要正視自己 美國衰落與中國崛起無關

First things first. China is not about to replace the US as the world’s superpower. Last week’s news that China’s economy was close to overtaking that of the US on a purchasing-power basis marked a statistical milestone. But little more.

首先讓我們談談最重要的問題。中國在短期內不會取代美國成爲全球的超級大國。上週有新聞報道稱，中國按購買力平價計算的經濟規模就要超越美國，這從統計上來說是一個里程碑，但其意義僅限於此。

China is neither able nor ambitious to step into America’s shoes. It will be a decade or so before it overtakes the US in dollar terms. The story of our age is that the US is increasingly unwilling – and in crucial respects, unable – to continue in the role it has played for the past 70 years. After America comes multipolarity – not China. The question is, what type? Will it be based on a system of US-framed global rules? Or will it be “après moi, le déluge”?

當前中國既沒有能力也沒有雄心承擔美國的角色。中國按美元計算的經濟規模還需要10年左右才能超越美國。我們這個時代的主旋律是，美國越來越不願意——而且在某些關鍵方面也越來越沒有能力——繼續扮演其在過去70年一直扮演的角色。美國時代之後出現的是多極化——而非中國獨大。問題是哪種形式的多極化？它將基於一套由美國框定的全球規則體系？抑或是“我死之後，哪管它洪水滔天”？

The shift in geopolitics is already well under way at both ends of the Eurasian land mass. Last week Barack Obama returned from a four-nation Asian tour of China’s neighbours, all of whom fear an expanding regional hegemon. The US president spends much of the rest of his time trying to shore up unity among those living in Russia’s vicinity, from Ukraine westwards. They too fear an increasingly predatory regional power. Two generations ago George Kennan framed America’s famous “containment” strategy for the Soviet Union. Today, the US is stumbling into dual containment of China and Russia.

在歐亞大陸的兩端，地緣政治形勢已經在發生變化。上週，美國總統巴拉克•奧巴馬(Barack Obama)在結束了對亞洲四國的訪問後回到美國，這些國家都是中國的鄰國，它們都擔心出現一個不斷擴張的地區霸權。奧巴馬其餘時間的大部分都用於試圖增進鄰近俄羅斯的國家（從烏克蘭開始向西延伸）之間的團結，這些國家也害怕出現一個愈發具有掠奪性的地區強權。兩代人以前，喬治•凱南(George Kennan)框定了美國針對蘇聯的著名“遏制”戰略。如今，美國跌跌撞撞地陷入了對中國和俄羅斯的雙重遏制。

The demand for US leadership remains strong. But America’s ability to sustain a dual containment strategy is an open question.

世界各國仍然非常需要美國繼續保持全球領導地位。但美國推行雙重遏制戰略的能力是帶有問號的。

The return of great power rivalry in Asia and Europe finds a close parallel in global economic shifts. The US remains much the top dog in dollar terms – the only measure that counts. Its per capita income remains five times that of China. It may take 40 years or more for China’s living standards to catch up. But the speed with which it is catching up is breathtaking. At the start of the century China accounted for barely 4 per cent of the global economy in dollar terms. Today it is about 12 per cent. The US has fallen from just under a third, to barely 20 per cent.

亞洲和歐洲重新回到大國角力狀態，也密切反映了全球經濟實力的轉移。按美元計算（這是唯一真正有意義的衡量標準），美國仍是遙遙領先的全球最大經濟體。美國的人均收入仍是中國的五倍。中國或許還需要40年甚至更久的時間才能趕上美國的生活水平。但中國奮起直追的速度令人驚歎。本世紀初，中國在按美元計算的全球經濟總量中所佔比重僅爲4%，如今這一比重已經達到大約12%。同期美國所佔比重則從略低於三分之一降至僅20%。

China will overtake the US sometime in the next decade. But it can never replace it. Therein lies the danger. The US will no longer have the capacity to uphold the global order, while China will always lack the legitimacy. In addition to being an autocracy, China is not built on immigration and has never sought to project universal values.

中國將在未來10年的某個時點超越美國。但中國永遠無法替代美國。這正是危險所在。美國將不再具備維護全球秩序的能力，而中國將永遠缺乏承擔這一責任的正當性。除了威權政體以外，中國不是一個建立在移民基礎上的國家，而且從未尋求倡導普世價值觀。

We are already in the early stages of a multipolar economic world. The postwar US global order was built around the international institutions that it launched – the UN, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and Nato. It was also founded on the successive world trade agreements that culminated in the Uruguay Round of 1994.

我們已經進入了全球經濟多極化的初期階段。戰後美國主導的全球秩序是圍繞着美國創立的一系列國際機構建立的，這些機構包括聯合國(UN)、國際貨幣基金組織（International Monetary Fund，簡稱IMF）、世界銀行(World Bank)和北約(Nato)。以1994年烏拉圭回合(Uruguay round)談判完成爲終點的一系列國際貿易協定，同樣爲全球秩序的形成奠定了基礎。

Since then the US has lacked the capacity to finish a new round. The Doha trade round is all but dead. Mr Obama’s big trade initiatives in Europe and the Pacific are foundering. Both were launched for defensive reasons – China was not included in the Transpacific Partnership and Russia is not part of the transatlantic talks. But the US lacks the clout to see them through.

自那以後，美國一直未能推動新一輪貿易談判順利完成。多哈(Doha)回合貿易談判已幾乎死亡。奧巴馬在歐洲和太平洋地區主推的大手筆貿易倡議進展不順。這兩項舉措都是出於防禦目的而發起的——中國沒有被納入《跨太平洋戰略經濟夥伴關係協定》(TPP)，俄羅斯也不是跨大西洋貿易談判的一員。但美國缺乏推動這兩項談判順利完成的影響力。

The same applies to reform of the IMF. It is absurd that China’s voting share of the world’s top economic body is just 4 per cent – barely a third of its dollar weighting in the global economy.

這一問題在IMF的改革中同樣存在。中國在這一世界頂尖經濟組織中的投票權重僅爲4%（勉強達到中國在全球經濟總量中所佔比重的三分之一），這非常荒謬。

Countries such as India, Mexico and Brazil are also woefully under-represented: Belgium still has a greater voting weight than either. Understandably they are beginning to drift away from the institutions the US built. To his credit, Mr Obama concluded the IMF governance negotiations that were begun under George W Bush and reached a deal to increase the emerging world’s representation. But even this marginal reweighting has been blocked by Congress, which is also blocking Mr Obama’s leeway to pursue his trade initiatives. The US is behaving like a declining hegemon: unwilling to share power, yet unable to impose outcomes.

印度、墨西哥、巴西等國的投票權重同樣嚴重偏低（比利時的投票權重仍比上述任何一個國家都要高）。可以理解的是，新興國家正開始漸漸疏遠美國打造的國際機構。值得肯定的是，奧巴馬完成了始於喬治·W·布什(George W  Bush)任內的IMF治理談判，並達成了一項協議，提高新興世界國家在IMF中的投票權重。但即便是這種小幅度的權重調整也遭到了美國國會的阻撓，美國國會還封殺了奧巴馬推動貿易談判的自由空間。美國表現得像是一個日漸衰落的霸權：不願分享權力，但也無法強迫別國接受安排。

The same influences are visible in America’s approach to tackling climate change. As the world’s richest country, the US cut a deal to subsidise carbon emission reductions in the emerging world. But the so-called “cash for cuts” strategy is missing a vital ingredient – cash.

同樣的影響在美國處理氣候變化問題的方式中也能看出。作爲全球最富有的國家，美國達成了一項協議，擬爲新興國家縮減碳排放提供補貼。但這個所謂的“以減排換資金”(cash for cuts)戰略缺少一個關鍵元素——資金。

Neither the US nor its partners will come up with anything like the $100bn a year in climate aid promised in the Copenhagen talks in 2009. Again, Congress is blocking America’s leadership. Mr Obama is powerless to do much about it. Thankfully, China, India and others are beginning to see that energy efficiency is in their own interests. But they are making changes on their own initiative.

美國及其盟國都根本無法履行它們在2009年哥本哈根氣候變化大會上作出的承諾，即每年提供1000億美元的氣候援助。美國國會再一次叫停了美國的領導角色。奧巴馬對此有心無力，做不了太多。所幸中國、印度以及其他國家開始認識到，提高能源效率符合它們自身的利益。但這些國家正按照自己的打算做出改變。

The die has not yet been cast. The US holds more cards than any other in shaping what the multipolar world will look like. It has more legitimacy than any potential rival – China in particular. But America’s ability to address these vast challenges is stymied by domestic paralysis. Central to this is the declining fortunes of America’s middle class – the foundation of its postwar global strength. Growing economic inequality across the US, and the political fallout in Washington, have killed the spirit of magnanimity that defined cold war American leadership. This loss is impossible to quantify. It is no less real for that.

形勢尚未達到不可逆轉的地步。就塑造未來多極世界的格局而言，美國手中的牌比其他任何國家都要多。相對於任何潛在競爭對手——特別是中國，美國具備更強的正當性。但美國國內的癱瘓狀態，削弱了美國應對這些巨大挑戰的能力。問題的核心在於，美國中產階級的境遇（這是戰後美國全球實力的根基）在走下坡路。美國國內經濟不平等的加劇，加上華盛頓的政治衝擊波，扼殺了冷戰期間奠定美國全球領導角色的寬宏大度的精神。這一損失無法量化，但它是真真切切存在的。

America still has the power to set the tone of global engagement and negotiate outcomes that benefit both itself and the world. But it will require the US to retrieve the spirit of enlightened self-interest that once defined the nation. We must all hope that spirit is dormant rather than extinct.

美國仍然有實力爲全球接觸奠定基調，並通過談判達成對於自身以及世界各國都有利的結局。但這就要求美國找回曾經界定這個國家的開明的自利精神。我們都應抱有希望：這種精神僅僅是沉睡了，而非絕跡了。