債轉股 中國解決債務問題的可喜動向

It was not a good omen. In March, Chinese premier Li Keqiang confirmed that his government would authorise debt-for-equity swaps to reduce corporate indebtedness. A few weeks later, Huarong Energy announced that a dozen banks had agreed to swap loans totalling Rmb12.9bn ($1.9bn) for shares in the distressed shipbuilder-turned-oil exploration company.

當時那不是個好兆頭：3月，中國總理李克強證實，中國政府將允許通過債轉股來降低企業的負債率。幾周後，經營困難的石油勘探企業華榮能源(Huarong Energy)宣佈，12家銀行債主已同意該公司以股份抵償總計129億元人民幣（合19億美元）的貸款。華榮能源的前身是一家造船企業。

To many analysts, that debt-for-equity swap outlined by Huarong in a statement to the Hong Kong stock exchange seemed like a pointless exercise in delaying the inevitable. Surely it was better for banks to cut their losses rather than help a zombie shipbuilder reincarnate itself as a Central Asian petroleum play by acquiring oilfields in Kyrgyzstan’s Fergana valley.

對很多分析師而言，華榮能源在港交所(HKEx)公告中概述的債轉股方案看上去像是一種沒有意義的嘗試，只是爲了拖延時間，而無法改變不可避免的結局。對於銀行來說，比起幫助一家垂死的造船企業通過收購位於吉爾吉斯斯坦費爾幹納盆地的油田重生爲一家中亞石油企業，能夠減少損失無疑更好。

Six months later, two state-owned enterprises have unveiled the first state council sanctioned debt-for-equity swaps: Yunnan Tin Group and Wuhan Iron & Steel (Wisco). But neither Yunnan Tin nor Wisco’s swaps bear much resemblance to that outlined by Huarong in its transaction, which is still pending.

六個月後，兩家國有企業宣佈了頭兩個獲得國務院批准的債轉股項目：雲南錫業集團(Yunnan Tin Group)和武漢鋼鐵集團（Wisco，簡稱：武鋼）。但是雲南錫業和武鋼的債轉股項目與華榮此前在公告中概述的計劃（目前事情仍未確定）沒有太多相似之處。

The key difference is the introduction of middle men — in the form of a fund — that stand between Yunnan Tin and Wisco and bank creditors.

關鍵區別在於，在雲南錫業和武鋼與銀行債權人之間，引入了中間機構——一支基金。

In the case of Yunnan Tin, investors will be invited to purchase equity stakes in the company through the fund, and the proceeds will be used to pay down Rmb10bn worth of the company’s loans.

就雲南錫業而言，投資者將受邀通過該基金購買雲南錫業的股份，所籌資金將用於償還該公司總值100億元人民幣的貸款。

This will help to reduce the group’s leverage by about 15 per cent, according to NSBO Beijing, a research house. That in turn would help avoid the downside of the Huarong scenario, whereby banks that had lent billions of renminbi to a shipbuilder could end up as majority shareholders in an oil company with assets in one of Central Asia’s most volatile regions.

研究機構藍橡資本中國(NSBO China)表示，這將有助於將該集團的槓桿降低約15%。這反過來有助於避免華榮方案的壞處——向一家造船企業發放了數十億元貸款的那些銀行，到頭來可能會成爲一家在中亞最動盪的地區之一擁有資產的石油公司的大股東。

This attempt to create third-party demand for equity stakes in indebted companies is one of the main differences between the state council’s current debt-for-equity swap programme and its Rmb1.4tn bailout of the banking sector in the late-1990s. Back then, asset management companies paid banks full-face value for non-performing loans that were worth much less.

試圖爲負債企業的股份創造第三方需求，是國務院當前債轉股項目與上世紀90年代末總值1.4萬億元人民幣的銀行業紓困計劃之間的主要區別之一。當時，幾家資產管理公司(AMC)按面值全額支付了遠不值那個價格的不良貸款。

Another key difference is that the swaps involve standard rather than non-performing or special-mention loans, which is consistent with the government’s pledge that the programme will not be another “free lunch” for zombie companies. Yingchao Zhang, financial analyst at NSBO, observed in a recent report: “The scheme is not designed to tackle China’s NPL problem but to assist companies in reducing leverage levels.”

另一個關鍵區別在於此次債轉股涉及的是正常貸款、而不是不良貸款或關注貸款(special-mention loan)，這與政府承諾該項目不會成爲殭屍企業的“免費午餐”的說法一致。藍橡資本金融分析師張穎超（音譯）在最近一份報告中指出：“該項目並不是爲了解決中國的不良貸款問題，而是爲了幫助企業降低槓桿水平。”

If such swaps help companies such Yunnan Tin reduce leverage and revive their fortunes, the investors who bet on successful turnrounds will be rewarded.

如果此類債轉股項目幫助雲南錫業這樣的企業降低了槓桿水平並恢復了生機，押注企業出現轉機的投資者將得到回報。

They will also bear the risk if the companies fail. Despite provisions that would force Yunnan Tin to buy back investors’ shares if its return targets are not met, the government has said it will not come to investors’ rescue if the group is not able to meet its obligations.

假如企業失敗，投資者也將承擔風險。儘管按照規定，如果未能達到盈利目標，雲南錫業將必須回購投資者持有的股票，但是政府稱，如果該集團無法履行義務，政府不會出手搭救投資者。

The scheme is too small to be a panacea for China’s larger debt problem. In its initial phase, it is expected to involve no more than Rmb3tn in debt — compared with the country’s outstanding corporate debt stock of Rmb120tn. In that regard, the debt-for-equity swap programme is just one of many tools in the Chinese government’s regulatory toolbox as it attempts to stabilise overall debt levels.

債轉股計劃規模太小，不足以成爲解決中國龐大債務問題的靈丹妙藥。在初始階段，該計劃預計將涉及至多3萬億元人民幣的債務——而中國目前未償還的公司債務總計120萬億元人民幣。在這方面，債轉股項目只是中國政府在試圖穩定整體債務水平時使用的衆多監管工具之一。

But it is a useful reminder that when investors and analysts worry about problems in China, chances are the government is even more worried about the same issue.

但它有效地提醒了人們，當投資者和分析師爲中國的問題擔憂時，中國政府可能更是在爲同樣的問題心急如焚。

Earlier this year, investor relief that the country’s economic growth had stabilised in the first quarter gave way to concerns that the better than expected performance was simply the product of a reckless surge in credit.

今年早些時候，投資者對第一季度中國經濟增長保持穩定的寬慰，被這樣一種擔憂所取代，即強於預期的經濟表現只是不計後果的信貸激增的產物。

While the Chinese government has always prioritised economic growth and urban job creation over debt reduction, the complex debt-for-equity swap mechanism revealed in October makes it clear that regulators devoted a lot of time to the problem this summer.

儘管中國政府總是把經濟增長和城市就業放在比削減債務優先考慮的位置上，但是10月公佈的複雜的債轉股機制明確表明，監管部門在今年夏天花了大量時間來研究這個問題。

For all the limitations of such swaps, they at least constitute an official recognition that Chinese corporate debt levels need to be stabilised, if not reduced. Coming on the heels of an unprecedented credit bubble, that in itself is a welcome development.

儘管此類債轉股項目存在種種侷限性，但是它們至少體現出官方承認了這一點，即需要採取措施穩定、乃至削減中國的公司債水平。在一場前所未有的信貸泡沫之後，這本身就是一種可喜的動向。