歐洲公司治理結構的惡果

This has not been a salutary week for European corporate governance. AtVolkswagen in Germany and atIndustrivärden in Sweden, a system intended to encourage stability and long-term growth has instead created self-indulgence.

對歐洲的公司治理來說，3月底的一週可不是有益的一週。在德國的大衆汽車(Volkswagen)和瑞典的Industrivärden，一個原本旨在鼓勵穩定和長期增長的體制反而導致了自我放縱。

At VW, Ferdinand Piëch was ejected as chairman of the supervisory board by other members, including union representatives and politicians, after he tried to destabilise Martin Winterkorn, the chief executive. Mr Piëch, a member of one of the families that control VW, had done the same to Bernd Pischetsrieder in 2006. This time, he failed.

在大衆汽車，費迪南德•皮耶希(Ferdinand Piëch)試圖動搖首席執行官馬丁•溫特科恩(Martin Winterkorn)的地位，結果自己反被包括工會代表和政治人士在內的監事會其他成員趕下監事會主席寶座。皮耶希是控制大衆汽車的其中一個家族的成員，他曾在2006年對時任大衆汽車首席執行官的畢睿德(Bernd Pischetsrieder)採取過同樣的舉動。但這一次，他失敗了。

At Industrivärden, which along with the Wallenberg family controls more than half the value of the Swedish stock exchange, there was spectacular misbehaviour. Anders Nyrén was fired as chief executive on Monday after a scandal over the misuse of corporate jets by executives at SCA, the forestry and paper group, and their families.

在Industrivärden（該公司連同瓦倫貝里(Wallenberg)家族掌控着瑞典股市逾一半的市值），也發生了嚴重的不當行爲。近期，媒體曝光了林業和紙業集團SCA的高管及家人濫用Industrivärden公司飛機的醜聞，致使Industrivärden首席執行官安德斯•尼倫(Anders Nyrén)遭免職。

Both companies are unusual and rivals have used power more wisely. The Wallenberg family has shown greater self-discipline in running its industrial empire company than Industrivärden, while BMW has combined familial control with allowing managers to exercise greater professional autonomy than at VW. But both illustrate how the European approach can encourage corporate insiders to behave badly.

這兩家公司都非比尋常，它們的競爭對手對權力的運用要更明智一些。與Industrivärden相比，瓦倫貝里家族在管理自己的工業帝國時展現出更強的自律能力；而相比於大衆汽車，寶馬(BMW)在保證家族控股的同時，允許經理人行使更大的專業自主權。不過，這兩個例子都向我們揭示出一點：歐洲的公司治理方式如何能夠慫恿企業內部人員從事不當行爲。

Short-termism is the risk of the US and UK approach, of diversified shareholders including hedge funds pressuring companies from the outside. Entrenchment is the risk of the European approach, of “active governance” by a few powerful shareholders that influence board directors and sometimes appoint them. Placing too much power in too few hands is dangerous.

美國和英國的公司治理都存在短視主義的風險，包括對衝基金在內的各類股東會從外部給公司施加壓力。而歐洲的公司治理風險則在於壕溝效應，少數幾名大權在握的股東進行“積極治理”，影響董事會成員，有時甚至直接任命董事。把太多權力集於幾個人之手是危險的。

The good news is that, at both Industrivärden and VW, public exposure solved the problem. Mr Piëch, the former chief executive credited with rescuing VW in the 1990s, was used to behaving imperiously and causing trouble in private, but pushed his luck by doing so openly in an interview with Der Spiegel. Wrongdoing at Industrivärden could not survive being reported by the Svenska Dagbladet newspaper.

好消息是，在Industrivärden和大衆汽車的例子中，媒體曝光解決了這一問題。曾任大衆汽車首席執行官的皮耶希因在上世紀90年代拯救了大衆汽車而受到好評，私下裏則習慣於專橫跋扈和製造麻煩，但在接受德國《明鏡週刊》(Der Spiegel)的採訪時，他卻不知收斂、讓自己的跋扈性格曝了光。Industrivärden發生的不當行爲也沒有逃過《瑞典日報》(Svenska Dagbladet)的曝光。

Germany and Sweden differ on specifics. In Sweden, a few shareholder “spheres” exert influence over an array of companies through investment holding companies and two-tier equity that gives them more votes than their economic stakes would imply. They also appoint company directors by holding seats on board nominating committees.

德國和瑞典的具體情況有所不同。在瑞典，少數幾個股東“圈子”通過投資控股公司和雙層股權結構（賦予他們較所持股權更大的表決權）來向一系列公司施加影響。他們還在董事會提名委員會中佔據一席之地，從而能夠任命公司董事。

In Germany, families such as the Quandts, who founded BMW, control both Mittelstand small and medium-sized enterprises and many large ones. Management boards are overseen by supervisory boards that include worker representatives (and in VW’s case, the premier of Lower Saxony, which holds a 20 per cent voting stake). Private shareholders are kept on the outside.

在德國，家族（比如創立寶馬的匡特(Quandt)家族）既控制着中小企業，也控制着許多大型企業。管理委員會受到包含工人代表的監事會（在大衆汽車的例子中，監事會成員還包括下薩克森州州長，該州掌控着20%有表決權的股份）的監督。私人股東被排除在公司治理之外。

Yet the effect is similar. The Wallenberg family foundations, for example, hold 23 per cent of the capital of Investor, their industrial holding company, but 50 per cent of the voting rights. Investor in turn wields influence over industrial companies such as Electrolux and ABB, and the bank SEB. Not even the largest fund manager has such a loud voice in the US economy.

但效果卻是相似的。比如，瓦倫貝里家族基金會掌控着其工業控股公司銀瑞達(Investor) 23%的資本，卻擁有50%的表決權。銀瑞達反過來又對伊萊克斯(Electrolux)和ABB等工業企業及瑞典北歐斯安銀行(SEB)施加影響力。而在美國經濟中，即使是最大的基金管理公司也不擁有這麼大的發言權。

At VW, the Porsche and Piëch families control 51 per cent of the voting shares. Foreign pension and hedge funds hold 24 per cent of the subscribed capital, and private shareholders another 12.5 per cent, but largely in preference shares with no voting rights. It took Wolfgang Porsche and Stephan Weil, premier of Lower Saxony, to outvote Mr Piëch on the supervisory board.

在大衆汽車，保時捷(Porsche)和皮耶希家族掌握了51%有表決權的股份。外國養老基金和對衝基金掌握了24%的認繳資本，私人股東掌握了另外12.5%、但大多是無表決權的優先股。沃爾夫岡•保時捷(Wolfgang Porsche)和下薩克森州州長斯特凡•魏爾(Stephan Weil)需要聯手，才能在監事會投票中勝過皮耶希。

At its best, active governance by a few shareholders can achieve results. “You only need look at BMW to see how it can be done in a different way — that family ownership can provide long-term stability,” says Hans-Christoph Hirt, a director of Hermes Equity Ownership Services, an adviser to pension fund investors in companies including VW.

在最好的情況下，由少數股東進行積極治理能夠取得成果。“只需看看寶馬就會明白如何能用不同的方式實現這一點——家族所有制也能帶來長期的穩定，”諮詢公司Hermes Equity Ownership Services的總監漢斯-克里斯托夫•希爾特(Hans-Christoph Hirt)說。該公司爲投資大衆汽車等公司的養老基金提供諮詢服務。

Companies that are protected from short-term pressures, such as having to return cash to shareholders or keep their margins high instead of investing in new products, may benefit. It is a competitive advantage not only for family-owned companies but those controlled by private equity and venture capital funds in prioritising growth.

那些無需面臨短期壓力（比如必須向股東返現、或爲保持高利潤率放棄投資新產品）的公司可能會從中受益。它不但對家族企業來說是一項競爭優勢，對那些由私人股本和風險投資基金控股的公司來說也是如此，它有利於它們把增長擺在首位。