人民幣國際化不能依賴SDR

The International Monetary Fund delivered a valuable imprimatur of respectability to Beijing last week, when it declared that its exchange rate was probably no longer undervalued. The assessment was not a surprise: respected independent outfits such as the Peterson Institute and the consultancy Oxford Economics have been saying similar for a while.

國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)近日宣佈人民幣匯率很可能不再被低估，這相當於對北京的聲譽予以了寶貴的認可。這樣的評估結果不算出人意料：包括彼得森國際經濟研究所(Peterson Institute)與諮詢機構牛津經濟研究院(Oxford Economics)在內，許多受尊敬的獨立機構一段時間以來就一再表達了類似的看法。

The judgment increases the already rising probability that the renminbi might be included in the units that make up Special Drawing Rights (SDR), commonly though inaccurately known as the IMF’s currency, when the composition of the basket is reassessed later this year. Some regard this as a pivotal moment in the internationalisation of the renminbi. But history suggests that, while it may be symbolically important, membership of the SDR is neither necessary nor sufficient for the renminbi’s acceptance as a global reserve currency.

IMF的結論提高了一種本來就在不斷上升的可能性：今年晚些時候IMF重新評估特別提款權(SDR)貨幣籃子的構成時，有可能決定將人民幣納入這個籃子。所謂SDR，也就是人們常說的IMF貨幣，雖然這種叫法並不準確。有些人認爲，這將是人民幣國際化進程中的一個關鍵時刻。但歷史經驗表明，雖然加入SDR或許具有重要的象徵意義，但對於人民幣成爲一種公認的全球儲備貨幣來說，這既非必要條件，也非充分條件。

The SDR asset, sometimes likened to a monetary Esperanto, is a peculiar creature. Created in the 1960s to meet the world’s demand for reserve assets when the dollar — constrained by its link to gold — could not do so, that rationale disappeared when the Bretton Woods system collapsed in the early 1970s. Since then, even after the creation of $250bn in SDRs in 2009 to boost reserves and liquidity during the global financial crisis, they make up less than 4 per cent of non-gold global official foreign exchange reserves, less than half the level in the 1970s.

SDR資產是一種奇特的產物，有時被比喻爲貨幣領域的世界語。它誕生於上世紀60年代，目的是滿足世界對儲備資產的需求，因爲當時美元受制於與黃金掛鉤無法擔當此任。然而，當佈雷頓森林體系(Bretton Woods)於上世紀70年代初瓦解後，這種理由也就不存在了。從那時起，包括在2009年新增2500億美元SDR以提振全球金融危機期間的儲備和流動性之後，其在全球官方非黃金外匯儲備中所佔的比例都不到4%，還不到上世紀70年代水平的一半。

This renders the SDR largely irrelevant except in a minor role as an accounting unit: the basket of four currencies that compose it — the dollar, the euro, the yen and sterling — is occasionally used to value internationally traded goods. There is no liquid private market in SDR assets and to use SDRs for intervention or other purposes first requires them being broken down into their constituent currencies.

這使得SDR大體上變得無足輕重，除了作爲一種覈算單位的次要角色：由4種貨幣（美元、歐元、日元和英鎊）構成的貨幣籃子只是偶爾被用於評估國際貿易商品的價值。目前不存在具有流動性的SDR資產私人市場，而要利用SDR資產進行干預或其他目的，首先需要把它們分解爲成分貨幣。

A few years ago Zhou Xiaochuan, then governor of the People’s Bank of China, called for the SDR to become a super-sovereign reserve currency. That call was treated respectfully as a contribution to the global monetary governance debate in much of the world. In the US, probably correctly, it was regarded as part of China’s campaign to get other countries to bail it out of its own lopsided reserve accumulation policies by allowing Beijing to transform its dollar-denominated reserves into SDRs without selling its dollars on the open market.

中國人民銀行行長周小川幾年前曾呼籲將SDR變成一種超主權儲備貨幣。他的呼籲在世界大部分地區被尊稱爲對全球貨幣管理辯論的貢獻。在美國，周的呼籲被認爲是中國策略的一部分，目的是讓其他國家幫助自己擺脫不平衡的外匯儲備積累政策，方便北京將美元計值的儲備資產轉變爲SDR資產，而無需在公開市場出售美元——這種觀點或許是正確的。

The renminbi’s potential addition to the SDR, whose basket is reviewed every five years, carries risks for the credibility of the asset itself. If the unit is to take off as a reserve and indeed privately held asset, it will need to develop a deep and liquid market. This may not be assisted by the addition of a currency like the renminbi which, though its use has been growing rapidly, is still not much traded in foreign exchanges and which has a very small share of global bond markets and cross-border bank lending.

人民幣加入SDR（其貨幣籃子每五年審覈一次）會給SDR資產自身的信譽帶來風險。如果SDR要成爲一種儲備資產甚至是私人持有的資產，它需要發展成一個具備深度和流動性的市場。而人民幣的加入可能並不會助推這一進程，雖然人民幣的使用量一直在迅速增長，但它在外匯市場中的交易量仍然不多，而且在全球債券市場和跨境銀行放貸中所佔份額也很小。

It is not at all clear that the renminbi meets the IMF’s requirement to be “freely usable”. The renminbi is neither fully convertible nor free-floating, remaining subject to capital controls and opportunistic open market intervention. The inclusion of illiquid currencies has weakened the SDR in the past. To make it tractable at all, the IMF membership had to whittle the basket down from its original sixteen currencies in the 1970s to five after 1981, later compressed to four as the D-Mark and the French franc were subsumed into the euro.

目前完全不清楚的是，人民幣是否滿足IMF關於“可自由使用”的條件。人民幣既不是完全可兌換，也不能自由浮動，仍受制於資本管制以及相機而動的公開市場干預。歷史上，IMF將低流動性貨幣納入SDR曾削弱了SDR。爲了更加便於管控，IMF不得不將貨幣籃子從上世紀70年代的16種貨幣削減至1981年後的5種，後來隨着德國馬克和法國法郎被併入歐元又減少至4種。

As for the renminbi itself, it would undoubtedly get a symbolic boost to its credibility by being invited into the SDR basket with the big kids. But reserves managers around the world are conservative and independent characters, and are unlikely to outsource their assessment of what constitutes a liquid and reliable currency to a politically influenced process at the IMF. They are much more likely to want to hold renminbi assets if they know they can be bought and sold easily and quickly and that the value of the currency is not going to be jerked around by political meddling.

至於人民幣本身，被邀加入SDR貨幣籃子（從而躋身主流貨幣行列）對其信譽無疑會起到象徵性的提升作用。但世界各地的外匯儲備管理者都是保守、獨立的人士，他們不大可能會將自己評估一種貨幣是否具有流動性和可信度的任務外包給IMF的一項受政治影響的程序。如果他們知道人民幣資產能夠便利、快速地買賣，而且其價值不受政治干預所左右，他們會更有可能想要持有人民幣資產。

Precautionary reserves are held for the purposes of market intervention, not to earn a return, so deep and liquid markets are leading concerns. SDR membership is neither necessary nor sufficient for reserve asset status. The Swiss franc, for example, is quite widely held as a reserve currency (certainly relative to the size of the Swiss economy) without being in the SDR basket.

持有預防性儲備的目的是爲了進行市場干預，而不是爲了獲得回報，所以有深度、有流動性的市場是首要的考量。SDR資格對於儲備資產地位來說既不是必要條件，也不是充分條件。例如，瑞士法郎並沒有被納入SDR貨幣籃子，但它被相當普遍地（當然是相對於瑞士經濟規模而言）作爲一種儲備貨幣而持有。

Researchers at Citi asked official reserves managers recently if they agreed that SDR membership would increase their willingness to hold renminbi assets (Citi economists themselves are bullish on the issue). On average they found the answer somewhere between “agree” and “neither agree nor disagree”: not nothing, but unlikely to be a major influence.

花旗(Citi)的研究人員最近詢問了官方儲備管理者，他們是否同意，人民幣加入SDR將增加他們持有人民幣資產的意願（花旗的經濟學家們對此持樂觀態度）。總的看來，他們發現答案介於“同意”和“既不同意也不反對”之間：不是沒有影響，但不大可能造成重要影響。

As it happens, perhaps unexpectedly, the euro may serve as an example of reserves management reality overcoming symbolism. Upon its launch in 1999, the euro was often predicted to rival the dollar as a global reserve asset, eliminating the exchange rate risk between different European currencies and forming the basis of a large and unified pool of assets.

歐元或許可以作爲外匯儲備管理方面現實戰勝象徵意義的一個例子，這一點人們可能不曾料到。1999年歐元問世時，人們通常預計歐元將會與美元競爭全球儲備貨幣的地位，它將消除歐洲不同國家貨幣間的匯率風險，並作爲一個龐大而統一的資產池的基礎。

In practice, the euro’s share of reported global reserves, after rising to around a quarter, stalled and then somewhat fell back. The inept management of the euro crisis may be a factor, as may the fact that the eurozone sovereign bond market remains fractured into liquid safe assets (Bunds) and riskier instruments (most of the rest). But even before the crisis, the habit of European politicians in trying to talk down the euro whenever they considered it to be threatening their exports caused amused head-shaking by their American counterparts, who regarded the hands-off “strong dollar” policy as integral to the greenback’s status as a reserve currency. (Of course, it remains to be seen what effect on confidence will have the campaigns of quantitative easing in all four SDR currency areas, with consequent large swings in exchange rates, albeit without forex intervention.) China is likely to keep the nominal renminbi-dollar rate stable between now and the decision on the SDR at the end of the year, but is unlikely to eschew various forms of meddling indefinitely.

在現實中，歐元在全球外匯儲備公開數據中所佔的份額先是上升至25%左右，然後停滯不前，後來又有所回落。對歐元區危機處理不當可能是一個因素，而以下事實可能也有影響：歐元區主權債券市場仍分裂爲流動、安全的資產（德國國債）和風險較高的工具（其餘大部分）。但在危機爆發前，歐洲政界人士每次感覺出口受到威脅時就試圖口頭壓低歐元的習慣，屢屢讓美國同行笑着搖頭，後者將放任自流的“強勢美元”政策視爲美元儲備貨幣地位的一個要素。（當然，所有4種SDR貨幣區域都採取的量化寬鬆以及儘管沒有外匯干預卻伴隨而來的匯率大幅波動，會對市場信心產生怎樣的影響還有待觀察）。從現在開始到年底IMF做出關於SDR的決定前，中國很可能會保持名義人民幣兌美元匯率的穩定，但不大可能無限期地迴避使用各種形式的干預措施。

China has been moving, sometimes slowly and jerkily, towards turning the renminbi into a floating convertible currency and a reserve asset. The prospect of SDR membership may encourage that process, or at least help to lock in what progress has been made so far. But it seems unlikely, by and of itself, to make a material difference to whether renminbi-denominated assets become a major part of the world’s foreign exchange reserves in the medium term.

中國一直在朝着將人民幣轉變成一種自由浮動可兌換貨幣以及一種儲備貨幣的方向前進，雖然有時行動緩慢，腳步不穩。加入SDR的前景可能會鼓舞這一進程，或者至少有助於鞏固迄今取得的進展。但中期內要使人民幣資產成爲世界外匯儲備中的重要組成部分，單憑加入SDR這一點似乎不大可能起到什麼實質作用。