俄羅斯天然氣公司:受傷的巨人

THE good times for Gazprom once seemed like they would never end. The world’s largest natural-gas producer, founded out of the old Soviet gas ministry, enjoyed sky-high gas prices for years. The gas flowed along pipelines into Europe; the profits flowed back. Gazprom began work on a $1.9 billion headquarters in St Petersburg and acted as a bottomless wallet for Russia’s rulers. Whatever problems it encountered, it could “drown with money”, as Natalia Volchkova of the New Economic School in Moscow puts it.

曾經無人會相信俄羅斯天然氣公司的好時光會結束。這家全球最大的天然氣製造商，在前蘇聯天然氣部門的基礎上成立，數年來坐擁天價天然氣。天然氣通過管道涌入歐洲；利潤則從歐洲滾滾而來。俄天然氣公司投資19億美元在聖彼得堡建立公司總部，併成爲俄羅斯統治者取之不盡的大錢包。正如來自莫斯科新經濟學院的Natalia Volchkova所說：“無論遇到何種問題，該公司都能用錢擺平。”

All this is now under threat. Its ageing gasfields are in decline. Thanks to America’s shale boom, gas is more plentiful on the world market. Gazprom’s European customers are realising that they have other choices. The prices it can charge are falling, and with them the firm’s prospects.

而目前，所有這一切都在遭受威脅。很多氣田經過多年開採已經減產。多虧了美國頁岩氣開採量大增，保證了全球市場的燃氣充足。俄天然氣公司的歐洲客戶也開始意識到他們還有其他選擇。俄天然氣公司可收取的價格也不斷下跌，隨之而來的是公司利潤的縮減。

Years of easy money have made Gazprom fat and slow. It dominates its domestic market, producing 75% of Russia’s gas. It enjoys a monopoly over exports of the stuff. Until recently, it had a tight grip on western Europe, where it supplies around 25% of gas. It retains an even tighter grip on former Soviet-bloc countries in eastern Europe. For a long time, this insulated Gazprom from shifts in global gas markets.

多年來，俄天然氣公司輕而易舉地獲得鉅額利潤，導致公司結構臃腫，執行力緩慢。該公司主導國內市場，俄羅斯75%的天然氣產自該公司。同時，該公司也在出口上實行壟斷。直到最近，該公司一直都還緊緊掌握着西歐市場，西歐市場25%的天然氣來自該地區。同時，該公司在前蘇聯國家的東歐市場地位更是根深蒂固。長期以來，俄天然氣公司儼然與世隔絕，完全不受全球天然氣市場任何影響。

Gazprom is not a normal company. It serves two masters. As a firm that issues shares to outside investors, it should in theory strive to maximise profits in the long run. But since it is majority-owned by the Russian state, it pursues political goals, too.

俄天然氣公司並不是一家常規的公司。該公司同侍二主。作爲一家對外投資者發行股票的公司，理論上說，該公司應該致力於最大化長期利潤。但由於該公司大部分股權屬於俄羅斯政府，它也同時致力於實現政治目標。

In practice, it serves one master more assiduously than the other. As President Vladimir Putin consolidated his power in the early 2000s, he built Gazprom into a main instrument of Russia’s new state capitalism. He appointed allies to top positions. He used Gazprom as a tool of foreign policy, for example by cutting off gas supplies to Georgia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova during political rows.

實際上，該公司顯然更殷勤地爲其中一主效勞。早在本世紀初，普京總統鞏固其政權時，他將俄天然氣公司建立成爲俄羅斯新國家資本主義的主要工具。總統任命同僚爲該公司最高領導人。普京總統將俄天然氣公司打造成外交工具。在政治爭議期間，俄天然氣公司中斷了對格魯吉亞、烏克蘭、白俄羅斯和摩爾多瓦的天然氣供應。

Gazprom’s deep pockets have helped Mr Putin at home, too. It sells gas cheaply in Russia, so that the poor do not freeze in winter. Oddly for an energy company, it has bought television stations and newspapers, all of which are now friendly to the Kremlin. Mikhail Krutikhin of RusEnergy, a consultancy, says, “Gazprom has one manager: Putin.”

在國內，財力雄厚的俄天然氣公司也幫了普京總統大忙。該公司在國內以低價出售天然氣，從而保證貧困人口在冬天取暖。對於一家能源公司來說，收購電視臺和報紙的行爲實屬罕見，並且這些媒體現在對俄政府都十分友好。來自俄能源投資集團的顧問Mikhail Krutikhin說道：“俄天然氣公司只有一個老闆，那就是普京。”

With friends in high places, Gazprom has enjoyed low taxes and privileged access to gasfields. But its costs are startlingly high. It treats its executives generously: a 2008 tender, for example, included a solarium and a special bath for horses. It buys supplies in an idiosyncratic fashion, too. The Peterson Institute for International Economics, a think-tank, reckons that although Gazprom posted nominal profits of $46 billion in 2011, it lost $40 billion to corruption and inefficiency.

俄天然氣仗着身居政壇高位的朋友，享受着低稅政策，並且可優先開採天然氣田。但該公司的成本仍然高地令人瞠目結舌。該公司對其供應商出手特別大方：以2008年一家投標方爲例，採購內容爲馬匹所用的日光浴室和特殊的浴室。該公司採購的也是以特殊方式供應的產品。彼得森國際經濟研究所的一位智囊表示，雖然2011年俄天然氣公司公佈的名義利潤爲460億美元，但實際上，因腐敗和無作爲，該公司損失掉400億美元。

And some projects favoured by Mr Putin are of questionable economic value. For example, he is dead set on building a $21-billion South Stream pipeline between southern Russia and Austria via eastern Europe. This project has political appeal because it would bypass troublesome Ukraine as the main transit route for gas to Europe. But given weak prices and demand, it is “commercial idiocy”, says Mr Krutikhin. The opening in 2011 of Nord Stream, an offshore pipeline to Germany, was a diplomatic coup for Mr Putin, but it is still running far below capacity.

一些普京總統青睞的項目，經濟價值也遭到質疑。例如，他堅定不移致力於貫穿東歐，在俄羅斯南部和奧地利之間鋪設造價高達210億美元的南溪天然氣管道。這一項目具有政治誘惑力，因爲該項目將避開烏克蘭，該國使天然氣到達歐洲的主要中轉站，但同時也麻煩不斷的國家。但考慮到低廉的價格和疲軟的需求量，Krutikhin認爲這是一場“愚蠢的商業行爲”。繼而2011年北溪項目的開啓，鋪設通往德國的海底管道，也是普京總統的外交壯舉，但該項目運行仍遠未達到計劃產量。

These days, Gazprom is finding itself in an unfamiliar situation: it has more problems and less money with which to drown them. On March 4th its shares hit a four-year low. Investors reckon Gazprom is worth only a third as much as it was in 2008. By one broker’s calculation its market capitalisation of $110 billion is barely half the value of its assets.

最近，俄天然氣公司對自身處境也深感困惑：問題重重，資金越來越少。在今年3月4日，其股價跌至四年最低值。投資者認爲目前俄天然氣公司的價值僅爲2008年的三分之一。根據一位經紀人的預計，該公司1100億美元市值僅爲其資產總價值的一半。