中國困境會引發全球危機嗎

So, will China’s problems cause a global crisis? The good news is that the numbers, as I read them, don’t seem big enough. The bad news is that I could be wrong, because global contagion often seems to end up being worse than hard numbers say it should. And the worse news is that if China does deliver a bad shock to the rest of the world, we are remarkably unready to deal with the consequences.

中國的問題會引發全球危機嗎？好消息是，在我看來，這些數據似乎不夠糟糕。壞消息是，我也許會錯，因爲危機在全球蔓延的情況，似乎通常會比實在的數據反映的情況更糟糕。更壞的消息是，如果中國確實會給世界其他地方造成巨大沖擊，那麼我們還沒準備好應對相關後果。

For those just starting to pay attention: It has been obvious for a while that China’s economy is in big trouble. How big is hard to say, because nobody believes official Chinese statistics.

有些人剛開始關注這個問題，但很明顯，中國經濟遇到大麻煩已有一段時間了。很難說這個麻煩有多大，因爲沒人相信中國官方的統計數據。

The basic problem is that China’s economic model, which involves very high saving and very low consumption, was only sustainable as long as the country could grow extremely fast, justifying high investment. This in turn was possible when China had vast reserves of underemployed rural labor. But that’s no longer true, and China now faces the tricky task of transitioning to much lower growth without stumbling into recession.

主要問題在於中國高儲蓄低消費的經濟模式，只有在該國經濟保持極快增長的情況下才能維持，這支持了高投資的合理性。當中國擁有大量未充分就業的農村勞動力儲備時，這是可能實現的。但現在情況不同了，中國目前面臨一個棘手的任務：過渡到增長率較低，但不至於陷入衰退的水平。

A reasonable strategy would have been to buy time with credit expansion and infrastructure spending while reforming the economy in ways that put more purchasing power into families’ hands. Unfortunately, China pursued only the first half of that strategy, buying time and then squandering it. The result has been rapidly rising debt, much of it owed to poorly regulated “shadow banks,” and a threat of financial meltdown.

可以通過信貸擴張、增加基礎設施開支來爭取時間，同時改革經濟以便增強家庭購買力，這原本是一個合理的策略。遺憾的是，中國只追求該策略的前半部分，爭取到了時間，然後又浪費掉了時間。結果導致債務快速增加，這在很大程度上歸咎於欠缺監管的“影子銀行”，可能會誘發金融崩盤。

So the Chinese situation looks fairly grim — and new numbers have reinforced fears of a hard landing, leading not just to a plunge in Chinese stocks but to sharp declines in stock prices worldwide.

因此，中國的情況看起來相當嚴峻，而新發布的數據加劇了人們對硬着陸的擔憂，不僅導致中國股市下跌，還導致世界各地的股價大跌。

O.K., so far so bad. And some smart people think that the global implications are really scary; George Soros is comparing it to 2008.

好吧，到目前爲止情況就是這麼糟糕。一些聰明人認爲，這種全球性的影響真的很可怕；喬治·索羅斯(George Soros)將它與2008年金融危機相提並論。

As I suggested above, however, I have a hard time making the numbers for that kind of catastrophe work. Yes, China is a big economy, accounting in particular for about a quarter of world manufacturing, so what happens there has implications for all of us. And China buys more than $2 trillion worth of goods and services from the rest of the world each year. But it’s a big world, with a total gross domestic product excluding China of more than $60 trillion. Even a drastic fall in Chinese imports would be only a modest hit to world spending.

但正如我上面說到的，我很難根據數字得出會出現這種災難的論斷。是的，中國是一個經濟大國，大約佔全球製造業總產值的四分之一，因此中國發生的事情會影響到我們所有人。中國每年從世界其他地方購買價值兩萬億美元的商品和服務。但這個世界很大，除中國之外，其他國家的國內生產總值加起來超過60萬億美元。即便中國進口額大幅下降，也只會對全球消費造成有限的衝擊。

What about financial linkages? One reason America’s subprime crisis turned global in 2008 was that foreigners in general, and European banks in particular, turned out to be badly exposed to losses on U.S. securities. But China has capital controls — that is, it isn’t very open to foreign investors — so there’s very little direct spillover from plunging stocks or even domestic debt defaults.

那金融關聯性呢？美國次貸危機在2008年蔓延至全球的一個原因是，外國人，特別是歐洲的銀行，因持有美國證券而受到了嚴重衝擊。但中國實行資本管制，也就是說不怎麼對外國投資者開放，所以中國股市下跌甚至國內債務違約，幾乎不會對其他國家造成直接影響。

All of this says that while China itself is in big trouble, the consequences for the rest of us should be manageable. But I have to admit that I’m not as relaxed about this as the above analysis says I should be. If you like, I lack the courage of my complacency. Why?

這一切都說明，雖然中國自身面臨大麻煩，其他國家受到的影響應該是可控的。但我必須承認，我沒有上述分析說的那麼放鬆。可以說，我沒有勇氣自鳴得意。爲什麼呢？

Part of the answer is that business cycles across nations often seem to be more synchronized than they “should” be. For example, Europe and the United States export to each other only a small fraction of what they produce, yet they often have recessions and recoveries at the same time. Financial linkages may be part of the story, but one also suspects that there is psychological contagion: Good or bad news in one major economy affects animal spirits in others.

答案部分在於，各國的經濟週期通常似乎比“應有水平”更加同步。例如，歐洲和美國相互出口的商品只佔其產量的一小部分，但它們通常同時衰退和復甦。金融關聯性可能是一部分原因，但有人也推測存在心理感染的問題：與主要經濟體有關的好消息或壞消息，會影響其他經濟體的“動物精神”(animal spirits)。

So I worry that China may export its woes in ways back-of-the-envelope calculations miss, that the Middle Kingdom’s troubles will one way or another have the effect of depressing investment spending in America and Europe as well as in other emerging markets. And if my worries come true, we are woefully unready to deal with the shock.

因此我擔心，中國可能會以粗略的計算無法體現的方式，輸出其面臨的問題；擔心中國的問題會以某種方式抑制美國、歐洲及其他新興市場的投資支出。如果我的擔心成爲現實，那麼我們並沒有準備好應對這種衝擊，這很糟糕。

After all, who would respond to a China shock, and how? Monetary policy would probably be of little help. With interest rates still close to zero and inflation still below target, the Fed would have limited ability to fight an economic downdraft in any case, and it has probably reduced its effectiveness further by signaling its eagerness to raise rates at the first excuse. Meanwhile, the European Central Bank is already pushing to the limits of its political mandate in its own so far unsuccessful effort to raise inflation.

歸根結底，誰來應對中國的衝擊，以及會如何應對呢？貨幣政策可能沒有多大幫助。由於利率仍然處在接近零的水平，通脹仍然低於目標，美聯儲要抗擊經濟下滑問題，其能力無論如何都是有限的。而且美聯儲還表示，一有理由就會提高利率，這種信號可能進一步削弱了其動作的效果。與此同時，歐洲中央銀行已經將政治權力用到極限，努力提高通脹水平，但迄今爲止尚未成功。

And while fiscal policy — essentially, spending more to offset the effects of China spending less — would surely work, how many people believe that Republicans would be receptive to a new Obama stimulus plan, or that German politicians would look kindly on a proposal for bigger deficits in Europe?

雖然財政政策——實際上是通過增加開支來抵消中國減少的開支——肯定會發揮作用，但有多少人相信，共和黨人會接受奧巴馬提出的新刺激計劃，或者德國政治人物會樂於看到相關提議導致歐洲揹負更大赤字？

Now, my best guess is still that things won’t be that bad — nasty in China, but just a bit of turbulence elsewhere. And I really, really hope that guess is right, because we don’t seem to have a plan B anywhere in sight.

目前我仍然猜想，最大的可能性是情況不會那麼糟糕——中國的局面會很嚴重，但其他地方只是出現一些波動。我真的，真的希望，我的猜測是正確的，因爲目前任何地方似乎都沒有B計劃。