如何應對移民帶來的兩難 How to deal with the dilemmas over migrants

The recent images of refugees literally struggling over fences to get into Europe make for a powerful reminder, if it were needed, of the scale of the movement of people around the world. The latest official figures for world migration date show a clear step up in the proportion of the global population on the move. It rose from around 2.5 per cent of the total for the decades 1960-1990, to 3.2 per cent in 2013 — and the absolute number had reached 231.5m. For the attractive destination countries, the share of the total population consisting of those of foreign birth has reached much higher proportions (15.9 per cent in Sweden, 14.3 per cent in the US, 12.4 per cent in the UK and 11.9 per cent in Germany, on theinternationally comparable UN figures).

最近那些難民掙扎着翻越隔離圍欄、涌入歐洲的照片有力地提醒了我們全世界人口流動規模之巨大（如果這種提醒有必要的話）。最新的全球移民官方數據顯示出，全球人口中流動人口比例出現明顯上升。這一比例從1960年至1990年數十年間的2.5%左右上升至2013年的3.2%，而且流動人口絕對人數已增至2.315億。對於有吸引力的目的地國家來說，總人口構成中出生於外國的人口比例已遠高於以前（根據具有國際可比性的聯合國數據：瑞典爲15.9%、美國14.3%、英國12.4%、德國11.9%）。

Large-scale migration is nothing new. The late 19th and early 20th century saw huge movements from the Old World to the New. Before that, African slavery transformed the populations of the Caribbean and US. Taking into account movements within Asia, too (for example from northeastern China to Manchuria and Japan), the global total peaked in the 1920s. Post-war turmoil in Europe and Asia alike brought further large movements of people hoping to build new lives in new places.

大規模移民並不是什麼新鮮事。19世紀末20世紀初，大量人口從“舊世界”遷徙到“新世界”。在那之前，來自非洲的奴隸改變了加勒比海地區及美國的人口構成。再加上亞洲範圍內的人口遷徙（比如從中國東北到日本），全球流動人口總數在上世紀20年代達到了峯值。一戰後歐洲及亞洲的動盪局勢同樣帶來了更大規模的人口流動，人們希望在新的地方開始新的生活。

Equally, though, there is nothing new about the political and cultural tensions these migrations bring. Assimilation takes (at least) a generation, for obvious reasons. Residents dislike some of the consequences if they are directly affected by immigrant arrivals, or fear them, if they are not — polling evidence shows stronger support for anti-immigration politicians in areas where there are the fewest immigrants.

然而，同樣不新奇的是這些移民帶來的政治、文化上的緊張關係。因爲顯而易見的各種原因，實現同化（至少）需要一代人時間。如果本地居民直接受到了外來移民的影響、或者沒有受到影響但害怕後者，他們不會歡迎移民的到來——民調證據顯示，在外來移民最少的地區，居民對反對移民的政客表現出更大的支持。

This is creating an acute policy dilemma, reportedly played out in the UK in the shape of a row between ministers. The political imperative is to limit or reduce the number of inward migrants; the economic imperative is to do the opposite. The economic consequences of large-scale immigration will always depend on the context, but the recent evidence for the UK is that the large inflows have had little adverse labour market effect on existing residents. The country’s employment rate is high, and it was only during the recession that there were signs of downward pressure on the wages of people on low pay.

這正在造成一種嚴峻的政策兩難，據報道這一幕正在英國上演，表現爲各部大臣之間的爭吵。政治上要做的是限制或減少外來移民的數量；經濟上則相反。大規模移民的經濟後果通常取決於環境，但對英國來說，最新的證據是，移民大量流入幾乎未對本地居民在勞動力市場造成不利影響。英國就業率高，而且只有在經濟衰退期間，纔會出現對低收入人羣工資產生下行壓力的跡象。

This might seem surprising until you realise that the recent immigrants have skills that are complementary to the workforce in situ, rather than competing with it. This is a characteristic encouraged by the points-based migration policy; the independent Migration Advisory Committee (on which I served for five years) updated its skills shortage list earlier this year. Immigrants here have tended to be younger on average than the existing (ageing) population, net contributors to the public finances; and many are skilled workers. And, after all, it is probably the most dynamic and determined who go through the upheaval of moving to a new country.

這或許令你感到驚訝，直到你意識到，近期的移民擁有與本地勞動力互補、而非競爭的技能。這正是基於積分的移民政策的特點；我曾供職過5年的獨立諮詢機構——移民諮詢委員會(Migration Advisory Committee)今年早些時候更新了短缺技能清單。外來移民平均而言往往比現有（老齡化）的人口更年輕，是公共財政的淨貢獻者；而且，許多都是有技能的工人。畢竟，經歷過遷移到一個新國家的劇變的人，可能是最有幹勁和決心的人。

So immigration has had, if anything, a positive impact on the aggregate UK economy. No country can be a global leader in any market if it cannot bring in a global workforce. The City’s banks and professional services firms, the multinationals, the software companies, the creative industries — all the high value growth sectors of the economy — need that raw material of a diverse and international workforce. Higher education needs foreign students, who subsidise UK undergraduates. The public sector needs nurses and nursery assistants and carers and cleaners from eastern and southern Europe because cost pressures mean it does not increase wages to attract residents from, say, accountancy or PR.

因此，如果移民對英國整體經濟有什麼影響的話，也是積極影響。如果不能引入全球勞動力的話，沒有國家能在任何市場領域成爲全球領導者。倫敦金融城的銀行與專業服務公司、跨國公司、軟件公司以及創意產業——經濟中所有的高價值增長領域——需要多樣化、國際化的勞動力供應。高等教育需要外國留學生，後者所交學費可以補貼英國大學本科生。公共部門需要來自東歐、南歐的護士、託兒所助手、護工及清潔工，因爲成本壓力意味着不可能利用提高工資來吸引（比如說）從事會計或公關工作的居民從事此類工作。

So what can politicians do to deal with the conflicting pressures?

那麼，政客們該如何做才能應對這些相互衝突的壓力呢？

One step — simple to an economist, harder for politicians who dread “U-turns” — would be not to shoot yourself in the foot with an unattainable target. The UK government’s “net migration in the tens of thousands” target was obviously always unattainable. It is a very bad idea to target the difference between two large numbers neither of which you can control. The structure of the target is causing stupid decisions such as preventing foreign students from working in the UK for a limited period after graduation. Targets should at least in principle be controllable and meaningful, so in the UK context that means aimed at non-EU inward migration for economic reasons.

第一步——對經濟學家來說簡單，但對害怕“180度大轉彎”的政客們來說難一些——是不要用無法實現的目標砸自己的腳。英國政府“數萬淨移民”的目標顯然是永遠無法實現的。爲兩個你無法控制的大數字的差額設定目標是一個非常糟糕的主意。這一目標的結構正導致愚蠢的決定，如阻止外國留學生畢業後在英國工作一段有限的時間。目標至少應該在原則上是可控的、有意義的，所以，對英國來說，這意味着從經濟原因出發制定針對非歐盟外來移民的目標。

A second kind of measure addresses the economic drivers. The public sector itself could play a large role here by reducing its reliance on cheap labour, often arising indirectly through budget pressures on local authority spending on old age care or NHS spending on nurses. Pay and employment conditions will have to improve otherwise the demand for new immigrants to fill these jobs dependent on public spending will only grow.

第二類措施需要解決經濟驅動力問題。在這方面，公共部門本身可以通過降低對廉價勞動力的依賴發揮很大的作用，這種依賴往往間接地產生於地方當局養老支出、或者國民衛生服務體系(NHS)護士薪水支出方面的預算壓力。工資及僱傭條件必須得到改善，否則，對於用新移民填補這些依賴公共支出的職位的需求只會不斷增加。

It is also important to deal with the adverse consequences of immigration outside the labour market, which manifest themselves in higher demand for public services and housing. Rents go up, GP surgeries are crowded with people speaking foreign languages, buses are packed full at rush hour. Although immigrants here are net financial contributors, paying more in taxes than they receive in benefits and services, that net contribution is not going into the services they use. This is a consequence of the UK’s highly centralised fiscal politics. If the government would devolve enough tax raising and spending power to local authorities, the pressures could be more easily addressed. Let the places where the immigrant settle charge a small local sales tax or keep local property tax revenue, and spend it on schools, housebuilding, transport and the health and social care budget in their area.

同樣重要的是要應對移民在勞動力市場之外造成的不良後果，主要表現在提升了對公共服務和住房的需求。租金上漲，全科醫生診所擠滿了操着外語的患者，高峯時間公交車裏人滿爲患。雖然來到英國的移民是財政淨貢獻者——納稅額比得到的福利和服務要多，但淨貢獻不會進入到他們享受的服務之中。這是英國高度集中的財政政治的結果。如果英國政府能將足夠的徵稅和支出的權力下放到地方當局，就可以更容易地緩解這些壓力。讓移民定居的地方當局徵收少量的地方消費稅或者保留當地的房地產稅收收入，並用於這些地區的學校、住房建設、交通、醫療和社會福利預算。

None of these would make the migration flows that the world and the UK are experiencing easy to deal with but they would make the dilemmas far less acute.

這些措施都不可能讓全球及英國正在經歷的移民流動更加易於應對，但會顯著緩和兩難局面的尖銳性。