中國經濟金融風險的債轉股有什麼不好

Earlier this year Chinese Premier Li Keqiang, responding to a press conference question about financial risk in the economy, said: “We can also use such market-oriented format as debt equity swap [by commercial banks] to help bring down the corporate leverage ratio.”

今年早些時候，中國總理李克強在一場新聞發佈會上回應有關中國經濟中金融風險的問題時說：“（我們）也可以通過市場化債轉股的方式來逐步降低企業的槓桿率”。

This remark was seized upon by the media, both inside and outside of China, but there has been almost no policy clarification by officials.

中外媒體都注意到了這句話，但中國官員幾乎還沒有從政策層面進行任何闡釋。

While details are sketchy, to say the least, I have nevertheless been surprised at the generally negative response to the proposal from analysts reported in the western news.

至少可以說，細節還沒有敲定，但在西方媒體的報道中，分析師們對債轉股的提議普遍持負面看法，這讓我感到驚訝。

Allowing banks to swap debt for equity in their borrowers is a prerequisite for consensual restructuring of indebted companies. For example, some businesses may be viable with a lower debt burden. If they can negotiate a “haircut” with lenders then they can continue to trade, preserving jobs and achieving a turnround. Alternatively, a debt reduction could pave the way for new investment, or enable struggling firms to be acquired by competitors driving synergies and much needed sector consolidation.

允許銀行將債務轉爲對借款人的股權，是在雙方同意的情況下對負債企業進行重組的前提條件。比如，有些公司只要減輕債務負擔就能繼續運營下去。如果它們能夠和貸款人協商進行減記，它們就能維持運營，保留就業崗位，實現扭虧爲盈。削減債務還能爲新投資鋪平道路，或者讓處境艱難的公司被競爭對手收購，從而產生協同效應，實現亟需的行業整合。

But banks are not motivated to write down their loans if they get nothing back in return. In doing so the banks take a loss and if the company can be turned around all of the upside goes to the shareholders. Allowing banks to take an equity stake in return for writing off some portion of their loans (they will rarely convert all) enables the banks to share in any upside. In successful cases, the equity upside could exceed the amount of the original loan.

但是，銀行如果得不到任何回報就沒有動力減記貸款。那樣做銀行要蒙受損失，即使公司扭虧爲盈，好處也都歸股東。允許銀行持有一部分股權，以減記公司的一部分貸款（銀行很少會將全部債務轉爲股權），一旦公司獲得盈利，銀行能夠從中分一杯羹。在成功的案例中，股權帶來的紅利可能超過原始貸款的金額。

To make an example, suppose Company X owes Bank Y $100m. Company X has a decent underlying business and with say $40m of investment in new plant and equipment its management believes they could improve margins and increase sales and ebitda.

舉個例子，假如X公司欠Y銀行1億美元。X公司的基礎業務經營得不錯，其管理層相信，如果能夠獲得4000萬美元的投資用於建設新廠房和購置設備，他們就能夠改善利潤率，提高銷售額和息稅折舊及攤銷前利潤(Ebitda)。

But Company X’s debt burden is too high, though it could handle $60m of debt if it got the new investment. In a case like this New Investor Z might sit down with Company X and Bank Y to negotiate a deal involving a debt-for-equity swap. Investor Z puts in $40m of new money for an equity stake. Bank Y also contributes $40m by way of debt forgiveness in return for equity.

但是X公司的債務太重了，不過如果它獲得4000萬美元新投資，它就能應付得起6000萬美元債務。在這種情況下，新投資方Z可能會和X公司、Y銀行坐下來協商一項債轉股協議。投資方Z拿出4000萬美元新投資，獲得股權。Y銀行也通過債務減免的方式貢獻4000萬美元，並換取股權。

A deal like this seems fair. Without the new money Company X will fail and everyone loses. Instead, Bank Y is asked to make the same contribution as Investor Z, but shares the returns if things go to plan. Although quite normal elsewhere, restructuring like this cannot happen in China as the banks are forbidden to hold equity.

這樣的協議看上去公平合理。沒有新投資，X公司就會破產，各方都有損失。而在這樣的協議下，Y銀行被要求與投資方Z貢獻同樣的資金，但如果事情按計劃進行，兩方就能分享回報。像這樣的重組在別的地方相當正常，但在中國不可能發生，因爲銀行被禁止持有股權。

So I fail to see how permitting the Chinese commercial banks to swap debt for equity can be bad per se for the banks or the economy at large. The alternative is either to crystallise a certain loss for the banks or, as is prevalent in China, to kick the can along the road by rolling over non-performing loans ad-infinitum (and we get so called “zombie enterprises”). Either case is bad for both the banking sector and the general economy.

因此，我看不出允許中國的商業銀行實施債轉股怎麼會對銀行本身，或者對更大範圍上的經濟有害。其他方案或者是讓銀行承擔一定的損失，或者就像中國盛行的做法，把不良貸款無休止地展期（於是就產生了所謂的“殭屍企業”）。不管是哪種做法，對銀行業和對整體經濟都是有害的。

Of course, if debt-equity swaps are mandated by the state or used only to patch up inefficient SOEs that might not be such a good thing. Although little known, there is precedent in China: banks were allowed to make equity conversions around the turn of the century at the same time as the big four asset management companies were established and in the boom years that followed some of these stakes may have done rather well.

當然，如果債轉股是政府強制執行的，或者僅僅是用來改善效率低下的國有企業，那麼債轉股可能就不是那麼好的一件事。儘管外界所知不多，但在中國的確有先例：大概在世紀之交的時候，銀行被允許進行債務置換，同時四大資產管理公司成立了起來，在之後的繁榮時期，其中一些股份的表現可能相當不錯。

In mature economies around the world debt restructurings are negotiated at arm’s length on commercial terms. If no deal can be reached based on transparent information flow and good-faith commercially motivated discussions, only then might a company slide into bankruptcy or liquidation. These are probably the companies that should be allowed to fail. Others can be given a new lease of life, facilitating optimal market-based restructuring in the economy and maximising returns from troubled loans to the banks.

在世界各地的成熟經濟體中，債務重組是各方獨立自主依據商業條款協商達成的。如果按照信息透明原則、出於商業動機進行誠信的協商還無法達成協議，那時一家公司纔會陷入破產或者清算的境地。這些公司很可能應該被允許破產。其他公司則可以被賦予新生，以促成經濟中最優的市場化重組，最大化銀行從不良貸款中獲得的回報。

Permitting Chinese commercial banks to hold equity stakes in their borrowers is an important and necessary step on the long and winding path toward sorting out the country’s multibillion renminbi non-performing loan problem. Policymakers should provide this essential instrument for the banks’ tool kits and, to paraphrase Mr Li again, allow market forces to play a decisive role.

解決中國鉅額不良貸款問題需要經歷一個漫長而曲折的過程，允許中國商業銀行持有借款人的股份是這個過程中重要和必要的一步。政策制定者應該在銀行的工具箱中加入這個基本手段，而且——再轉述一句李克強的話——要讓市場力量發揮決定性的作用。