新興市場變革的引擎 The real engine of the Brics is China

The leaders of the Brics – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – held their seventh annual summit amid deep scepticism about their once-promising growth story. While Russia may have been the host of the show, the real engine behind the summit, and the changes taking place across the emerging world, is China.

金磚國家（Brics，指巴西、俄羅斯、印度、中國和南非5國）領導人剛剛舉行了第七屆年度峯會，此際外界對於這些國家曾經頗有希望的增長故事持嚴重懷疑態度。儘管俄羅斯是東道主，但此次峯會以及整個新興市場發生的變革背後，真正的引擎是中國。

Right now, the Brics face serious cyclical and structural challenges and India seems to be the only bright spot in the club. Russia, Brazil and South Africa are either in recession or dangerously close to it. China is struggling to maintain its growth momentum as it tries to rebalance its economy. All need to implement deep and difficult structural reforms if they want to increase their long term growth potential and live up to the Brics dream as it was envisioned in the early 2000s.

目前，金磚國家面臨嚴重的週期性和結構性挑戰，印度似乎是唯一的亮點。俄羅斯、巴西和南非要麼正處於衰退，要麼正危險地逼近衰退。中國正在努力實現經濟轉型之際艱難保持其增長勢頭。要想提高長期增長潛力，並實現金磚國家在本世紀初提出的夢想，所有這些國家都需要實行深刻且艱難的結構性改革。

Yet, over the last 15 years, the Brics story has been little short of spectacular. In 2001, when the term was coined, their combined GDP was a quarter of that of the US. Now, it is almost on a par. What was little more than a loose concept has given rise to institutions such as the Brics Bank and the Contingent Reserve Agreement. Regular dialogue is taking place among the five countries above and beyond their regular summits.

然而，過去15年，金磚國家的故事並不缺少壯舉。2001年，當“金磚國家”這個詞首次出現時，這些國家的國內生產總值(GDP)總額爲美國的四分之一。如今，它們幾乎可與美國比肩。這個不過是個鬆散概念的詞彙，促成了“金磚銀行”(Brics Bank)以及應急儲備安排(Contingent Reserve Agreement)等機制的誕生。除了定期峯會以外，金磚5國還在定期舉行對話。

But the Brics are not a club of equals and their balance of power has changed radically over time. China’s GDP is now almost 60 per cent larger than the other four countries combined. In 2001, it was 10 per cent smaller. More importantly, and in a stark departure from its usual restraint, China has decided to play a more assertive role in the pursuit of its global financial agenda. Indeed, 2015 is likely to go down in the financial history books as the year when China awoke.

但金磚5國的實力並不均衡，隨着時間的流逝，它們的力量平衡發生了徹底的變化。中國的GDP現在比其他4國的GDP總和高出近60%。2001年，中國的GDP比其他4國GDP總和低10%。更重要的是，與往常的低調迥然不同的是，中國決定在實現其全球金融議程的過程中扮演更強硬角色。實際上，2015年可能會成爲金融史上中國覺醒的一年。

This change of attitude is partly due to the frustration caused by a lack of progress in reforming the Bretton Woods institutions, and particularly by Washington’s continued inability to ratify reforms that were supposed to give additional IMF voting rights to emerging countries, most notably to China which currently has less voting rights than the Benelux countries.

這種態度的轉變在一定程度上源於對佈雷頓森林(Bretton Woods)機構改革缺乏進展感到失望，尤其是美國一直沒能批准將國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)更多投票權賦予新興國家的改革措施，特別是賦予中國更多投票權，中國目前的投票權低於比利時、荷蘭和盧森堡三國之和。

Faced with such paralysis, at a time when development banks are more needed than ever to tackle the challenges of infrastructure and sustainable development finance, China has decided to organize things for itself and to promote a set of new financial institutions. Three have been formally established: the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which has been capitalized with $100bn dollars and is headquartered in Beijing; the New Development Bank (Brics Bank), based in Shanghai and with starting capital of $50bn; and an associated Contingent Reserve Arrangement of $100bn, which will receive up to $41bn from China.

面對這種無所作爲，在全球比任何時候都更需要開發銀行，來解決基礎設施和可持續開發性金融面臨的挑戰之際，中國決定自己組織力量，推動一系列新的金融機構的設立。中國已正式創建了3個機構：亞洲基礎設施投資銀行(AIIB)，法定資本爲1000億美元，總部位於北京；新開發銀行（New Development Bank，即“金磚銀行”），總部設在上海，初始資本爲500億美元；以及配套的應急儲備安排，規模爲1000億美元，中國最高出資410億美元。

In addition is a Silk Road fund with $40bn of capital put up exclusively by China. It will be used for equity investments in infrastructure projects on land and sea that, like the old Silk Road, will further connect China with Central Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Europe and beyond.

此外還有總規模爲400億美元的絲路基金(Silk Road fund)，完全由中國出資。該基金將用於陸地和海上基礎設施項目的股權投資，與過去的“絲綢之路”一樣，這些設施將進一步加強中國與中亞、中東、非洲、歐洲以及其他國家的聯繫。

China, then, is spearheading the development of a group of institutions within the region and more broadly within emerging markets that will contribute to financing economic development and to sustaining financial and commercial dynamism. If they are successful, these institutions will increase the potential growth rate of the region, will consolidate China’s central role in it and will help the country find new engines of growth at a time when its traditional engines are sputtering.

因此，中國正在引領本地區以及更廣泛的新興市場內一系列機構的發展，這將有助於爲它們的經濟發展提供資金，以及維持金融和商業動力。如果取得成功，這些機構將推升該地區的潛在增長率，鞏固中國在該地區的主導角色，並將有助於中國在傳統增長引擎失靈之際找到新的增長引擎。

To strengthen the entire architecture, Beijing is determined to give the renminbi a central role as a trade and investment currency. In the last five years, tremendous progress has been achieved on this front. From virtually zero, 25 per cent of China’s international trade and 30 per cent of its direct investment abroad are now denominated in renminbi. The renminbi has become one of the most widely used currencies, particularly in Asia. To facilitate its use and to ensure its liquidity, China has signed currency swap agreements with close to 30 countries and has set up RMB clearing centres on all continents. Finally, China has forcefully expressed its wish that its currency should be included in the SDR basket as part of the ongoing revision process to accelerate its rise as a reserve currency. The infrastructure underpinning the internationalization of the renminbi is rapidly taking shape across the world and will culminate with its wide acceptance as a reserve currency.

爲了加強整體架構，中國政府決心讓人民幣成爲主要的貿易和投資貨幣。在過去5年裏，中國在這方面取得了巨大進展。在中國的國際貿易和對外直接投資中，以人民幣計價的比例從基本上爲零分別上升至25%和30%。人民幣已經成爲全球（尤其是在亞洲）使用最廣的貨幣之一。爲了方便人民幣的使用並確保其流動性，中國與近30個國家簽署了貨幣互換協議，並在所有大陸建立了人民幣清算中心。最後，中國強烈表達了希望人民幣被納入特別提款權(SDR)貨幣籃子的願望，這是中國加快讓人民幣成爲儲備貨幣的持續修正過程的一部分。支持人民幣國際化的基礎設施迅速在世界各地成型，並將隨着人民幣被廣泛接受爲儲備貨幣而達到頂峯。

This being China, there is an element of pragmatism in the promotion of these institutions. China is seeding different entities and will likely provide the greatest support over time to the ones that, by its own criteria, are the most successful. For the time being, there is clearly a coincidence of interests among the Brics and Chinese dominance serves the other members well, as does the creation of an alternative system to Bretton Woods. The mobilisation of capital to spur their development and strengthen their resilience is very welcome at a time when liquidity is likely to become tighter and, in the case of Russia, sanctions are biting. Over the longer term, however, Chinese dominance over the Brics will likely create tensions as significant strategic differences between the members become more visible.

由於背後是中國，因此這些機構所得到的推動有務實的色彩。中國正在培育不同的實體，並很可能隨着時間推移，對按自己標準衡量最爲成功的那些機構提供最大的支持。就現在而言，金磚國家的利益顯然保持一致，中國佔據主導地位也很符合其他成員國的利益，創建一個替代佈雷頓森林體系的體系也是如此。在流動性可能緊縮、俄羅斯遭受制裁之際，調動資本支持各國發展並增強它們的適應力，受到熱烈歡迎。然而，就更長期而言，隨着各成員國的巨大戰略差異變得日益明顯，中國在金磚國家中佔據主導地位可能導致緊張局勢。

Yet the historical importance of these developments should not be missed. As China lays out a web of new trade and capital routes which connect Asia with the Middle East, Africa and Latin America, it positions itself at the centre of a new growth dynamic linking 85 per cent of the world’s population.

然而，我們不應忽視這些發展在歷史上的重要意義。隨着中國設計出將亞洲與中東、非洲和拉美連接起來的新的貿易和資本路線圖網絡，中國正將自己定位於連接全球85%人口的新增長動力的中心。