中國崛起的奧祕:民進國退

There is no shortage of critics who confidently attribute China’s Rise to the forceful intervention of the state in the economy. But the ranks of policy makers and commentators decrying Beijing’s brand of state capitalism are wrong – and, worse, they risk provoking short-sighted and counterproductive responses.

堅信中國崛起緣於國家強勢干預經濟的批評人士爲數不少，由政策制定者和評論員們組成的這些批評者強烈譴責北京奉行的國家資本主義。但他們的觀點是錯誤的，而更糟的是，他們可能引發短視和毫無建設性的迴應。

The reality is that China’s rapid economic ascent is the result of the expanding role of the market and the rise of private businesses. Private companies now account for more than two-thirds of output, up from nothing when reform began in 1978, in an economy that has expanded 25 times in real terms. They account for almost all employment growth in the same period. Private companies are also increasingly the leading contributors to export growth.

現實情況是，中國經濟快速崛起是市場角色不斷擴大和私營企業壯大的結果。在一個實際規模擴大了25倍的經濟體中，私營企業貢獻的產出比例，從1978年中國開始改革時的零，升至如今的逾三分之二。同期幾乎所有的就業增長均來自私營企業。私營企業還日益成爲出口增長的主要貢獻因素。

State companies’ shrinking role has been particularly rapid in manufacturing, which opened up to competition from private businesses in the 1980s. State enterprises’ share of output in the sector is now only a fifth, compared with four-fifths in 1978. Conventional wisdom says state industrial companies have enjoyed a resurgence since the onset of the global financial crisis. In fact, the growth in output of private businesses since 2008 has averaged 18 per cent, twice the pace of expansion of state businesses.

中國國有企業的角色，在製造業收縮得尤其快——中國的製造業在上世紀80年代向私營企業放開了競爭。國企在製造業所佔產出份額現在只有五分之一，而在1978年則有五分之四。人們普遍認爲，自全球金融危機爆發以來，中國國有工業企業如今已經復興。實際上，自2008年以來私營企業產出年均增長18%，是國企擴張速度的兩倍。

Underlying the relatively poor performance of state industrial companies is low productivity. Most investment is financed with retained earnings – so private industrial businesses, with a return on assets more than twice that of state companies, can expand more rapidly. This is reinforced by the increasingly commercial behaviour of mostly state-owned banks: in recent years they have lent almost twice as much to private as to state companies.

國有工業企業相對疲弱表現的深層根源在於生產率低下。大多數投資資金來自留存利潤，因此資產回報率是國企兩倍多的私營工業企業能夠更爲迅速地擴張。大多數國有銀行的行爲日益商業化，讓私企更加如魚得水：在最近幾年裏，它們向私企發放的貸款幾乎是發放給國企的兩倍。

China’s industrial policy is perhaps exemplified best by the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, created in 2003 to oversee the largest state-owned non-financial enterprises. Critics say it favours state companies in an attempt to create national champions that are larger, more powerful and more profitable. But this has failed: the return on assets of Sasac’s companies has plummeted since 2007, and is now below half their cost of capital.

創建於2003年、監督各大國有非金融企業的中國國有資產監督管理委員會(SASAC)或許是中國工業政策的最佳體現。批評人士稱，國資委青睞大型國企，力圖創建更大、更強、更加盈利豐厚的國家冠軍企業。但這種努力失敗了：自2007年以來國資委監督企業的資產回報率大幅下降，現在還不到其資本成本的一半。

The disparity between state and private companies is evident even in the steel industry, identified by Sasac as one industry in which Beijing was to maintain relatively strong control. This seemed an easy task in the mid-2000s, when state companies produced half of all steel output and their efficiency matched that of private companies. But when the annual growth in output fell to an average of just 9 per cent after 2006, compared with its average pace of more than 20 per cent earlier in the decade, state companies’ returns fell sharply. By 2012 they were in the red, and their share of production had fallen below a third. In contrast, the return on assets of private steel companies rose after 2006, reaching a peak of over 10 per cent in 2011 before declining slightly. With private steel companies investing more than twice as much as their state counterparts, their rising output share will continue.

即便在被國資委確認爲北京要保持相對強有力控制的鋼鐵行業，也體現出國企和私企之間的差距。在2005年，這似乎是一個輕鬆的任務：當時全國一半的鋼鐵由國企生產，它們的效率與私企相當。但是在2006年以後的幾年裏，年均產出增長率降至9%（該十年的頭幾年平均增長率超過20%），國企回報率大幅下降。到2012年，它們出現了虧損，產量份額下降至三分之一以下。相比之下，私營鋼鐵企業的資產回報率在2006年之後出現上升，在2011年達到逾10%的峯值後略有下降。由於私營鋼企的投資是國企的兩倍，它們的產量份額仍會繼續上升。

The exception to the rise of private business is in finance, telecoms and other high-tech business services, as well as in upstream oil and gas. In manufacturing, private companies now account for seven times more investment than state ones. But in services the share of state companies’ investment exceeds that of private companies and has declined only very slightly in recent years. Yet the productivity differential favours private service providers by a margin of two to one over state enterprises, suggesting a substantial misallocation of capital.

私營企業興起的例外是在金融、電信、其他高科技商業服務行業，以及油氣行業的上游領域。在製造業，私企現在的投資份額是國企的7倍。但在服務業，國企投資份額超過私企，近幾年只是略有下降。然而，私營服務提供商的生產率比國企高出一倍，這表明資本配置嚴重不當。

The footprint of state companies is shrinking but, because they earn far less than their cost of capital, they remain a drag on growth. If China enacts economic reforms announced last year – particularly eliminating all but natural monopolies such as power distribution – and making the market the decisive factor in the allocation of resources, private businesses will displace state enterprises in services. That would allow China to sustain a relatively high rate of growth and thus to continue its role as a leading driver of global growth. Those who make policies and predictions based on a fundamental misunderstanding of China’s ascent are likely to miss out.

中國國企的地盤正在縮小，但因爲它們的利潤遠低於資本成本，它們依然拖累了增長。如果中國實施去年宣佈的經濟改革（尤其是打破除電網等自然壟斷業務以外的一切壟斷），讓市場成爲資源配置的決定性因素，私企將取代國企在服務業的角色。這將讓中國保持相對高速的經濟增長，從而繼續其作爲全球增長主要驅動因素的角色。那些對中國崛起有着根本性誤解並據此制定政策和作出預測的人很可能錯失機遇。

The writer is a fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics and author of ‘Markets over Mao: The Rise of Private Business in China’

注：本文作者是彼得森國際經濟研究所(Peterson Institute)研究員，著有《市場高於毛澤東：中國私營企業的崛起》(Markets over Mao, the Rise of Private Business in China)一書。