中國應如何與市場對話 China needs to learn how to talk to markets

The Chinese leadership is discovering that financial markets have a tendency to punish governments for doing the right thing at the wrong time. And it is not the only one dealing with the repercussions. The consequences are being felt around the world.

中國領導層正在發現，金融市場往往會懲罰在錯誤時間做正確事情的政府。而中國並非唯一一個受其影響的國家。全世界都感受到了後果。

Just a few weeks ago, Beijing moved to make its exchange rate setting mechanism more flexible. This decision — which had been advocated to Chinese officials for years by economists and US governments — is an important step in the country’s multi-decade journey towards a truly market-based system. And, as such a large economy on the global stage, it is consistent with the country gradually assuming more of its multilateral economic governance responsibilities.

就在幾周前，中國政府採取行動以使其匯率形成機制變得更加靈活。這一決定（經濟學家們以及美國政府多年來一直主張中國官員這樣做）是中國數十年來走向真正市場化機制進程中的重要一步。而且，作爲全球舞臺上如此巨大的經濟體，中國這樣做與逐步承擔更多的多邊經濟治理責任相一致。

From many dimensions, this was a good policy step. The problem is that it was implemented at the wrong time.

從許多方面來說，這是一項不錯的政策措施。但問題在於它是在錯誤的時間實施的。

Delayed and then announced in the context of mounting evidence that China is in the midst of a significant economic slowdown, it resulted in an immediate depreciation of the renminbi. As such, rather than being viewed as an important part of beneficial medium-term economic reform, it was deemed by many as China’s attempt to “steal” growth from other countries — thereby contributing to global financial instability as markets rushed to price in the probability of a larger deceleration of the global economy.

之前一直拖延、而後又在越來越多的證據表明中國經濟正處於顯著放緩時宣佈這一決定，其結果是人民幣隨即貶值。如此一來，這一舉措不但未被看作是有益的中期經濟改革的重要部分，還被許多人視爲中國試圖從其他國家“竊取”增長——從而導致了全球金融不穩定，因爲市場急於在價格中反映全球經濟更大範圍減速的可能性。

It only took a few days for disruptive markets to force the government to intervene in the foreign exchange market, rather than be less involved. As the global financial disorder persisted, it then felt obliged to supplement this with a series of monetary stimulus measures, including an interest-rate cut, lower reserve requirement and direct liquidity injections.

混亂的市場只用了幾天時間就迫使中國政府幹預外匯市場（而非更少地介入）。隨着全球金融混亂持續不斷，中國政府還感到有必要輔以一系列貨幣刺激措施——包括降息、降准以及直接注入流動性。

There is a risk that a similar phenomenon could play out following reports that the government may pare down its involvement in the stock market.

中國政府可能會減少干預股市的報道出現後，類似的一幕有可能還會上演。

Recognising that it cannot (and should not) be in the business of supporting overvalued stocks, there are reports that Beijing is considering moving away from its policy of large-scale market purchases. This is the right thing to do. But, once again, if the government is not careful, a step consistent with medium-term reform could well come at the wrong time; and, this time around, it is regrettably accompanied by the shaming of those raising doubts about current market valuations.

有報道稱，在認識到自身無法（也不應該）支撐估值過高的股價之後，中國政府正在考慮退出大規模購股政策。這是正確的做法。但是，如果中國政府不謹慎行事的話，一項與中期改革一致的措施很有可能再次出現在錯誤的時間；而遺憾的是，這次還要伴隨着那些對當前股市估值提出質疑人士的羞辱。

Markets in China and elsewhere are still in the process of trying to regain their footing after a week of unprecedented volatility. In such circumstances, market-savvy policymakers would allow the dust to settle further before doing something that could destabilise still-anxious investor sentiment.

經過一週空前的震盪後，中國及其他地區的股市仍處於努力重新站穩腳跟的階段。在這種情況下，洞悉市場的政策制定者在採取一些可能讓仍然焦慮的投資者情緒更加不穩定的措施前，應該繼續等待塵埃落定。

This phenomenon, of taking the right policy step at the wrong time from a markets perspective, is not limited to China. The US Federal Reserve has experienced it several times, including when it triggered a “taper tantrum” in May-June 2013: the sudden announcement that it intended to ease — or taper — monetary stimulus that threw global markets in a dizzy for a few weeks, and that forced the Fed to talk back its statement.

這種現象——從市場的角度看，在錯誤時間採取正確的政策措施——並不只發生在中國。美聯儲(Fed)已經歷過多次，包括在2013年5月至6月間引發的一場“縮減恐慌”(taper tantrum)：美聯儲突然宣佈打算放緩（或縮減）貨幣刺激，引發全球市場幾個周的動盪，並迫使美聯儲收回了自己的聲明。

As it engages further on the road of economic liberalisation and broader market-based reforms, China will learn something that other countries have done so painfully, be it elsewhere in the emerging world (Brazil or South Korea, for example) or in the advanced world. It has no choice but to be a lot more sensitive to short-term market positioning, including the potential for sudden portfolio reversals that then risk spilling back on to the real economy and undermining the effectiveness of policies.

隨着在經濟自由化和更廣泛市場化改革的道路上進一步深入，中國將學到一些其他國家——無論是其他新興市場國家（如巴西和韓國）還是發達國家——已有過的慘痛教訓。中國別無選擇，只能對短期市場資源配置更加敏感，包括投資組合突然反轉、隨後風險蔓延至實體經濟並削弱政策有效性的可能性。

Such sensitivity will need to be accompanied by much better communication, as well as more sophisticated management of market expectations (and this does not include the intimidation of sellers and the public shaming of financial journalists). Otherwise, the credibility of the Chinese government itself, including its history of admirable policymaking and vision, would be repeatedly tested by disgruntled and unstable financial markets; and, were this to materialise, the repercussions would inevitably be felt by financial markets in the rest of the world.

這樣的敏感需要伴隨更好的溝通，以及更成熟的市場預期管理（而這不包括對賣方的恐嚇以及對財經記者的公開羞辱）。否則，中國政府自身的公信力——包括其令人欽佩的決策和願景構想歷史——將受到滿腹牢騷的不穩定金融市場的反覆考驗；而如果真是這樣的話，影響將不可避免地波及到世界其他地區的金融市場。

Mohamed is chief economic adviser to Allianz, chairman of President Barack Obama’s Global Development Council, and author of When Markets Collide

本文作者是安聯集團(Allianz)首席經濟顧問，並擔任美國總統巴拉克攠巴馬(Barack Obama)的全球發展委員會(Global Development Council)的主席，並著有《當市場發生衝撞》(When Markets Collide)一書。