人民幣國際化中暗潮雲涌的矛盾

We hate you guys.” This was how Luo Ping, a senior official at the China Banking Regulatory Commission, vented his frustration at the US in 2009. He and others in China believed that, as the US Federal Reserve printed money to resuscitate American demand, the value of China’s vast US Treasury bond holdings would plunge along with the dollar. “Once you start issuing $1tn-$2tn . . . we know the dollar is going to depreciate so we hate you guys – but there is nothing much we can do,” Mr Luo told a New York audience.

“我們討厭你們這些傢伙。”2009年中國銀監會(CBRC)高官羅平在發泄自己對美國的不滿時如是說。他和中國其他一些人相信，隨着美聯儲(Fed)爲恢復美國需求而增印鈔票，中國所持有的大量美國國債會和美元一道貶值。羅平對一批紐約聽衆說：“一旦你們啓動1萬億至2萬億美元的印鈔……我們就知道美元會貶值，因此我們討厭你們這些傢伙，但我們沒有辦法。”

These frustrations have been catalysts of great change. The authoritarian rulers of 1.3bn people felt an imperative to reassert control. Imbued with the resentful narrative of a “century of national humiliation”, they felt the prospect of the US squandering Chinese wealth was an indignity too far. In response, Beijing decided to hasten the promotion of the renminbi as a global currency. That way China’s exporters could earn “redbacks” rather than greenbacks, allowing their revenues to be invested at home rather than recycled into US Treasuries – the only pool of dollar liquidity big and safe enough to absorb significant investments from China’s reserves (which rose to $3.95tn at the end of March).

這些不滿成爲中國發生鉅變的催化劑。這個擁有13億國民的政府感到了重新掌握控制權的必要性。“百年國恥”這一充滿憤怒的說法深入他們的內心，他們一想到美國有可能揮霍中國的財富就倍感侮辱。對此，中國政府決定加快推進人民幣的全球化。這樣中國的出口企業就可以賺回人民幣而不是美元，於是它們的收入就能投到國內，而不必重新流入美國國債——這是唯一一個流動性和安全性都高到足以吸收中國外匯儲備大量投資的美元資產池。今年3月末中國的外匯儲備攀升至3.95萬億美元。

Therefore, the genesis of renminbi internationalisation, which will be a key theme during the UK visit this week of Prime Minister Li Keqiang, is indivisible from China’s aspiration to blaze its own trail rather than integrate into a Pax Americana in whose creation it had no say.

因此，人民幣國際化（中國總理李克強本週訪英的一個關鍵主題）的起因，脫離不了中國對開闢自己道路的渴望，它不願融入“美國治下的和平”(Pax Americana)，畢竟它在其中沒有發言權。

The scheme is showing signs of success. Financial capitals are competing for a slice of the fast-growing market in offshore renminbi. London plans to underline its credentials by designating China Construction Bank as a clearing bank for the currency. This should make trading in renminbi more efficient, more liquid and less risky. It could also attract Chinese companies keen to invest in Europe, and make it easier for investors to enter China’s capital markets.

中國人的計劃正顯露出成功的跡象。全球金融資本都爭着想在快速增長的人民幣離岸市場上分一杯羹。倫敦想通過指定中國建設銀行(CCB)爲人民幣清算銀行來凸顯自己的資格。此舉應會令人民幣交易的效率和流動性增加，風險減少。這還能吸引渴望在歐洲投資的中國公司，也能讓投資者更方便地進入中國資本市場。

The use of renminbi as a global payments currency is growing rapidly, though from a small base. In April it was the seventh most used currency, with 1.4 per cent of transfers, up from 0.6 per cent in January 2013, according to Swift, the international payments network. In the US the redback is also gaining a following, with the value of renminbi payments between the US and the rest of the world rising 327 per cent in April, compared with the value in April 2013.

人民幣作爲全球支付貨幣的使用量增長迅速，儘管基數很小。根據國際支付系統Swift的數據，今年4月人民幣成爲全球第七大支付貨幣，在所有轉賬支付中佔1.4%，而2013年1月這個比例只有0.6%。人民幣在美國也獲得青睞，今年4月美國與其他國家之間的人民幣支付價值與去年同期相比增長了327%。

At times, adopting the renminbi is portrayed as a snub to the US. Russian politicians have called for a “de-dollarisation” of their economy after sanctions imposed by the US and EU in response to Moscow’s annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea.

使用人民幣有時會被描繪爲對美國的冷落。俄羅斯吞併烏克蘭的克里米亞後招致歐美製裁，俄國政客們遂呼籲本國經濟“去美元化”。

Such are the easy wins. Creating a genuine world currency will be much harder, rubbing up against the central paradox of China’s emergence: its political system relies on control while acceptance into global free markets needs liberalisation.

這些都是人民幣全球化相對容易取得的進展。但創造一個名副其實的世界貨幣要困難得多，它會與中國崛起的核心矛盾發生摩擦：其政治體制依賴於管控，而被全球自由市場接受則需要自由化。

Institutions that hold renminbi have precious little scope to invest them. China has opened only tiny apertures for foreign investors in its domestic capital markets, promoting instead an offshore renminbi capital market that is as yet minuscule in comparison with its US dollar counterpart. Jonathan Anderson, economist at the Emerging Advisors Group, estimates that in mid-2013 total capital market assets freely available to international investors in US dollars were worth $55tn; in euros, $29tn; in yen, $17tn; and, in sterling, $9tn. The renminbi offered a mere $250bn. “That is about 0.1 per cent of the global market, putting the renminbi on a par with the Philippine peso and just a bit higher than the Peruvian nuevo sol,” Mr Anderson wrote.

人民幣持有機構鮮有將所持人民幣投出去的機會。中國在國內資本市場只爲外國投資者開了一個小孔，卻努力推進人民幣離岸資本市場的發展，而與美元資本市場相比，它的規模仍微不足道。Emerging Advisors Group的經濟學家喬納森•安德森(Jonathan Anderson)估計，2013年年中，可供全球投資者自由投資的資本市場總資產中，美元資產總價值爲55萬億美元，歐元資產總價值爲29萬億美元，日元資產總價值爲17萬億美元，英鎊資產總價值爲9萬億美元。而人民幣資產總價值僅爲2500億美元。安德森寫道：“這一數額約爲全球市場的0.1%，令人民幣的地位與菲律賓比索差不多，僅略高於祕魯的新索爾。”

Of course, Beijing could throw open its capital markets but doing so might leave it at the mercy of the type of capital outflow that precipitated the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s. It would also require the opening up of its state-owned banks, local government bond issuers and state companies to scrutiny from foreign investors.

當然，中國政府可以敞開國內資本市場的大門，但這樣或許會使它遭遇嚴重的資本外逃，這樣的資本外逃曾引發20世紀90年代末的亞洲金融危機。而且中國的國有銀行、地方政府發債機構和國有企業也要向外國投資者開放監督。

So reasserting one form of control would entail sacrificing another: winning a measure of freedom from the “dollar zone” and the concurrent influence of the Fed would imply inviting in the oversight of global capitalism, the rules of which were written under Pax Americana.

因此，想要重獲某種控制權就必須犧牲另一種：贏得脫離“美元區”及美聯儲影響的一定自由，就意味着邀請全球資本主義的監督，而後者的種種規則正是在“美國治下的和平”框架下制定的。