中國經濟再平衡的根本問題仍未解決

China is the world’s biggest economy in purchasing power terms but its secretive political system, unreliable statistics and restrictions on foreign investment make it one of the least-understood markets among global investors.

按購買力平價計算，中國是全球最大經濟體，但中國隱祕的政治體制、不可靠的統計數據以及對外國投資的限制，使其成爲全球投資者瞭解最少的市場之一。

This fact was on display over the summer as global sentiment on China swung from greed to fear in the space of just a few months. The bursting of an equity bubble was compounded by Beijing’s decision in early August to change the way it sets its exchange rate — a move many investors interpreted as a sign of panic and incompetence on the part of Chinese policymakers.

這一真相在今年夏天顯露無遺，全球市場對中國的態度在僅僅幾個月間就由貪婪轉爲恐懼。繼股市泡沫破裂之後，北京方面又在8月決定改變本國匯率的形成方式，此舉被許多投資者解讀爲一種信號——中國政策制定者既感到恐慌又無能爲力。

The resulting global sell-off and currency market turmoil was largely based on a sudden realisation that the Chinese economy has slowed a lot, and is likely to slow even more in the future.

由此引發的全球拋售及外匯市場動盪在很大程度上是由於人們突然意識到，中國經濟已經大幅放緩，而未來很可能進一步放緩。

For those who follow China, this is hardly news. Supercharged growth rates have been declining for several years, with annual real GDP sliding from 10.6 per cent in 2010 to 7.3 per cent last year. This year, the economy is projected to grow by a little under 7 per cent, its slowest pace in a quarter-century (although some question even that state figure).

對於那些關注中國的人士來說，這並非新聞。多年來，中國動力超強的經濟增速一直在不斷下降，國內生產總值(GDP)實際年增速從2010年的10.6%下滑至去年的7.3%。今年中國經濟增速預計將略低於7%，爲四分之一世紀以來的最低速（儘管有人甚至對這一官方數據都表示質疑）。

In simple terms, the Communist party is facing the consequences of the extraordinary measures it took in 2008 and 2009 to tackle the effects of the global financial crisis. At that time, China’s economy was reliant on the export sector, which not only provided external demand for its products but also drove domestic investment in new factories and infrastructure.

簡言之，中國共產黨正在面臨其在2008及2009年採取非常措施應對全球金融危機影響而導致的後果。彼時，中國的經濟依賴於出口部門，後者不僅爲中國產品提供了外部需求，還推動了對新建工廠以及基礎設施的國內投資。

When global demand collapsed following the Lehman Brothers crash, China’s leaders launched an enormous stimulus programme to pump up credit-fuelled infrastructure investment, particularly in real estate. That helped growth rates rebound quickly and propped up Chinese demand for a wide range of imports, from commodities to luxury goods — which in turn helped drive recovery in other countries.

當全球需求在雷曼兄弟(Lehman Brothers)破產後大幅下滑時，中國領導人推出了一項龐大的刺激計劃，以提振信貸推動的基礎設施投資，尤其是在房地產領域。這幫助中國經濟增速實現了快速回升，而且提升了中國對從大宗商品到奢侈品的各種進口品的需求，反過來也幫助推動了其他國家的經濟復甦。

But the explosion in credit and the large number of unproductive investments resulting from the stimulus soon became apparent and forced the government to rein in the excess.

但信貸的爆炸式增長以及刺激計劃導致的大量非生產性投資很快顯現出來，並迫使政府遏制過度信貸。

For several years, Beijing’s stated objective has been to reduce the economy’s reliance on credit and investment and move to more sustainable growth, based on consumption and services.

多年來，北京方面公開宣稱的目標一直是要減少經濟對信貸和投資的依賴，轉向基於消費和服務業的更加可持續的增長。

“We began the rebalancing process slowly around 2011-2012, and we are still in the early of the issues, [for example] to get control of the growth in credit, haven’t really been resolved yet,” says Michael Pettis, professor of finance at Peking University.

北京大學金融學教授邁克爾槧艏斯(Michael Pettis)說：“我們在2011至2012年前後才緩慢開啓再平衡進程，我們仍處於早期階段……大多數問題——如控制信貸增長——還未得到真正解決。”

Mr Pettis says if China is serious about getting debt expansion under control, the maximum rate the economy will be able to grow in coming years is 3 or 4 per cent, far below Beijing’s target this year of “around” 7 per cent.

佩蒂斯稱，如果中國真要控制住債務擴張的話，那麼，未來幾年中國經濟能達到的最大增速將是3%或4%，遠低於中國政府今年“7%左右”的目標。

“Every single country that has followed this growth model — without exception — has had an extremely difficult adjustment, with either very low or negative growth,” he says.

“每一個曾經遵循此種增長模式的國家無一例外都經歷了極其困難的調整，增長率不是非常低就是爲負，”他說。

“To me it’s absurd to assume China — which has taken imbalances deeper than any other country and had more rapid growth in debt than any other — will somehow be immune from this.”

“對我而言，假設中國能設法免遭這種境況是荒謬的——中國陷入不平衡的程度比任何其他國家都深，而且債務增速也比任何其他國家都快。”

Even those sanguine about prospects for the Chinese economy acknowledge that deep reforms, for instance overhauling the huge, inefficient state-owned enterprise sector (SOE), are necessary to keep growth from falling further.

就連那些對中國經濟前景充滿樂觀的人士都承認，有必要通過深化改革——如徹底改革龐大、效率低下的國企部門——避免經濟增速進一步放緩。

The government unveiled an SOE reform programme last month but critics argue it does not go far enough in breaking up state monopolies in sectors such as oil, aviation, telecommunications, electricity, health and education.

中國政府上月公佈了一份國企改革計劃，但批評者認爲，該計劃並未能打破國家在石油、航空、電信、電力、醫療及教育等部門的壟斷。

In fact, some say the reforms announced so far are intended to tighten the state’s grip on many of these sectors and allow state companies to tap the private sector for more funding, without ceding any control.

實際上，有人認爲，中國政府迄今所宣佈的改革措施旨在收緊國家對上述許多領域的控制，讓國企在不讓出任何控制權的情況下利用私營部門獲得更多資金。

“If we don’t reform, the Chinese economy may even slow to collapse. You could stimulate by printing more money but returns will get less and less,” says Tao Ran, a professor of economics at Renmin University in Beijing.

北京的中國人民大學(Renmin University of China)經濟學教授陶然說：“如果不進行改革，中國經濟甚至有可能放緩至崩潰。你可以通過印更多鈔票來刺激經濟，但收效將越來越少。”

Mr Tao does point out that, even in the absence of significant reforms, there is still a fair bit the government can do to stave off any collapse in the near future.

陶然還指出，即使在沒有重大改革的情況下，中國政府仍可以採取許多措施避免在不久的將來出現任何崩潰。

Beijing has announced trillions of renminbi of new government investment projects across the country. Furthermore, in recent months credit restrictions and attempts to force deleveraging have quietly been rolled back, to help stimulate growth.

中國政府已經宣佈了遍及全國、數萬億元人民幣的政府投資新項目。此外，最近幾個月，信貸控制以及強迫去槓桿化的努力已悄然放鬆，以幫助刺激經濟增長。

As this feeds through into stronger activity numbers, the dismal sentiment among global investors will no doubt go into reverse in coming months as fear of China reverts back to greed.

隨着這些刺激帶來更強勁的經濟活動數據，全球投資者的悲觀情緒必將在未來數月發生逆轉，對中國的恐懼又會重新變爲貪婪。

But as long as the underlying problems of poor-quality investment and debt build-up are not addressed, any rebound is likely to be short lived.

但是，只要低質量投資與債務堆積的根本問題得不到解決，任何反彈都可能是短暫的。

“Perhaps we will see a Chinese version of quantitative easing and that will stimulate the economy a bit in the very short term,” says Mr Tao. “But I worry that if there is no reform, all we have achieved in the past 20 or 30 years will be lost.”

“也許我們將看到中國版的量化寬鬆，這將在很短時間內刺激經濟增長，”陶然說，“但我擔心，如果不進行改革，我們將失去在過去20或30年間所成就的一切。”