華爾街遊說運動 CDS值得重啓

This month, Wall Street is back with a new lobbying campaign. But this latest battle is not about bank capital or bonuses; instead the issue is something that looks almost retro: credit derivatives.

華爾街本月發起了一個新的遊說運動。但這場最新遊說與銀行資本或獎金無關，而是涉及看起來幾乎令人懷舊的信用衍生品。

Back in last decade’s crazy credit bubble, these products boomed. But since then, trading in so-called single name credit default swaps, or instruments which let investors bet whether a specific company or country will default, has withered: activity is now a mere third of 2008 levels (although the picture for index products is better).

在本世紀頭十年信貸泡沫狂熱時期，信用衍生品蓬勃發展。但自那以後，所謂的單名信用違約互換（single name CDS，即讓投資者押注某個公司或者某個國家會否違約的工具）日漸式微：現在交易活動僅爲2008年水平的三分之一（儘管指數產品的情況要好一些）。

Now, however, some big financial institutions — along with lobbying bodies like the International Swaps and Derivatives Association — want to stage a retro revival. Rebuilding credit derivatives, they argue, will make modern finance considerably safer, particularly if (or when) the US Federal Reserve finally puts up rates.

然而，現在一些大型金融機構以及國際互換和衍生工具協會(International Swaps and Derivatives Association，簡稱ISDA)等遊說團體希望恢復單名CDS的昔日榮光。它們辯稱，重啓信用衍生品將讓現代金融安全得多，尤其是如果（或者當）美聯儲(Fed)最終加息的時候。

Are those bankers mad? Or just playing their old profit-seeking games? Most politicians (and voters) would probably like to howl “yes” on both counts. After all, the reason why the single name CDS market has withered since 2008 is that regulators have imposed new rules making it more onerous and costly to trade these products.

那些銀行家瘋了嗎？或者只是玩他們老套的逐利遊戲？大多數政客（和選民們）可能想對這兩個問題都大喊一聲“是的”。畢竟，單名CDS市場自2008年以來萎縮的原因是，監管機構出臺的新規則讓這些產品的交易更加繁瑣和昂貴。

And the motive behind that shift was that credit derivatives had a starring role in the horror show of the credit boom and bust. While these products did not actually create the gigantic bubble or the subprime mortgage abuses, canny financiers used credit derivatives to run rings around regulations and load investors’ portfolios with dangerously large, partly concealed, risks and debts.

那種轉變背後的動機是，信用衍生品在信貸市場可怕的暴漲暴跌中曾扮演“主角”。儘管這些產品實際上並未製造巨大的泡沫或者導致次貸濫發，但精明的金融家利用信用衍生品來繞過監管，讓投資者的投資組合揹負大得危險、且部分隱藏的風險和債務。

While that sorry history might appear to offer every reason to say “no” to any comeback, that would be a bad idea. Although these instruments were horribly used and abused in the past decade, there is a good idea at their core. Most notably, when credit derivatives were created back in the 1990s, the raison d’être was to enable investors to make bets about credit risks, either to protect themselves from default or to earn income by selling that quasi- insurance to others.

儘管那段令人惋惜的歷史似乎讓人有理由對重啓信用衍生品說“不”，但那將會是一個糟糕的想法。儘管這些工具在過去10年裏被用得過多過濫，但它們的核心有一個好的構想。尤其是，當信用衍生品在上世紀90年代被創造出來的時候，其存在理由是讓投資者能夠押注信用風險，要麼讓他們抵消違約風險，要麼通過向其他人出售這種半保險產品來獲取收入。

That original core concept now looks very useful, if not essential, for modern markets. As my colleague Martin Wolf points out, we are probably nearing the end of a 30-year bull market in bonds. It would be nice to hope this turning point will occur smoothly. But that seems naive. Investors are going to need all the help — or instruments — they can find to hedge risks in the next year.

對現代市場來說，上述初始的核心概念現在看起來非常有用，甚至不可或缺。正如我的同事馬丁•沃爾夫(Martin Wolf)所指出的，我們很可能正在接近30年債券牛市的結束。要是這個轉折點能夠平穩發生就好了。但這種期盼似乎有些幼稚。未來一年投資者將需要一切找得到的幫助（或者說工具）來對衝風險。

The second reason why credit derivatives might look useful is that it is much harder today for anyone to trade cash bonds, partly because post-crisis regulations have prompted broker dealers to cut their market-making roles. Reviving single name derivatives might help to alleviate this, since investors may be more willing to hold bonds if they can protect themselves from default.

信用衍生品看起來有用的第二個理由是，如今交易現金債券的難度大得多，這在一定程度上是因爲危機後的監管促使經紀自營商縮減了自己的做市角色。恢復單名衍生品或許有助於緩解這個問題，因爲如果投資者能夠保護自己不受違約的影響，就可能更願意持有債券。

Moreover, if derivatives are traded in a way that produces credible prices, this might provide a benchmark for the murkier corners of the illiquid bond market, signalling how sentiment is shifting. For evidence of that, think about how swings in CDS prices signalled that smart money was getting worried about Lehman Brothers, AIG or Bear Stearns in 2008.

此外，如果衍生品交易能夠產生可信的價格，這或許會爲缺乏流動性的債券市場的比較隱祕的角落提供一個基準，表明了情緒正如何轉變。想要證據？2008年時，正是CDS價格的波動表明，聰明的投資者對雷曼兄弟(Lehman Brothers)、美國國際集團(AIG)或者貝爾斯登(Bear Stearns)感到擔憂。

Can this happen? ISDA and others certainly hope so. And they are trying to revive it by promoting two policy ideas: pushing the single name business via central clearing houses, to make the product safer and cheaper to process; and simplifying the market by cutting the frequency with which credit default swap contracts are updated, from four times a year to twice.

CDS能夠重啓嗎？ISDA和其他機構當然希望可以。它們試圖提出兩個政策觀點來重啓CDS：一個是通過中央清算機構來推動單名CDS業務，使該產品更安全，處理成本更低廉，另一個是將CDS合約更新的頻率從一年四次減至一年兩次，以簡化市場。

This is sensible. But if the industry is going to fly again, it needs three other things to happen.

這是明智的做法。但要讓該行業再次繁榮起來，它還需要其他三件事情。

Financiers need to demonstrate that they fully embrace the idea of maximum transparency. Then they must show that they view the tool as a risk management device, not just a technique for regulatory arbitrage. Most importantly, there needs to be genuine demand for CDS — most crucially from end investors rather than fee-hungry banking salesmen.

金融家需要表明，他們完全支持最大化透明度的想法。因此他們必須表明，他們將CDS視爲風險管理工具，而不僅僅是監管套利手段。最重要的是，市場需要對CDS有真正的需求，最關鍵的是來自最終投資者、而非渴求賺取手續費的銀行銷售員的需求。

That may occur. It is encouraging to note, for example, that one of the most active voices now pushing for a revival of single name CDS is not any bank, but BlackRock, the asset management group. Nobody can pretend that it will be easy or quick to rebuild trust in this sector; least of all when fresh evidence of bank transgressions, such as foreign exchange scandals, keeps tumbling out.

CDS有可能被重啓。例如，令人鼓舞的是，推動重啓單名CDS的最活躍聲音之一不是來自銀行，而是來自資產管理公司貝萊德(BlackRock)。沒有人能佯稱，在這個領域將會輕易或迅速重建信任，尤其是在有新的證據表明銀行不當行爲（如外匯醜聞）層出不窮之際。