關於中國與菲律賓南海較量 你只需要知道一件事情

China vs. Philippinesin South China Sea: The Only Thing You Need to Know

關於中國與菲律賓南海較量：你只需要知道一件事情

Manila can sue Beijing all it wants, but in the end it seemsChinese leaders already know how they will respond. . .

菲律賓可以隨意的控告中國，但是中國政府已經決定如何迴應…..

In just a few weeks the Permanent Court of Arbitration in TheHague will render its verdict in a case filed by the Philippines to challengeChina’s longstanding maritime claims in the South China Sea. While the resultof that arbitration remains unknown, Beijing has already telegraphed how itwill react should the court rule in Manila’s favor.

過不了幾個周，海牙法庭關於菲律賓提交的起訴中國關於南海主張的仲裁結果即將出爐。雖然結果還未知，但是中國已經表明自己將會採取什麼樣的措施，如果仲裁結果有利於菲律賓。

For months now, Chinese officials have made Beijing’s casefor rejecting the tribunal’s legal authority in the matter while characterizingManila’s gambit as “irresponsibly frivolous.” The Chinese foreign ministry hasalready questioned the court’s authority and is boycotting the entire process,which it has derided as an “orchestrated performance.” As legal scholar JeromeCohen noted in a recent article, both the Chinese Society ofInternational Law and the All China Lawyers Association have issued “dutifulsupporting arguments” in favor of snubbing the process.

最近幾個月內，中國官員依照北京指示拒絕承認海牙法庭的法律權威，並且指責菲律賓的控訴是極不負責行爲。中國外交部已經質疑並且抵制整個過程，並嘲笑其爲精心策劃的鬧劇。正如法學專家科恩在其文章裏提到的，爲了阻止該仲裁過程，所有中國的國際和國內法律協會都對該仲裁案提出了質疑，

More important to understanding Beijing’s mind-set on thematter is the fact that even if the court had had the authority to rule in thecase and the powers to enforce its decision, it is highly unlikely that Beijingwould have been any more inclined to accede. The reason behind this is directlyrelated to the historical narrative of “national humiliation” and the beliefthat as a product of Western imperialism, global institutions and the legalarchitecture of international law are little more than mechanisms to maintain askewed distribution of power. In other words, a ruling by an internationalcourt against Beijing would have provided more “evidence” that the West, alongwith its allies in East Asia, are conspiring to keep China in a state ofsubjugation. As Zheng Wang demonstrates in his book Never Forget National Humiliation, the victimization narrative wields a powerfulinfluence on decisionmaking in Beijing and public support for its doggedresponse to the perceived affront. A survey conducted in 2013 by Andrew Chubbalso shows that 83 percent of Chinese respondents regarded the South China Seadispute as a continuation of theso-called “century of humiliation.”

在這件事上我們需要清楚的瞭解中國的想法，因爲即使海牙法庭有權利進行仲裁和有能力執行仲裁結果，中國也不可能接受仲裁結果。在仲裁案背後，中國有着很強烈的歷史觀“國家恥辱”，並且堅信現有的國際法律體系只不過是西方帝國主義和國際組織爲了維持權利平衡而設立的機制。也就是說，如果國際法庭作出不利於中國的裁決，那麼更加證明西方國家及其盟友東亞國家正在合謀壓制中國。正如鄭旺在其書《永不忘記的國家恥辱》中所提現的，受害者心態影響着北京的決定，並且促使公衆強烈支持對抵抗外來冒犯有。安德魯丘博在2013年做的調研表明83%的中國民衆認爲南海爭端是中國世紀恥辱的延續。

Having attained a certain level of respectability ininternational relations, Beijing is no longer a “status quo” power. Ittherefore has less compunction in seeking to undermine or reconfigure globalinstitutions when it sees fit, to “reorder the world” so as to better align thesystem with the new norms created by China’s reemergence as a majorcivilizational power.

除了在一定程度上尊重國際關係，中國已經不是“維持現狀”的力量。因此在北京認爲合適的時候，將會毫無內疚的破壞或者重新構造國際組織，以此來更好的適應中國再次崛起爲一個主要的文明力量下的新常態體系。

The fate of the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s ruling isalready sealed. Appealing to international law may have been a good idea onpaper, but from the outset it had no chance of having any impact on thedispute.

南海仲裁案的結局已經註定，通過國際法來解決問題只是紙上談兵，國際法從來就不會對南海爭議產生影響。