阿根廷債務困局走向何方 經濟問題導致社會不穩

Argentina’s 12-year dispute with a group of hedge funds holding out for full payment on defaulted Argentine bonds is proving to be one of the most wasteful debt restructurings in history.

阿根廷與一羣堅持要求全額償付其違約債券的對衝基金長達12年的爭執，已證明是歷史上最耗神耗力的債務重組之一。

During the past few years an unedifying legal battle waged in New York courtrooms has steadily unpicked the restructurings that allowed Argentina to pick up the pieces after its $95bn default in 2001. Basing their rulings on a tight definition of the so-called pari passu clause that guarantees equal treatment for bondholders, US judges have declared it illegal for Argentina to make payments to the holders of restructured bonds unless it includes full payments to holdouts too.

過去幾年裏在紐約法庭上展開的不光彩的訴訟戰，逐步破壞了阿根廷的債務重組努力，後者本會讓阿根廷在2001年950億美元債務違約之後重整旗鼓。按照他們對所謂的同等權益條款(pari passu clause)的嚴格定義，即所有債券持有人有權得到同等對待，美國法官宣佈阿根廷向接受重組的債券持有人償付是不合法的，除非償付也包括向拒絕重組的債權人全額償付。

This week, the unresolved dispute reached its doleful climax. Unwilling to bow to the demands of the holdouts, and consequently unable to keep the restructured bonds current either, Buenos Aires threw up its hands and gave up on its attempts to pay its creditors under US law.

本週，久拖不決的爭執達到了令人沮喪的頂峯。由於不願屈從那些拒絕重組債權人的要求，從而也無法推進償付接受重組的債券持有人，阿根廷政府放棄了按照美國法律償付債權人的努力。

Neither side can claim the moral high ground. Central to the holdouts’ case has been that in two restructurings, Argentina strong-armed creditors into accepting a savage haircut worth just 25 cents on the dollar. Yet if warrants linked to economic growth are added, the payouts have in some cases been worth much more.

雙方都不能說佔據了道德高地。拒絕重組債權人的核心論點是，在兩次重組中，阿根廷都威逼債權人接受折後僅餘債券面值25%的野蠻折價(haircut)。然而，如果加上與經濟增長掛鉤的權證，某些情況下的償付價值要高得多。

Of greater systemic concern, the points of law in the hedge funds’ favour have led to a situation where it will be easier for other holdouts to block future sovereign restructurings. This is an unwelcome possibility, however difficult Argentina’s behaviour has been.

就更大的系統性擔憂來說，有利於對衝基金的法律觀點已導致一個情況，即其他拒絕重組的債權人將更容易阻礙未來的主權債務重組。這是一個不受歡迎的可能性，無論阿根廷的行爲多麼令人不快。

President Cristina Fernández has revelled in her “won’t pay, can’t pay” attitude. While this is central to her political image as someone who takes on financiers and wins, it is also a fiction. Argentina’s restructurings have not reopened international markets. The bigger worry is that her intransigence poses a real threat to the economic wellbeing of her compatriots. Although the initial reaction has been muted, Argentina’s default is likely to lead to a squeeze in trade finance and higher borrowing costs. Argentina has no easy options. Restructuring all of its debt into bonds issued under local law would be one way of thumbing its nose at the pesky holdouts and the US courts. But the costs would be huge. A general default could lock the country out of capital markets for years at a time when it needs international capital to develop its deposits of shale gas.

阿根廷總統克里斯蒂娜•費爾南德斯(Cristina Fernández)沉迷於其“不會償付、償付不了”的態度。儘管這對她塑造與金融家較量並取得勝利的政治形象至關重要，但這種態度也只是個幻想。阿根廷的債務重組沒有重新打開國際市場。更大的擔憂在於，費爾南德斯的不妥協對其同胞的經濟福祉造成了實實在在的威脅。儘管市場反應最初波瀾不驚，但阿根廷違約可能導致貿易融資緊張和借款成本上升。阿根廷沒有輕鬆的選擇。將所有債務重組爲按照當地法律發行的債券，將是向惱人的拒絕重組債權人和美國法庭表達蔑視的一種方式。但這樣做的代價將是巨大的。全面違約將讓阿根廷在需要國際資本以開發頁岩氣資源之際，多年無法進入資本市場。

That leaves settling, which has difficulties too. For instance, it exposes Argentina to claims from other holdouts, which Buenos Aires costs at $15bn. Another problem is the so-called RUFO clause in the restructured bonds. This prohibits Argentina from offering investors more than the 30 cents on the dollar it paid holders that accepted the restructuring.

那麼就只剩下和解，但這也很困難。例如，阿根廷將面對其他拒絕重組債權人的索償，阿根廷政府估計索償規模爲150億美元。另一個問題是債務重組中所謂的“未來發行權利”條款(Rights upon Future Offers，簡稱RUFO)。之前阿根廷向接受重組的債券持有人償付面值的30%，而RUFO條款規定，阿根廷現在向投資者支付的賠償不得超過這一比例。

Allowing the stand-off to continue profits no one. Meanwhile, the holdouts are racking up legal fees and must want to settle. The outlines of a deal exist. Argentina could meet the holdouts’ claim, or some compromised figure, with fresh bonds, issued on a deferred basis to sidestep the RUFO clause which expires at the end of 2014. All the holdouts could be invited in, settling the problem for good.

讓僵局持續下去不會令任何人受益。與此同時，拒絕重組的債權人的訴訟費用不斷攀升，他們必然希望和解。和解協議的輪廓是存在的。阿根廷可以以延期方式發行新債券，避開將於2014年底到期的RUFO條款，來滿足拒絕重組債權人的索償要求，或達成一個折中數字。所有拒絕重組的債權人都可以受邀加入，徹底解決這個問題。

Whether this can be agreed swiftly, if at all, is another matter. Indeed the case once again illustrates the need for a better way of managing sovereign defaults. The collective action clauses since introduced into many bond contracts, which oblige minorities to accept majority writedowns, are no fail safe. The pari passu clause should be scrapped, even at the price of higher borrowing costs.

這一方案能否迅速達成一致（如果真的會達成一致的話）則是另一回事。實際上，此案再次說明亟需一種更好的方式來管理主權債務違約。後來很多債券合約中引入的集體行動條款也並非萬全之策，這種條款迫使少數債權人接受多數債權人同意的減記比例。應取消同等權益條款，就算以更高的借款成本爲代價也在所不惜。

In the absence of clarity, well-paid lawyers to hedge funds will continue to exploit the confusion in other debt workouts, and perhaps other jurisdictions. Debt bondage of this kind is the last thing the world needs.

在沒有明確解決方案的情況下，對衝基金聘請的收入不菲的律師，將繼續利用其他債務重組方案、乃至其他司法管轄地區的含混之處。這種債務奴役是這個世界最不需要的。