切斷ISIS的經濟命脈 Isis and the war for oil
It has always been hard to accept the argument that the series of wars in the Middle East since 2001 have been about oil. Afghanistan is not an oil state and most of the oil which will be produced from Iraq will end up in China and the Far East rather than in the United States or Europe. On the other hand what is happening now in Syria and Northern Iraq shows that oil and power are inseparably linked.
我們一直很難接受這樣一種觀點，即中東自2001年以來發生的一系列戰爭都與石油相關。阿富汗並非產油國，而伊拉克未來開採的大部分石油將運往中國以及遠東地區，而非美國或歐洲。另一方面，敘利亞與伊拉克北部如今的形勢表明，石油與實力之間有着密不可分的聯繫。
As the FT reported in October, in building its caliphate Isis has not followed al-Qaeda in relying on donations from rich supporters in Saudi Arabia or other parts of the Persian Gulf. Instead the ISIS leadership created its own economic structure in the territories it controlled based almost entirely on oil revenue. Another report published in December recorded in fascinating detail how oil from fields such as al-Tamak and al-Omar in the eastern Syrian province of Deir Exxor and from the Qayyara field close to Mosul in northern Iraq made its way mostly in trucks to other parts of both countries and beyond. In an almost medieval economy, some was even carried in pans on the backs of mules or donkeys. Even rebels fighting Isis within Syria turned out to be dependent for their basic fuel supplies on purchases of illicit oil which helped to fund their opponents.
英國《金融時報》去年10月報道稱，在建立哈里發國的過程中，“伊斯蘭國”(ISIS)並未效仿基地組織(al-Qaeda)在資金上依靠沙特阿拉伯或波斯灣其他地區富裕支持者捐贈的做法。相反，ISIS領導層在其控制的地盤建立了幾乎完全依靠石油收入的經濟體系。去年12月發表的另一篇報道介紹了一些引人入勝的細節：產於敘利亞東部省份代爾祖爾(Deir Ezzor)的al-Tamak、al-Omar等油田以及伊拉克北部摩蘇爾附近的Qayyara油田的石油，是如何主要通過卡車運往兩國其他地區及境外的。某些經濟活動簡直是中世紀的翻版：一部分石油甚至用駝於騾子或驢背上的鐵鍋運輸。就連敘利亞境內與ISIS作戰的叛軍都要依靠購買非法油料來保障基本燃料供應，儘管這麼做幫助了他們的對手獲得資金。
At one point, Isis was earning as much as $40m a month from oil, using a professional operation which was tightly controlled from the centre. That money allowed Isis to create the semblance of an effective government and no doubt also funded the purchase of arms and weaponry.
藉助從中心嚴密控制的專業經營，ISIS一度每月獲得多達4000萬美元的石油收入。這些資金讓ISIS創建了一個貌似有效的政府，無疑還被用於購買武器裝備。
That position has now been degraded by the bombing campaigns initiated by the French and the Russians which the British have recently joined. As well as attempting to decapitate the leadership structure of Isis, the air strikes have clearly targeted a number of key elements in the chain of activities from production and refining to the transport links which allowed Isis to make money from whatever it could produce.
如今，由法、俄兩國發起（英國最近也加入）的轟炸戰役已削弱了ISIS的這種地位。在對ISIS領導層實施斬首行動的同時，空中打擊的目標顯然還包括整條活動鏈上的多個要素（從生產和煉油，到運輸線），這一鏈條使得ISIS無論生產什麼都可以賺錢。
A recent article in Iraq Oil Report summarised the state of play towards the end of 2015:
《伊拉克石油報》(Iraq Oil Report)最近一篇文章總結了接近2015年底時的情況：
- Production is down as field infrastructure has been hit by bombing. Some oil continues to flow automatically and has to be stored temporarily in holes dug hurriedly in the ground.
—— 隨着油田基礎設施遭到轟炸，產量下滑。有些石油在繼續自動噴涌，不得不在地上匆忙挖出大坑，將其暫時儲存。
- Key refining links have been broken forcing the use of primitive techniques using open pits to make usable products.
—— 關鍵的煉油環節遭到破壞，不得不使用原始技術，利用露天作業生產能用的產品。
- The fall in the price has cut margins – already low because of discounting and is discouraging the black market trade because the risks involved now far outstrip the rewards especially for the tanker drivers.
—— 油價下跌壓低了因爲打折原本就低的利潤率，同時打擊了黑市交易，因爲如今在黑市倒賣石油的風險遠遠大於回報，特別是對油罐車司機而言。
This, however, is far from the end of the story. Isis has not been defeated. The Iraqi army, no doubt with a good deal of help from outside, has retaken territory north of Baghdad. The situation on the ground is not quite trench warfare, but the unending conflict over narrow strips of land which pass from one side to another at enormous cost in terms of lives and physical damage is reminiscent of the battles of the first world war.
然而，這遠非故事的結局。ISIS並未被擊潰。在大量外援的幫助下，伊拉克軍隊在巴格達以北收復了一部分失地。戰場局勢雖然不是典型的塹壕戰，但以人命和物質損失的巨大代價反覆爭奪狹窄區域的無休止拉鋸戰，難免讓人聯想起第一次世界大戰的戰鬥。
As well as the human suffering, the environmental damage must be horrendous. What remains of Ramadi ( 80 per cent of the city is said to be in ruins ) is for the moment in Iraqi hands, but the major city of Mosul, despite promises of a renewed assault by Iraqi forces, is not. There and elsewhere across the region Isis still appears to be in control.
除了對人類造成的苦難外，對環境的破壞也必然是極大的。拉馬迪的斷壁殘垣（據稱該城80%成爲廢墟）如今回到了伊拉克軍隊手中，但摩蘇爾這個大城市沒那麼幸運，儘管伊拉克軍隊承諾再次發動進攻。摩蘇爾及整個地區的其他地方似乎仍處於ISIS的控制之下。
An undefeated Isis remains a serious threat – in the immediate region and beyond. So far there has been no impact on the world market from any action taken by Isis because the volumes involved have been so small. Even at its peak, oil production from territory controlled by Isis never exceeded 70,000 barrels per day. That position could change.
未被擊潰的ISIS仍構成嚴重威脅——無論對當地還是對世界都是如此。迄今爲止，由於涉及的數量太少，ISIS的任何行動都未對世界石油市場造成影響。即使在峯值時期，ISIS控制區的石油日產量也從未超過7萬桶。這一產量水平可能發生變化。
In northern Iraq Isis now has a clear incentive to try to take further oil installations of which there are many around Mosul, particularly to the east and area of Kirkuk. The main fields should be well defended but others are more vulnerable. An Isis move towards Kirkuk would widen the physical conflict and that could bring the bombing campaign close to areas holding much more significant volumes of oil.
在伊拉克北部，ISIS如今有強烈動機設法進一步搶佔摩蘇爾周邊的許多石油設施，特別是在摩蘇爾以東以及基爾庫克地區。主要油田應當得到了嚴密保衛，但其它設施可能比較脆弱。ISIS向基爾庫克逼近將擴大武裝衝突的範圍，並將轟炸戰役引向那些石油儲量多得多的地區。
At the same time there is evidence that Isis appreciates the potential to use attacks on oil installations to weaken their opponents. Last week’s attack on facilities near al-Sidra in Libya is just one example of what can be done to cut revenue and to discourage new investment in a country where oil provides 95 per cent of exports and 75 per cent of the national budget.
與此同時，有證據表明，ISIS明白攻擊石油設施以削弱對手的意義。ISIS近期對利比亞al-Sidra附近石油設施的襲擊就是一例——在一個石油佔出口95%、佔國家預算75%的國家，這麼做能夠打擊政府的財政收入，嚇阻對該國的新投資。
Isis has every incentive to make sure that Libya declines into being a failed state.
ISIS完全有動機希望利比亞淪落爲失敗國家。
Even if the oil producing region in the eastern province of Saudi Arabia is assumed to be too well defended for Isis to penetrate, there are still substantial potential targets in Egypt, Algeria and the wider oil producing regions of Iraq itself. Isis has shown that while the principal focus is on the territory it holds the organisation still has the ability to venture into other areas in order to undermine existing regimes and to demonstrate its remaining power. If one of the aims of the caliphate is to drive foreigners out of the region another successful attack on oil facilities could well prove successful.
即使假設沙特東部省份的產油區保衛嚴密，足以防止ISIS滲透，在埃及、阿爾及利亞乃至伊拉克境內的大片產油區，仍有大量的潛在目標容易受到攻擊。ISIS已經表現出，雖然其主要關注點在自己控制的地盤內，但該組織仍有能力滲入其他地區，以破壞現政權，展示自己尚存的實力。如果ISIS的目標之一是把外國人趕出中東地區，那麼對石油設施發動又一次成功襲擊就可能達到目的。
The bombing campaign has changed the game in Syria and northern Iraq. Isis can no longer depend on a steady flow of revenue through the creation of a quasi national oil enterprise. That business model – “Isis Inc” in the words of the first FT report – looks dead. But the war for oil and power across the region is far from over.
轟炸戰役改變了敘利亞和伊拉克北部的遊戲規則。ISIS無法再通過建立準國有石油公司獲得穩定收入。這種商業模式——前述英國《金融時報》首篇報道稱其爲“ISIS公司”(ISIS Inc)——似乎已被絞殺。但中東地區爭奪石油與實力的戰爭還遠未結束。
