希臘公投開啓潘多拉魔盒

August 1914 was a descent into hell. May 1945 was an escape from hell. July 2015, the month of a surreal Greek referendum that had no clear question and an answer whose meaning is disputable, will go down in history as a continuation of hell — for Greece, and for Europe.

1914年8月歐洲墜入地獄。1945年5月，歐洲逃離地獄。2015年7月將作爲希臘乃至整個歐洲再次滑入地獄的日子載入史冊——在這個月裏，希臘舉行了離奇公投，這次公投沒有提出明確的問題，而給出的答案是否有何意義也頗具爭議。

Policy makers in some eurozone capitals will shed crocodile tears and explain the No vote as a regrettable, but voluntary act of Greek self-exclusion from Europe’s monetary union. They will unfold a prepared narrative according to which Greece’s European creditors — a more accurate term than allies or partners — bear no blame whatsoever for this debacle.

歐元區一些國家的政策制定者將會流下鱷魚的眼淚，並把希臘人對國際救助條款說“不”的投票結果解釋爲，希臘令人遺憾、但自願地選擇從歐洲貨幣聯盟自我排除。他們將拿出已經事先準備好的說辭，而在這種說辭中，希臘的歐洲債權人——比盟友或夥伴更爲精確的說法——對這場災難不承擔任何罪責。

Secretly, or not so secretly, some will relish getting the head of Alexis Tsipras, Greece’s radical leftist premier, served to them on a platter. But the question to which they will have no convincing answer is what the Greek disaster implies for the cause of European unity or the stability of the Balkans.

一些人將私下或公開地希望希臘激進的左翼總理亞歷克西斯•齊普拉斯(Alexis Tsipras)的頭顱盛在盤子裏呈到自己面前。但是，有一個問題他們將無法令人信服地回答：希臘災難對歐洲一體化的大業或巴爾幹地區的穩定意味着什麼。

In Greece the No vote will widen political fissures in a society knocked senseless by an economic slump. Greeks who voted Yes will treat the outcome as a calamity comparable to the 1922 military defeat at Turkish hands that resulted in the annihilation of Greek civilisation in Asia Minor. Greeks who voted No will rapidly learn that there is no salvation, only misery, ahead.

在希臘，否決結果將擴大社會中的政治裂縫，而經濟低迷已經把社會打擊得失去了理智。投支持票的希臘人將會把這種結果視爲堪比1922年軍事失利於土耳其之手的災難，當時的失利導致了小亞細亞地區希臘文明的毀滅。投反對票的希臘人將很快明白未來不會有什麼救贖，只有痛苦。

The question to which no Greeks will have a convincing answer is how, at long last, to put their country on a path of modernisation in which political parties, business oligarchs, trade unions and ordinary citizens act, at least some of the time, in the public interest. As in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, Greece is doomed to be a ward of Europe for many years to come, a condition that hardly encourages self-reliance and commitment to reform.

而希臘人將無法確切回答的問題是，終究該如何讓自己的國家走上現代化的正途，使各政黨、商業寡頭、工會和普通公民至少在某些時候採取符合公衆利益的行動。就像波黑和科索沃一樣，希臘註定將在未來很多年成爲歐洲的一個病區，在這種情況下將很難鼓勵其自力更生並下定決心推進改革。

Mr Tsipras and his ruling Syriza party were too cunning to phrase the referendum question as “in or out of the euro”, a wording that would have permitted Greeks to understand that what was really at stake was their modern European identity. As a result, the outcome does not resolve the fundamental conundrum: that most Greeks want to stay in the eurozone but detest the austerity that has bled them dry since 2010.

齊普拉斯及其領導的執政黨激進左翼聯盟黨(Syriza)太過狡猾，沒有將此次公投的問題描述爲“留在還是退出歐元區”，而這種描述本可以讓希臘人明白公投真正攸關的是他們的現代歐洲身份。結果，公投並未解決根本問題：多數希臘人希望留在歐元區，但痛恨自2010年以來逐漸榨乾他們的緊縮政策。

Mr Tsipras and his government will forever bear the responsibility for having thrown away the best cards he had, upon winning Greece’s parliamentary elections in January, for negotiating a new rescue deal with the creditors. Greece had, and still has, a strong case for debt relief. Greece had, and still has, a strong case for shifting the emphasis of a new rescue deal away from austerity and towards economic growth.

齊普拉斯及其政府將永遠揹負罪責——他們在1月一贏得希臘議會選舉，就扔掉了與債權人就新的援助協議進行談判的最好的牌。希臘過去曾經有、現在仍然擁有有力理由，要求債務減免；希臘過去曾經有、現在仍然擁有有力理由，要求新援助協議的重心由緊縮轉向經濟增長。

But with what Loukas Tsoukalis, a Greek economics professor, calls “a lethal combination of arrogance and the diplomatic grace of an elephant”, the Syriza leadership alienated everyone else in the 19-nation eurozone. It is some feat to unite Europe’s squabbling political leaders — just think of the continuing, acrimonious rows over how to handle the refugee crisis in the Mediterranean — but Mr Tsipras and his colleagues managed it, bringing catastrophe to their nation.

但是，憑藉希臘經濟學教授勞卡斯•楚卡里斯(Loukas Tsoukalis)所稱的“大象的傲慢和外交優雅的致命組合”，激進左翼聯盟黨的領導層疏遠了由19國組成的歐元區中的所有其他國家。如果能把歐洲爭吵不休的政治領導人團結起來，那可算是某種壯舉——只需要想想圍繞地中海難民危機如何解決的持續不斷的激烈爭吵便可以明白——但是齊普拉斯及其同僚做到了，只不過給他們自己的國家帶來了災難。

Europe’s other leaders should take no comfort from this. Their anti-Greek unity is hollow. In theory, the Greek horror show ought to inspire them with the will to grasp the nettle of building the more cohesive banking, economic, fiscal and political union that is essential to the survival of the monetary union launched in 1999. There are, indeed, concrete policy proposals to this effect: the so-called Five Presidents’ Report, published by Jean-Claude Juncker, the European Commission chief, last month.

歐洲其他領導人不應該對此感到幸災樂禍。他們的反希臘聯盟是沒有意義的。從理論上講，希臘的恐怖秀應該激起他們迎難而上、打造更有凝聚力的銀行、經濟、財政和政治聯盟的決心——這對這個於1999年建立的貨幣聯盟的存續至關重要。現在的確有以此爲目的的具體政策提議—— 歐盟委員會(European Commission)主席讓-克洛德•容克(Jean-Claude Juncker)於上個月公佈的所謂的“五總管報告”(Five Presidents’ Report)。

But in reality each European government is pulled this way and that by the national public opinion from which each, ultimately, derives its legitimacy. This might have been less of a problem if, as Wolfgang Schäuble, Germany’s finance minister, suggested in 1994, European monetary union had been limited to a “hard core” centred on Germany and a small group of advanced, neighbouring countries.

但是事實上，每一個歐洲國家政府都被各自的國內公衆意見拽向不同方向，因爲它們最終都從後者獲得合法性。如果如德國財長沃爾夫岡•朔伊布勒(Wolfgang Schäuble) 1994年建議的，歐洲貨幣聯盟被限制在以德國爲中心的“中堅核心”以及少數鄰近的發達國家內，上述情況可能問題沒那麼大。

But the expansion of the eurozone into central, eastern and southern Europe changed the picture. Some of the governments that advocate the strictest possible line in the Greek debt crisis are former communist countries that joined the EU in 2004 and, remaining short of western European levels of prosperity, voice outrage at the notion of special treatment for Greece.

但是歐元區擴大至歐洲中部、東部和南部，改變了這種局面。一些主張對希臘債務危機採取最嚴厲立場的政府，是在2004年加入歐盟(EU)的前共產主義國家的政府，這些國家仍然沒趕上西歐的繁榮水平，它們對給予希臘特殊待遇表達了憤怒。

Too many eurozone policy makers are complacent about the risks of political and financial contagion from the Greek nightmare. Arguably, these risks will not emerge in the short term, with the European Stability Mechanism firewall in place and the European Central Bank committed to whatever emergency action is required to protect the eurozone.

太多的歐元區政策制定者對希臘噩夢帶來的政治和金融蔓延風險掉以輕心。或許，有歐洲穩定機制(European Stability Mechanism)防火牆，有歐洲央行(ECB)承諾採取任何必要的緊急行動來保護歐元區，這些風險短期內不會出現。

But in years to come, the dangers will become all too evident. Unless a stronger union is built, on solid democratic foundations, Europe’s hell will persist.

但是在未來數年，這種危險將變得十分明顯。除非在堅實的民主基礎上建立更強大的聯盟，否則歐洲將會持續在地獄中煎熬。