歐洲財經: 歐盟不應把德國當成替罪羊

The most terrifying words in the English language, according to Ronald Reagan, are: “I’m from the government and I’m here to help.” Today, for some Europeans, they are: “I’m from the EU and I’m here to bail you out.”

羅納德•里根(Ronald Reagan)說過，英語中最可怕的幾個詞是：“我是政府派來幫忙的。”今天，對有些歐洲人來說，最可怕的幾個詞則是：“我是歐盟(EU)派來紓困的。”

Germany and the single currency have been made scapegoats for the problems of member states and for Europe’s inability to overcome the continent’s financial and economic crises. Berlin is accused of lacking solidarity, imposing contractionary policies and gaining competitiveness at others’ expense. The euro is blamed for depriving countries of their own central banks’ ability to act as lender of last resort and provide unlimited liquidity to the government and banks; and for depriving national policy makers of scope to devalue, thereby trapping them in a vicious spiral.

德國和單一貨幣已被當成了替罪羊。人們認爲，歐元區成員國的問題就是這二者造成的，歐洲無力戰勝發生在這塊大陸的金融與經濟危機，責任也在這二者身上。他們指責柏林方面缺乏團結精神、將緊縮政策強加於人、而且爲提高自身競爭力不惜損害他國利益。至於歐元，人們則指責它一方面使得各成員國央行無法充當最後貸款人、不能向政府和銀行業提供無限流動性，另一方面使得各成員國政策制定者失去了壓低本幣匯率的選項、從而讓各成員國陷入惡性循環。

Germany is flabbergasted at being made the scapegoat. It sees itself as a victim, not a perpetrator. It has contributed substantial funds and assumed a great deal of risk for the five bailouts to date. And it has sacrificed much in the past decade to generate employment at home, with real wages barely higher today than in 1999.

對於被當成替罪羊這件事，德國倍感震驚。它認爲自己是受害者，而不是加害者。德國爲迄今爲止的五次紓困提供了大量資金，承擔了極大風險。而且在過去的十年裏，爲了在國內創造出就業崗位，德國作出了巨大犧牲，今天德國的實際工資水平只略高於1999年。

But the fact is that every country in crisis needs a scapegoat. It is hard to accept that the fruits of decades of hard work can vanish in a few years. For Europe today, painful domestic reforms can be accomplished only with a high degree of national solidarity, and it is tempting to rally against a common nemesis to achieve such solidarity.

但現實就是這樣，每個處在危機中的國家都需要找到替罪羊。數十年來辛勤工作的成果，在短短數年之間就灰飛煙滅，這一點很難讓人接受。就今天的歐洲而言，痛苦的國內改革只有在國民高度團結的前提下才能實現。因此對各國來說，爲國民找到一個共同的出氣筒來達成這種團結，實在是一個誘人的選項。

The history of financial crises is a good guide to how scapegoating works. Take the International Monetary Fund. Although some of its prescriptions during the 1997-98 Asian crisis were misguided, governments succeeded in implementing essential reforms – many of which domestic opposition had thwarted for years – by rallying national solidarity against the fund. The cost is that the IMF’s standing on the continent is permanently damaged, as shown by the unwillingness of Asian governments to accept its help during the global crisis of 2008-09.

金融危機的歷史爲我們清晰地指出了這種尋找替罪羊的做法是如何得逞的。就以國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)爲例。在1997-98年亞洲金融危機期間，IMF開出的部分藥方確實帶有誤導性，但有關國家的政府是通過使國民團結在反對IMF的大旗下才得以成功實施必要的改革的（其中許多改革曾在它們國內受到多年的阻撓）。爲此付出的代價是，IMF在亞洲的地位受到了永久性的損害——亞洲國家政府在2008-09年全球危機期間不願接受IMF援助，就佐證了這一點。

This strategy has, to some extent, proved effective in Europe. Germany is the perfect scapegoat: it is the big European brother who is doing well, is often diplomatically clumsy and has a stained history that makes it tempting to revive old prejudices. There is another virtue: scapegoating has so far allowed moderate governments to keep political extremism largely at bay, a remarkable achievement given the deep social changes under way.

事實證明，從某種程度上說，這種策略在歐洲是有效的。德國是一隻完美的替罪羊：這位歐洲老大哥發展得不錯、外交上又笨招頻出、還有一段很容易引發人們舊有成見的骯髒歷史。這種策略還有一個優點：迄今爲止，尋找替罪羊的做法使得那些溫和派政府得以在很大程度抵擋住政治極端勢力的攻擊——考慮到社會正在發生的深刻轉變，這實在是個了不起的成就。

Yet scapegoating is dangerous. At stake for Europe is nothing less than the survival of the euro. The confrontations are causing deep rifts among both states and citizens. Surveys reveal a high degree of animosity between nations. Think of mocked-up photos showing German politicians in Nazi uniforms, or the misguided perception in Germany of citizens in crisis countries living on European welfare handouts.

然而，這種策略是危險的。它不僅對歐元的生存、而且也對整個歐洲造成嚴重的威脅。這種對抗正在各成員國、各成員國民衆之間造成深深的裂痕。調查顯示，各國之間的敵意已達到很高的水平。你只需想想那些給德國政治家穿上納粹制服的諷刺照片，或是德國對依靠歐洲救濟過活的危機國家民衆的偏見。

The renationalisation of policy making – with politicians increasingly focused on domestic objectives – and the continued blaming of monetary union for national problems, in crisis and non-crisis countries alike, has eroded the credibility of European institutions and the euro. By making integration more difficult, if not politically impossible, this is starting to cause permanent damage. EU institutions may end up in the position of the IMF in Asia, with governments disengaging from Europe and turning inward.

由於各國政治家日益關注國內目標，歐洲的政策制定正在迴歸各國；另一方面，處於危機中的和未處於危機中的國家仍在將國內問題歸咎於貨幣聯盟。這兩點侵蝕了歐盟機構和歐元的可信性。這一結果正開始對歐盟造成永久性的傷害，它加大了歐洲一體化的難度，甚至使之在政治上變得不可行。歐盟機構的處境最終可能會與IMF在亞洲的處境相同，各國政府會減少對歐洲事務的關注，轉而把注意力放在國內。

What is the way forward? For one, Berlin must take more leadership in Europe. As irritating as it may be to be blamed for all Europe’s ills, Germany’s position of strength gives it a special responsibility. This means it should stop hindering financial and fiscal union, and start pursuing it more forcefully. To revive the European economy, it should also address its own domestic structural imbalances.

接下來該怎麼做？首先，柏林方面必須在歐洲承擔更多領導責任。就算被當作歐洲所有問題的罪魁禍首再令人不快，德國的強大地位也決定了它必須承擔起特殊責任。這意味着，德國不應再阻撓財政與貨幣聯盟的建立，而應開始更加有力地促成這一聯盟。爲了重振歐洲經濟，德國還應解決其國內的經濟結構不平衡問題。

Second, EU countries must assume greater ownership of reforms. Rather than scapegoating, governments need to convince their citizens that the fundamental restructuring is necessary and will be fruitful. It is clear, not just in Cyprus and Italy but across the EU, that we have a long way to go to achieve this.

其次，歐盟國家必須承擔更大的改革責任。各國政府不應再尋找替罪羊，而是必須讓本國民衆相信，根本性的結構調整勢在必行且將帶來豐厚的回報。我們還要走很長的路才能實現這個目標，這一點顯然不只適用於塞浦路斯和意大利，也適用於整個歐盟。

Third, selected decision-making processes in Europe must be removed from the national political sphere. The crisis has shown that, for many issues of eurozone governance, delegating decisions to intergovernmental political bodies does not work. We need to build institutions to fill this void. Creating a European finance minister, making institutions more immune to national interests and strengthening the European parliament are all urgent.

第三，歐洲一些高級別的決策程序必須與各國國家政治脫離關係。本次危機表明，對有關歐元區治理的許多問題來說，委託政府間政治機構作出決定是行不通的。我們需要設立相應的機構來填補這一空白。設立歐盟財政部長、建立更加不受各國國家利益左右的機構、以及加強歐洲議會的權力，都是十分緊迫的任務。

The renationalisation of policy making is splitting Europe and risks causing irreversible damage. The pursuit of these three measures is important if Europeans are to prove the Reaganite approach wrong and continue on the path of integration.

政策制定迴歸各國正在令歐洲陷入分裂，並可能造成不可逆轉的破壞。如果歐洲人想證明裏根的說法是錯誤的、並想繼續走一體化道路，那麼推行以上三項措施就有着重要的意義。