短線觀點賣空中國面臨變數 China bears may start to feel isolated

It is not easy being a bear on China — at least, not this month. Data, events and even market moves are conspiring to complicate what, just a month ago, looked to be a relatively simple story. And yesterday the most hard-to-fudge part of the “sell China” case, namely rising capital outflows, also confounded forecasts by slowing sharply. Bears may shrug, but they should tread carefully, too.

賣空中國不容易——至少本月不容易。數據、事件甚至市場變動的共同作用，正使得一個月前看起來還相對簡單的故事複雜化。昨天，“賣空中國”理由中最難以矇混過關的部分——資本外流加劇——也證明預測並不準確；中國的資本外流已大幅放緩。賣空人士可能會對此聳聳肩，但他們也應該謹慎行事。

China’s foreign exchange reserves fell by $28.6bn last month, far less than the near-$100bn run-rate of the past few months. The lunar new year holiday in the middle of February will have played a part, but market moves also suggest the country has succeeded in diluting January’s strong “sell China” narrative. The offshore renminbi — considered the gauge of international sentiment — has in the past four weeks spent more time trading more strongly against the dollar than the tightly controlled onshore rate than at any time since last August’s surprise devaluation.

上月，中國的外匯儲備下降了286億美元，遠低於過去幾個月每月近1000億美元的水平。2月中旬的春節假期可能有一定的影響，但市場變動也表明，中國已成功地衝淡了1月強勁的“賣空中國”敘事。相比受到嚴格控制的在岸匯率，被視爲國際情緒風向標的離岸人民幣兌美元匯率，在過去4周裏比自去年8月意外貶值以來的任何時候都更強勢。

Shorting the renminbi is based on the argument that China is running out of liquid reserves with which to combat identifiable and intensifying capital flight. Both parts of that case were also dented at the weekend. The People’s Bank of China asserted that its reported reserves are in fact liquid, in an effort to quell doubts. It may or may not succeed. But few will be able to as easily shrug off research published this week by the Bank for International Settlements that suggested third-quarter outflows last year — that is, immediately after the August brouhaha — were due mostly to companies paying off dollar debt, and to a reduction in offshore deposits, than a scramble for the exits by panicked mainlanders.

做空人民幣的依據是：中國正在耗盡高流動性儲備，後者可用來應對可識別的、不斷加劇的資本外流。上週末，這兩點都遭到了削弱。爲了平息質疑，中國人民銀行(PBoC)斷言，其報告的外匯儲備實際上只包括高流動性資產。此舉可能（也可能不會）成功。但很少有人能同樣輕易地對國際清算銀行(BIS)本週發佈的研究不屑一顧，該研究稱，去年第三季度的資本外流——也就是說，緊隨8月的匯率風波——主要原因在於企業償還美元債務以及境外存款減少，而非驚慌失措的內地人士競相把資金轉移出境。

Selling the renminbi is only one way of expressing negative views on China — and it is not the most popular since the PBoC intervened heavily in January, sharply raising the cost of the trades. China is not likely to do anything if hedge funds instead sell proxies such as the Australian dollar or the South Korean won, as they have been doing. But if China’s reserves are as liquid as it says and the outflows do not return to their previous rate, the bears will have to think more carefully about their base case. What promised to be one of the few big trends of the year — namely selling China — now needs careful watching.

賣出人民幣只是表達對中國負面看法的一種方式，而自1月份中國央行大舉干預、大幅提高此類交易成本以來，這已不再是最受歡迎的方式。如果對衝基金轉而賣出澳元或韓元（正如他們一直在做的），中國不太可能採取任何行動。但是如果中國的外匯儲備像其所稱的那樣具有流動性，而資本外流不再回到此前的水平，那麼賣空者將不得不更慎重思考自己的基本預測。“賣空中國”曾經有望成爲今年爲數不多的大趨勢之一，現在則需要審慎觀察。