. Sooner or later, however, it is an indulgence they will come to regret.

儘管老實的會計方法也許帶來不那麼鼓舞人心的報表，但它至少能讓數字如實反映情況，免遭上述不愉快結局。眼下投資者也許會滿足於附和企業的會計幻想。然而，他們遲早會爲這種縱容後悔。