中華復興:中國的"責任大國"之路

In 2005 Robert Zoellick, as US deputy secretary of state, proposed that China might play the role of “responsible stakeholder” in shaping the international agenda. Despite its rise, most observers now do not see Beijing playing this role. China is often seen as unco-operative on issues ranging from trade and investment flows to intellectual property rights, climate change and the acquisition of natural resources. This has created the impression that Beijing is more inclined to use its clout to advance core interests than strengthen partnerships.

2005年時任美國副國務卿的羅伯特•佐利克(Robert Zoellick)提出，中國應在國際事務領域扮演“負責任的利益相關方”角色。雖然中國日漸崛起，但絕大多數觀察家目前並未看到中國擔負起這一職責。在貿易與投資流動、知識產權、氣候變化以及自然資源採購等問題上，中國常被看做是一個不願合作的國家。這給外界留下了一種印象，即中國政府更願意運用自身政治影響力來增進核心利益，而非加強夥伴關係。

Some observers have interpreted President Xi Jinping’s “China dream” to mean that he will adopt a more nationalistic policy. But in advance of his first state trips to Russia and Africa, he stressed that his country’s great national renewal” would benefit the world and that “as its strength increases, it will assume more international responsibilities”.

某些觀察家把中國國家主席習近平提出的“中國夢”解讀爲，這意味着習近平將採取一種更具民族主義色彩的執政風格。但在對俄羅斯和非洲進行首次國事訪問之前，習近平強調說，中華民族的偉大復興將有益於整個世界，“隨着國力不斷增強，中國將承擔更多國際責任”。

Mr Zoellick may have been right, just a decade premature. Evolving circumstances could lead China to becoming a responsible stakeholder but much will depend on its actions and those of western powers.

佐利克或許是對的，但他的提議較現實超前了十年。國際局勢的不斷演進可能促使中國成爲一個“負責任的利益相關方”，但這在很大程度上將取決於中國自身與西方大國的行動。

The nation is becoming a more “normal” economy – relying less on centrally driven investments in moving to a more market-driven growth path. But normality means slower growth and greater vulnerability to cycles. The country can no longer maintain stability by controlling interest and exchange rates and limiting capital movements, while internationalising the renminbi involves greater risks.

中國正在逐步成爲一個更加正常的經濟體，較少依賴於中央主導型投資，轉向以市場驅動爲主的增長路徑。但“正常”意味着經濟增速的放緩以及更易受到經濟週期波動影響。中國無法繼續依靠控制利率和匯率以及限制資本流動來保持經濟穩定，而人民幣國際化則蘊含着更大的風險。

The result is that Beijing’s instincts are reactive rather than designed to forge long-term solutions. Its economic success is pushing it to act as a leading power prematurely.

由此產生的結果是，中國政府的才能僅限於應對當下問題，而不適於設計長期解決方案。中國的經濟成就正迫使中國過早地像一個世界主要大國那樣行事。

China’s tensions with the west intensified as its trade surpluses surged in the past decade. These surpluses have been depicted as the result of exchange rate manipulation and unfair subsidies.

近十年來，隨着中國貿易順差規模的快速增長，中國與西方關係的緊張程度加劇。貿易順差被外界描繪爲中國操縱本國匯率以及實施不公平貿易補貼的結果。

But country’s long history also affects its thinking. It is a returning economic power – one that accounted for 30 per cent of global production two centuries ago but saw its share fall to less than 5 per cent by 1950. Even today at 15 per cent it is only half of what it once was. Moreover, China’s ability to escape the middle-income trap is not guaranteed. Only a handful of middle-income countries have made the transition in the past four decades, and none with China’s formidable handicaps. Foremost among these is that the country will become old before becoming rich, with the needs of the elderly representing a huge financial burden.

悠久的歷史對中國的思維方式也有影響。中國是一個正在復興的經濟大國。在兩個世紀以前，中國在全球總產值中所佔比重高達30%，但到1950年，這一比重降至不足5%。即使如今中國在全球總產值中所佔比重已回升至15%，但也依然僅是過去的二分之一。此外，中國並不一定有能力避開中等收入陷阱。在過去的四十年中，成功實現轉型的中等收入國家屈指可數，而且沒有一個具有像中國這樣難以克服的不利條件。其中最主要的困難在於，中國社會將未富先老，對老年人的福利支出將帶來沉重的財政負擔。

Many observers do not appreciate that China ranks only 90th internationally in per capita income. China also recognises the reality that if it succumbs to a debilitating economic crisis, adequate external financial support is unlikely to materialise because of its sheer size.

按人均國民收入計算，中國在全球僅名列第90位，很多觀察家不正視這一點。中國也意識到，如果經受不住經濟危機的負面影響，自身過於龐大的經濟規模將使其不太可能獲得充足的外部財政支持。

All this suggests the nation may not be ready to move into the role of a responsible stakeholder. But more positive outcomes are possible as its status in the international financial system is recalibrated to reflect its enhanced standing.

所有這些都表明，中國或許還沒有準備好擔當起“負責任的利益相關方”的角色。但如果中國在國際金融體系中的地位得到重估，以反映其影響力的提升，那麼就有可能產生更爲積極的結果。

Beijing has incentives to support more open markets domestically and fight protectionism. This would help counter criticisms of its trade practices and put pressure on those countries inclined to raise barriers.

中國政府願意支持進一步開放國內市場和打擊保護主義。這將有助於回擊對中國貿易舉措的批評，並給那些有意提高貿易壁壘的國家以壓力。

Nudging China in the direction of becoming a responsible stakeholder will gain momentum if Beijing has more say in the system. There are lessons from the way that the US has been pushing the trans-Pacific Partnership. If it had been more flexibly designed, China might have seen itself as having a stake in developing a productive outcome.

如果中國在國際體系內擁有更多的發言權，將有助於推動中國朝着成爲一個負責任的利益相關方的方向邁進。美國推動跨太平洋夥伴關係協定的方式值得借鑑。如果當時的機制設計更爲靈活，中國或許會把取得更有建設性的結果看作與自身利益密切相關。

Criticism of China’s economic policies affects Beijing’s perception of itself if it believes it is suffering from a system not of its making. The key is convincing China that its interests are best served by forging solutions through compromise and co-operation and reassuring Beijing that its concerns will be heard.

如果中國認爲一個自身在其中說不上話的體系正損及本國利益，那麼對於中國經濟政策的批評將影響中國對自身的認知。問題的關鍵在於說服中國相信，通過妥協與合作形成解決方案是最符合中國自身利益的，此外還應打消中國方面的疑慮，使其相信自身的擔憂將得到傾聽。

The writer is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment and a former World Bank director for China

本文作者爲美國卡內基國際和平基金會(Carnegie Endowment)高級研究員，曾任世界銀行(World Bank)中國業務局局長