人民幣政策背後的木馬戰略和全球目標(上)
China long kept a tight hold on its currency as a way to control its economy and to help its factories sell their products overseas.
爲了控制本國經濟，幫助國內工廠在海外銷售產品，中國對自己的貨幣一直管得很嚴。
But China has grown in economic power and ambition, and the old restrictions are not helping a country that hopes to call more of the world’s financial shots.
但中國的經濟實力和雄心都已經壯大了起來，對於一個希望在世界金融中能更多地呼風喚雨的國家，這些舊有的限制無法提供幫助。
In his new book, Gaining Currency: The Rise of the Renminbi, Eswar S.
埃斯瓦爾•S•普拉薩德(Eswar S.
Prasad describes how China’s view of its currency has evolved, starting from the Han dynasty — China invented paper money, of course — to today’s globally ambitious leadership.
Prasad)在自己的新書《不斷升值的貨幣——人民幣的崛起》(Gaining Currency: The Rise of the Renminbi)中，自漢朝——當然，紙幣就是中國發明的——到希望雄心勃勃引領全球的今天，描述了中國對其貨幣看法的演化。
Mr Prasad, a professor at the Dyson School of Applied Economics and Management at Cornell University and senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, was formerly head of the International Monetary Fund’s China division.
普拉薩德曾任國際貨幣基金組織的中國事務主管，現爲康奈爾大學戴森應用經濟與管理學院教授兼布魯金斯學會高級研究員。
In an interview, he explained China’s motivations, how money can be a back door to overhauling the country’s financial system and why some people fear a financially powerful China.
在採訪中，他解釋了中國的動機、貨幣是怎樣能成爲徹底改革國家金融體系的後門的，以及爲什麼有些人害怕金融上強大的中國。
Why is China reconsidering the role of its currency?
爲什麼中國在重新考慮其貨幣的角色？
China is increasing its dominance in the world economy.
中國正在加強其在世界經濟上的主導地位。
But there was a sense that China wasn’t getting the respect that it felt it deserved.
但目前有一種意識，即中國沒有得到它覺得自己應得的尊重。
One of the manifestations of that was that its currency was not quite seen as an elite currency.
這個問題的表現之一，是中國的貨幣還沒有被完全視爲精英貨幣。
Chinese policy makers, especially the more reformist-minded officials, recognized that China needs to do a lot of work to get its financial markets ready before the renminbi could become a prominent international currency.
中國的決策者們，特別是那些致力於改革的官員們認識到，在人民幣成爲重要國際貨幣之前，中國需要讓自己的金融市場有所準備，因此有大量的工作要做。
Of course, there is a lot of opposition to such reforms because the system worked well for a lot of politically and economically powerful people.
當然，有很多人反對這種金融改革，因爲現行體制對許多政治、經濟上強大的人很有利。
About three or four years ago, these reformist-minded officials had a very important insight: If they could get the Chinese people and leadership to sign on to making the renminbi a great global currency, that could provide a very useful mechanism for getting around the opposition and putting in place a lot of reforms.
大約三、四年前，這些致力於改革的官員有了一個非常重要的洞悉：如果他們能夠得到中國人民和中國領導人的支持，讓人民幣成爲重要全球貨幣，這就可以提供一個非常有用的機制，繞過反對意見，讓許多改革措施得以實施。
Ultimately it would be good for China, no matter what happened to the currency.
不管人民幣發生什麼，這最終都將對中國有利。
I view this as a sort of Trojan horse strategy.
我認爲這是一種特洛伊木馬策略。
Making the currency international requires meeting requirements from foreign institutions like the I.M.F.
讓貨幣國際化需要滿足來自國際貨幣基金組織等外國機構的要求。
At the same time, China is increasingly wary of what it calls Western influences.
與此同時，中國對所謂的西方影響越來越擔心。
Can those external pressures still help China overhaul its financial system?
這些外部壓力還能幫助中國徹底改革其金融體系嗎？
These serve a very positive role, but they must come from the right sources in the right fashion.
雖然這些外部壓力能起一種非常積極的作用，但壓力必須來自合適的地方，以對的方式進行施加。
When the US Treasury or the I.M.F. tells China to allow its currency to appreciate, that is seen as something that is not necessarily in China’s best interest.
當美國財政部或國際貨幣基金組織告訴中國要允許其貨幣升值時，這種要求被視爲不一定是符合中國最佳利益的東西。
When it comes to matters where the West has some sort of prize to offer, that changes the dynamic.
當涉及到西方可以提供某種獎勵的事情時，情況就會有所改變了。
We’ve seen some examples of that over the last year and a half.
我們在過去一年半中看到了一些這種例子。
When China decided it wanted to get the renminbi into the I.M.F.’s elite basket of currencies, it felt that this would be a great way of getting more prestige for its currency in one fell swoop.
當中國決定讓人民幣進入國際貨幣基金組織的精英貨幣籃子時，它覺得這是一下子能爲人民幣贏得更大聲望的好辦法。
The I.M.F. and China came together and decided on a checklist of things that China needed to accomplish over the next year.
國際貨幣基金組織與中國一起制定了一個清單，需要中國在之後一年裏完成。
That checklist turned out to be very useful particularly for the People’s Bank of China [China’s central bank] in pushing out its reforms.
這份清單被證明非常有用，尤其是對（中國的央行）中國人民銀行改革措施的推出。
After the 2008 financial crisis, the United States pumped money into its financial system, which in effect lowered the value of China’s vast holdings of American debt.
2008年金融危機之後，美國向其金融體系輸入了大量貨幣，這實際上降低了中國持有的龐大美國債務的價值。
How has that affected China’s ambitions for its currency?
這件事情是怎樣影響中國對其貨幣的野心的？
It is a matter of enormous frustration for China that the US has such a dominant role in global finance.
美國在全球金融中有如此主導性的作用，對中國來說是一個巨大的煩惱。
Because of its old policies, China has become even more vulnerable to US policy, especially monetary policy.
中國過去的政策讓這個國家更容易受美國政策、特別是美國貨幣政策的影響。
Chinese are net creditors to the rest of the world.
中國是世界上其他地方的淨債權人。
That is, the world owes China a lot more than China owes to the world.
也就是說，全世界欠中國的錢，比中國欠世界的多。
But the net income that China’s earning — the amount paid by foreign investors minus the amount it pays out to foreign investors — is in fact negative.
但中國的淨收入實際上是負的，淨收入指的是外國投資者支付的金額減去向外國投資者支付的金額。
Foreign investors get pretty good returns in China.
外國投資者在中國有相當好的回報。
But China, because most of its foreign assets are in the form of US Treasuries and the government securities of other advanced economies, is earning piddling rates of return.
但因爲中國大部分的國外資產以美國國債和其他發達經濟體的政府證券的形式持有，中國只得到了極低的利息回報。
The fact that the US dollar is so dominant in global finance, and also that the architecture of global finance is controlled by the US and the Western economies, frustrates the Chinese.
美元在全球金融中占主導地位，以及全球金融體系的構架由美國和西方經濟體控制的事實，都讓中國人不滿。
I think the Chinese feel that the system is stacked against them.
我覺得中國人認爲這個體系對自己不利。
Many foreign economists say China should loosen its grip on its financial system — opening the capital account, as policy wonks call it.
許多外國經濟學家說，中國應該放鬆對本國金融體系的控制，用政策人士的話說，應該開放資本賬戶。
But you quote one respected Chinese voice, Justin Lin Yifu, criticizing that view.
但你引用了批評這種觀點的一個備受尊重的中國聲音——林毅夫。
