中美貿易對峙兩不相讓,誰將成爲最後贏家?

SHANGHAI — At the heart of the intensifying trade dispute between the United States and China is a fundamental question: Which country is more willing to endure short-term pain for the long-term gain of playing a leading role in high-tech industries.

上海——處於美國與中國之間不斷加劇的貿易爭端核心的，是一個根本性的問題：哪個國家更願意承受短期痛苦，以換取在高技術產業起主導作用的長期利益。

China has embarked on an aggressive and expensive plan to retool its economy for the future as it moves to dominate in robotics, aerospace, artificial intelligence and more. President Trump has said China’s approach relies on unfair and predatory practices, and on stolen American technology. And even as Chinese leaders say they want to avoid a trade war, they are staunchly defending their plans and showing little sign of backing down.

中國爲了重組經濟，已經開始實施一項雄心勃勃、耗資巨大的計劃，力圖在機器人、航空航天、人工智能以及更多其他領域佔據主導地位。特朗普總統曾說，中國的做法依賴於不公平和掠奪性的手段，還依賴於竊取美國的技術。儘管中國領導人說，他們希望避免一場貿易戰，但他們依然在堅定地捍衛着自己的計劃，幾乎沒有一點退讓的跡象。

Mr. Trump’s threat to sharply escalate the administration’s tariffs on Chinese imports — a threat he reiterated on Friday — shows that neither side has yet gone far enough to persuade the other to compromise. Bigger and broader tariffs may be necessary to get China’s attention.

特朗普威脅要大幅提高美國政府對中國進口商品徵收的關稅，他在上週五重申了這個威脅。這表明，雙方都沒有做出足夠大的努力來說服對方妥協。要吸引中國的注意，也許需要徵收更多、更廣泛的關稅。

“The administration, if it’s serious, better be prepared for much more,” said Derek Scissors, resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute.

“政府最好有準備徵收更多的關稅，如果它是認真對待這個問題的話，”美國企業研究所(American Enterprise Institute)常駐學者史劍道(Derek Scissors)說。

China’s $300 billion plan for government assistance, Made in China 2025, calls for helping cutting-edge industries by providing low-interest loans from state-controlled banks, guaranteeing large market shares in China and offering extensive research subsidies. The goal is to help Chinese firms acquire Western competitors, develop advanced technology and construct immense factories with considerable economies of scale.

中國的3000億美元的政府扶植計劃《中國製造2025》呼籲爲前沿行業提供幫助，包括通過國有銀行提供低息貸款，在國內保證大的市場份額，以及提供大量研究補貼。這個計劃的目標是幫助中國企業收購西方競爭對手，開發先進技術，建設規模可觀的巨型工廠。

It is an agenda that China would probably go to great lengths to protect. “We will not start a war — however, if someone starts a war, we will definitely fight back,” Gao Feng, the commerce ministry spokesman, said at a news conference in Beijing on Friday. “No options will be ruled out.”

這是一箇中國可能會竭盡全力去保護的行動計劃。“我們不會挑事，但如果有人挑事，我們會堅決應戰，”中國商務部發言人高峯週五在北京的新聞發佈會上說。“我們不排除任何選項。”

For the United States, victory in such a war would be difficult to verify, much less achieve.

對於美國來說，在這樣一場戰爭中，什麼算勝利難以覈實，更不用說獲得勝利了。

China could say it plans to ease back on government support. But that could be difficult to quantify because of the country’s opaque political system and the state’s control of information.

中國可能會說，它計劃減少政府的資助。但是，由於中國不透明的政治體制和國家對信息的控制，很難對此進行量化。

China could back off from rules that favor local competitors and require American companies to share technology if they want access to the Chinese market. For example, foreign automakers face pressure to transfer electric-car technology to their local partners, and foreign technology companies are increasingly required to submit to security reviews. Foreign businesses have long complained that many of the rules they must follow are unwritten.

中國可能會放鬆有利於本國競爭者、要求美國公司如果想進入中國市場就必須共享技術的規則。比如，外國汽車製造商面臨着將電動汽車技術轉讓給當地合作伙伴的壓力，外國技術公司還越來越多地被要求接受安全審查。外國企業長期以來一直抱怨，他們必須遵守許多不成文的規則。

China’s government-financed campaign is already paying off in some ways. Drive into downtown Shanghai from Pudong International Airport and you pass a seemingly endless series of huge hangars and vast, glass-walled design centers, all part of the country’s effort to create a commercial aircraft manufacturing giant to rival Boeing or Airbus. Travel to factory districts in Shanghai and on the outskirts of many other Chinese cities and you see enormous, newly built factories ready to churn out electric cars, the batteries they use and other components.

中國政府提供資金的有計劃的活動在某些方面已經取得了成效。從浦東國際機場開車前往上海市區，你會經過一連串看上去無止境的巨型飛機庫，以及外面是巨大玻璃幕牆的設計中心，這是中國爲與波音(Boeing)或空客(Airbus)競爭，創造一個商用飛機制造巨頭努力的一部分。如果你前往上海工業園，或者去中國許多其他城市的郊區旅行，你會看到巨大的新建工廠，它們在準備批量生產電動汽車、電動汽車使用的電池，以及其他零部件。

Proving that the Chinese government unfairly supports the effort could be difficult, however.

然而，要證明中國政府不公平地支持這種努力，可能會十分困難。

The United States could press its argument with the World Trade Organization, which oversees global trading rules and prohibits big loans from government-controlled banks at artificially low interest rates. But the W.T.O. requires many contracts and government documents to prove cases, evidence that can be hard to get in a tightly controlled country like China.

美國可以向世界貿易組織(World Trade Organization)投訴，世貿組織負責監管全球貿易規則，並禁止政府控制的銀行以人爲壓低的利率發放大額貸款。但是，世貿組織需要大量合同和政府文件來證明案子成立；而在像中國這樣的政府嚴格控制的國家，得到這些證據很難。

Even when the W.T.O. rules against China, persuading the country to comply can be challenging. One such ruling, involving China’s restrictions on foreign electronic payment systems, was issued nearly six years ago. China is still mulling how it will comply — despite numerous complaints from the Obama administration and more recent nudges from the Trump administration.

即使世貿組織作出對中國不利的裁決，說服中國服從裁決也是一個挑戰。一項涉及中國對外國電子支付系統進行限制的裁決是將近六年前做出的。中國仍在考慮如何遵守裁決——儘管奧巴馬政府曾多次抱怨，儘管特朗普政府最近仍在慢慢做工作。

So the United States has turned to tariffs. That means it is using a 1980s tool to address an industrial policy issue that is already shaping the 21st century.

於是，美國轉向了關稅。這意味着，美國在使用一種20世紀80年代的工具，來解決一個已經在影響21世紀的產業政策問題。

Mr. Trump’s top trade official, Robert Lighthizer, was a deputy United States trade representative under President Ronald Reagan. The tariffs that Mr. Lighthizer threatened against Japan in those days are among the same ones he is wielding now. But the two periods differ in two big ways.

特朗普的高級貿易官員羅伯特·萊特希澤(Robert Lighthizer)曾在羅納德·里根(Ronald Reagan)總統手下擔任美國副貿易代表。萊特希澤在那些日子裏用來威脅日本的關稅與他現在正在使用的一樣。但是，這兩個時期在兩方面有很大的不同。

One is that Japan depended on the United States in the ’80s for military protection from the Soviet Union. China, by contrast, is an increasingly assertive global rival, sending naval vessels to the Baltic Sea and building a naval base in East Africa.

一是日本在20世紀80年代依靠美國的軍事保護來抵禦蘇聯。與日本不同，中國是一個日益自信的、與美國在全球競爭的對手，中國派海軍艦艇前往波羅的海，還在東非建立海軍基地。

The second major difference between then and now is that the European Union deeply resented the tariffs of the 1980s, and Mr. Trump’s use of them could make it difficult to persuade European officials to present a united front. In response to American tariffs, Beijing could simply shift business from American companies like Boeing and Ford to European rivals like Airbus and Daimler.

那時和現在的第二個主要區別是，歐盟對上世紀80年代的關稅深感不滿，特朗普再次使用這些關稅可能會使說服歐洲官員團結一致應對中國變得困難。作爲對美國關稅的迴應，中國政府可以輕而易舉地把與波音和福特(Ford)等美國公司的交易轉移到空中客車和戴姆勒(Daimler)等歐洲競爭對手那裏去。

Chinese officials dispute the American accusations about their unfair trade practices. They say Mr. Trump’s tariffs violate W.T.O. rules, and they dispute claims that China forces American companies to hand over technology. As for Made in China 2025, Chinese officials say the plan is only guidance, not a government directive — and that foreign companies are free to participate, too.

中國官員對於美國對中國不公平貿易行爲的指責有爭議。他們說特朗普的關稅違反了世貿組織的規則，他們還對中國強迫美國公司交出技術的說法表示異議。至於《中國製造2025》，中國官員稱，該計劃只是指南，不是政府指令，外國公司也可以自由參與。

In China’s current industrial policy, the Trump administration sees an extension of how the country has already come to dominate one major industry of the future: solar power.

在中國現行的產業政策中，特朗普政府看到了中國一種做法的延伸，這種做法已經讓中國開始主導一個未來重要產業：太陽能。

Mr. Trump himself is no fan of solar panels. He has spoken enthusiastically about coal, not renewable energy, throughout his campaign and his presidency. But the solar power industry is one of the biggest success stories so far in China’s efforts involving advanced industries.

特朗普本人不喜歡太陽能組件。在競選總統和擔任總統期間，他興致勃勃地談論煤炭，而不是可再生能源。但太陽能產業是迄今爲止中國在涉及先進產業的努力中最大的成功案例之一。

The United States played a central role in developing solar panels and manufacturing them until a decade ago. Around then, the Chinese government decided to finance a lavish expansion of the sector. State-controlled banks lent tens of billions of dollars at low interest rates despite the high-profile bankruptcies of solar manufacturers.

直到十年前，美國在開發和製造太陽能組件方面一直起核心作用。差不多在十年前，中國政府決定爲該行業的大規模擴張提供資金。雖然太陽能製造商在令人瞠目地破產，政府控股的銀行仍爲它們提供數百億美元的低息貸款。

Chinese firms now produce three-quarters of the world’s solar panels. Most American and European companies have closed factories, and many have become insolvent. China’s success in producing solar panels has given Beijing a blueprint for seizing the lead in a long list of other high-tech industries.

中國公司如今生產世界上四分之三的太陽能組件。大多數美國和歐洲的公司都關門了，許多公司已經沒有能力償還債務。中國在太陽能組件生產方面的成功，爲北京在其他高技術產業中佔據領先地位提供了藍圖。

Many foreign companies are caught between China’s industrial ambitions and Washington’s efforts to stop them, including major aerospace companies and carmakers. The conflict may spread: Made in China 2025 could create major competitors to General Electric and Intel, and to companies outside the United States like Siemens and Samsung.

包括大型航空公司和汽車製造商在內的許多外國公司，被夾在了中國的工業野心和華盛頓阻止這種野心的努力之間。這場衝突有可能會蔓延：《中國製造2025》可能會給通用電氣(General Electric)和英特爾(Intel)製造主要的競爭對手，也可能會給西門子(Siemens)和三星(Samsung)等美國以外的公司製造競爭對手。

Tariffs could hurt such companies if the United States and China follow through on their plans. They also risk losing their competitiveness if Beijing succeeds in subsidizing the creation of large Chinese rivals in their industries.

如果美國和中國把他們的計劃付諸實施，關稅可能會讓這些公司受到損害。如果北京在它們的行業中通過補貼製造出國內的大型競爭對手，這些公司也可能失去它們的競爭力。

Boeing, for example, could be hit by American tariffs on civilian aircraft parts it buys from Avic, a state-controlled Chinese military and aviation company — required purchases if the company, which is based in Chicago, wants to sell planes in China. China, in turn, is pushing a consortium that includes Avic to become a Boeing rival. Boeing, like other multinational companies, has refrained from endorsing or criticizing the tariffs.

比如，波音可能會在從中國政府控制的中國航空工業集團有限公司（簡稱“航空工業”）購買民用飛機部件時，受到美國關稅的打擊。如果這家總部位於芝加哥的公司希望把飛機賣給中國，就必須從航空工業購買零部件；而中國也正在推動一個包括航空工業在內的聯合企業，成爲波音的競爭對手。與其他跨國公司一樣，波音對徵收關稅不置可否。

“Although our members are unhappy with retaliatory tariffs being used,” said Kenneth Jarrett, the president of the American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai, “there is a belief that greater pressure has to be brought to bear on China.”

“儘管我們的成員對報復性關稅的使用感到不滿，”上海美國商會(American Chamber of Commerce)會長季瑞達(Kenneth Jarrett)說，“但有一種觀念認爲，必須對中國施加更大的壓力。”