FT社評 希臘須與歐盟合作

Syriza is as radical as any party to take power within the eurozone. Hardly any of Greece’s new cabinet have experience of government; predictably, its first week was studded with chaotic interventions, including a clumsy blunder into EU-Russian relations.

希臘激進左翼聯盟(Syriza)與歐元區任何掌權的政黨一樣激進。希臘新內閣成員幾乎都沒有政府治理的經驗；不出所料，其執政第一週就滿是混亂的干預措施，包括稀裏糊塗地闖入俄歐關係問題之中。

Syriza’s rhetoric is still more suited to a university seminar than a serious programme of government.

希臘激進左翼聯盟的說辭依舊更適合一場大學研討會，而非一項嚴肅的政府計劃。

To some on Europe’s northern fringe, just to meet Syriza is to crumble before blackmail. If you believe half of his past rhetoric, its leader Alexis Tsipras plans to dance wildly on the crumbling edge of the eurozone, to scare its thriftier members into accepting his demands. These would include debt repudiation, the unravelling of structural reforms, and rehiring thousands more civil servants. On this account Syriza would return Greece to the failed clientelism of the past and embolden anti-austerity parties everywhere.

對於歐洲北部邊緣的一些國家來說，滿足希臘激進左翼聯盟就等於在勒索麪前屈服。如果你對該黨領導人亞歷克西斯•齊普拉斯(Alexis Tsipras)過去說的話將信將疑，那麼他現在的計劃是在搖搖欲墜的歐元區邊緣瘋狂亂舞，以恐嚇歐元區較節儉的成員國接受他的要求。這些要求將包括拒付債務、放棄結構性改革，以及重新增加數千名公務員。以此，希臘激進左翼聯盟將使希臘回到過去失敗了的裙帶主義，並鼓舞各地反緊縮的政黨。

Many EU leaders would rather take their chances with “Grexit” than cave in to threats, even if this risked a deeper eurozone recession. But as Yanis Varoufakis tours European capitals to win support for a new deal, Greece’s finance minister deserves a full and even sympathetic hearing.

許多歐盟國家領導人寧願在希臘退出歐元區問題上碰碰運氣，也不願對威脅屈服，即使這樣做面臨加劇歐元區衰退的風險。但隨着亞尼斯•瓦魯法基斯(Yanis Varoufakis)訪問歐洲各國以便贏得對新協議的支持，這位希臘財長值得我們全面甚至抱以同情地去傾聽。

Syriza’s ascent to power highlights the reality that although the debate about Greece is couched in highly technocratic language, it is in essence thoroughly political. Most Greek debts are owed to other EU states. It is their governments that would carry the consequences of Greece defaulting or leaving the eurozone. This provides the best rationale for Mr Varoufakis’ refusal to deal with the “troika” of the European Central Bank, European Commission and IMF, and instead talk directly to national politicians.

希臘激進左翼聯盟的掌權凸顯了當前現實，儘管圍繞希臘的辯論都是高度的技術官僚語言，但它本質上完全是政治性的。希臘大多數債務都是欠其他歐盟國家的。這些國家的政府將承擔希臘違約或者退出歐元區的後果。這爲瓦魯法基斯拒絕與“三駕馬車”(troika)——歐洲央行(ECB)、歐盟委員會(European Commission)以及國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)——打交道，而與各國領導人直接磋商供了最好的理由。

He may also be right to query the technical expertise of the troika. The IMF has already admitted to having been too optimistic about Greek growth. More debt should have been restructured. The impressive progress made towards cutting Greece’s fiscal and trade deficits is mostly an automatic consequence of the collapse in domestic demand and living standards that brought Syriza to power.

他對三駕馬車專業技術的質疑或許也是對的。IMF已經承認，之前對希臘經濟增長過於樂觀。本該已對更多的債務進行重組。希臘在削減財政和貿易赤字上取得的明顯進展，基本上是國內需求崩潰和生活水平下降的自然結果——而正是內需和生活水平的下降致使希臘激進左翼聯盟上臺。

Moreover, what merit there may be in the troika’s emphasis on “structural reform” has proven patchy in implementation. Greece certainly has too many over-regulated industries and outdated practices, and a long tradition of overmanning the public sector. It was right to assume that Greek governments would need external impetus to change, and its creditors are quite entitled to resist the reversal of reform that Syriza has called for.

此外，三駕馬車所強調的“結構性改革”的優點在實施中已被證明差強人意。希臘的確有太多過度監管的行業和過時的做法，以及公共部門人員冗餘的長期傳統。這樣的假設是正確的：希臘政府需要外部動力推動變革，而其債權人也有權抵制希臘激進左翼聯盟所呼籲的逆向改革。

But what matters more to the reform of the economy is the continuing dominance of an oligarchic class. This includes a banking sector with over 40 per cent of loans non-performing, which drags on the rest of industry. A vigorous recovery may require a thorough banking recapitalisation that converts debt into equity and replaces current management. Under the tutelage of the troika, very little was achieved in confronting the oligarchs, or on tackling endemic tax avoidance. Syriza should be able to make more progress, simply because it has not yet acquired the deep ties with wealthy interests that bind the traditional parties.

但是，對希臘經濟改革影響更大的是寡頭階層持續的統治地位。這包括不良貸款超過40%、並拖累其他行業的銀行業。經濟強勁復甦可能需要一次徹底的銀行資本重組，將債務轉化爲股本並替換現有的管理層。在三駕馬車的指導下，希臘在對付寡頭或解決大範圍避稅方面鮮有成績。希臘激進左翼聯盟應該能有更大的作爲，因爲它尚未與那些將傳統政黨捆綁在一起的富人利益集團結下深厚的關係。

A fresh look at Greece’s predicament argues for co-operation on both sides. There, Syriza needs allies if it is to take on the oligarchs, restructure its banks and develop a modern system of tax collection. Its European partners must recognise that this is not a simple creditor-debtor relationship in which a concession to one side is a loss to the other. At 175 per cent of gross domestic product, Greece’s debt burden is too high for normal repayment and can be worked off only if the country enjoys sustained growth. The EU is massively invested in Greece. Its negotiating stance must make growth the top priority.

重新審視希臘的困境，我們認爲雙方應該合作。在這一點上，希臘激進左翼聯盟需要盟友來對付寡頭、重組銀行並建立現代稅收制度。其歐洲夥伴必須認識到，雙方之間並非一種簡單的債權債務關係——向對方讓步即是自身損失。高達國內生產總值(GDP)的175%的債務負擔使希臘無法正常還款。只有希臘經濟保持持續增長，這些債務纔可能逐漸償清。歐盟國家在希臘有大量投資，它們的談判立場必須將增長放在首位。

This points towards linking debt repayment to Greek GDP. As well as providing Athens with the breathing space needed for reforms to take effect, such instruments explicitly align EU incentives with those in Greece. With a fair wind the creditors may even garner a higher return over the long run.

這指向將償還債務與希臘GDP掛鉤。這些措施除了向雅典方面提供讓改革起作用所需的喘息空間，還可以明確地將歐盟與希臘的積極性協調起來。順利的話，長遠來看債權人甚至可能獲得更高的回報。

Some of Syriza’s other ideas are barmy. The reason EU member states should talk with Messrs Tsipras and Varoufakis is that within its idealistic platform may be enough sensible radicalism to sketch out the outlines of a deal. If Syriza can be helped towards implementing the good parts and shelving the bad, Greece may have a brighter future.

希臘激進左翼聯盟的一些其他想法是愚蠢的。歐盟成員國應該跟齊普拉斯和瓦魯法基斯談判的理由是，在其理想主義的政綱內可能存在足夠的理性激進主義，從而能夠勾勒出一項交易的輪廓。如果希臘激進左翼聯盟能夠在外界的幫助下興利除弊，希臘或會擁有一個更光明的未來。